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ABSTRACT
Residential mortgage lending has been guided by two axioms of neigh-
borhood analysis which generally classify urban neighborhoods as high risk.
One, the life cycle theory, maintains that neighborhoods as organisms pass
through stages of growth, maturity, and, at some point after 40 years, ine-
vitably decline. The other principle of neighborhood homogeneity argues
that social , economic and physical conformity maximizes property values.
Property values are not defined as market prices. Prices are to be
discounted by predictions made by the bank appraiser of the life cycle
stage and adverse influences in the neighborhood.
Mortgage risk research has generally focussed on individual loan
characteristics without further analysis as to whether neighborhood charac-
teristics do indeed contribute to mortgage delinquency and default. Thus,
the lender's emphasis on property appraisal as a key determinant of
mortgage risk has not previously been subject to much empirical analysis.
Analyses of metropolitan Boston data indicate that savings institu-
tions have placed considerable emphasis on property appraisal in loan
origination. An application on a property with a lower appraised dollar
value or a bank appraised value of less than the purchase price is more
likely to be approved as a federally insured loan, with coverage of 100
percent of the outstanding loan amount, than a conventional loan wherein
the lender assumes full risk. Subsequent experience with delinquency or
default, however, is best explained by the household financial resources
and the downpayment amount relative to the value of the property purchased.
Age of the loan is also key. For all households, the longer the loan has
been outstanding, the lower the probability of delinquency or default.
New forms of mortgage instruments and lending institutions have been
introduced in recent years. New instruments, such as the variable rate
mortgage, will require more stringent underwriting standards regarding the
borrower's ability to make higher payments as interest rates increase.
Access to home mortgage credit may thus decrease. New institutions intro-
duce their own portfolio risk considerations and, to date, appear to be
adopting the traditional anti-urban appraisal standards now abandoned by
the publicly regulated depository institutions.
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INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
Mortgage risk has traditionally been the exclusive concern of
actuaries, bankers, and a few academic researchers. In recent years,
however, public focus on urban reinvestment, fair housing, and equal access
to home mortgage credit has made this previously esoteric subject a matter
of more general public interest.
The major question raised by urban neighborhood groups and various
public agencies and consumer protection organizations is whether mortgage
underwriting standards used by lending institutions accurately reflect bad
business risks. Related issues are disinvestment and discrimination.
Banking industry representatives have generally maintained that their
loan policies and lending records in urban neighborhoods are a result, not
a cause, of the economics of the housing markets in these areas. Urban
housing problems are economic problems which stem from property owner
disinvestment, not from lack of available loan funds for property main-
tenance and improvement.
Community organizations, however, claim that by withholding capital
resources for which there is creditworthy demand, mortgage suppliers disin-
vest and, thus, contribute, rather than simply react, to decline. They
contend that anti-urban lending practices are often based not on economic
facts but on theoretical assumptions about types of borrowers, housing, and
neighborhoods.
In metropolitan Boston, confrontation between the savings institutions
as the major residential mortgage lenders in the region and urban neigh-
borhood organizations surfaced in 1974. In the spring of 1976, the Boston
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Urban Mortgage Review Board, a voluntary organization of bankers, community
leaders, and public officials was created.I The purpose of this Board,
similar to that of its counterparts in other major cities throughout the
country, was to address redlining problems through appeals made by individ-
ual homebuyers who had been denied mortgage loans at one of the parti-
cipating banks. After a number of cases had been reviewed by the Boston
Board, the participating banks publicly proclaimed that, indeed, no one of
them practiced redlining.2 The community organizations and public
officials, however, reached a very different conclusion. Several cases had
indicated that while participating institutions might not categorically
deny a mortgage application because of property location, a number of them
had policies which amounted to de facto redlining. Among these policies
and practices were:
mortgage terms on two- and three-family homes (the
prevalent type of housing stock in the cities)
less advantageous than those on single-family
homes (predominantly found in the suburbs) 3
urban properties valued at considerably less than
market prices of comparable sales on the basis of
predicted decline in property values even where
price trends had steadily increased for several
decades (thus discouraging applicants from pursu-
ing financing for a purchase and, cumulatively,
resulting in a negative impact on property values) 4
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loans denied because of the bank's assessment that
while a property was in good physical condition
that it was, regardless of what buyers were willing
to pay in arms-length transactions, "economically
obsolescent".5
Cumulatively, community leaders and public officials concluded that the
lenses through which some of the participating banks viewed urban
neighborhoods, both in their evaluation of particular properties and devel-
opment of underwriting standards were (1) formulated on inaccurate
theories, and (2) likely to serve as self-fulfilling prophecies in their
implementation. Participating bankers, however, maintained that these
policies were generally supportable insofar as they reflected an
institution's mortgage risk experience.
The analyses presented in the following chapters are an effort to pro-
vide some insight and further understanding of lending practices and home
mortgage risk. In the course of evaluating mortgage lending theory,
practice, and results of other risk research, two general themes evolve.
One is that "history matters". That is, socio-economic structure and orga-
nizational relationships change over time. Moreover, professional theory,
research, and practice reflect the various socio-economic contexts in which
they are developed. Second, "institutions matter". The "market" is shaped
by existing, new, and nascent institutions. Institutional economic and
non-economic agendas affect which theoretical perspectives are adopted as
operating principles and practices.
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TRADITIONAL APPRAISAL AND UNDERWRITING STANDARDS: APPLIED THEORIES OF
METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT
Chapter 1 examines the theories of metropolitan development on which
appraisal and underwriting standards traditionally used in residential
lending were formulated. There are two key assumptions in these theories
with regard to mortgage lending in urban areas. One is the principle of
neighborhood conformity in which homogeneity, that is, residents of com-
parable socio-economic status, race and ethnicity, and housing stock of
comparable age and type, are assumed to maximize residential property
values and, hence, minimize risk to the mortgage lender. Since the enact-
ment of federal and state civil rights legislation, professional appraisal
and underwriting textbooks have placed less emphasis on racial and ethnic
homogeneity. In fact, during the last few years, new editions of some of
these texts now emphatically discourage the use of this aspect of the homo-
geneity principle (Bloom and Harrison, 1978: 87-88). However, homogeneity
of housing types and socio-economic status of residents is still taken into
consideration by many public and private institutions. 6
The neighborhood life cycle theory is the other residential appraisal
principle with negative implications for urban mortgage lending. Under
this theory, a neighborhood is tantamount to an organism with an estimated
life of 40 years and with
a growth period of 10 years after the commencement of
new construction;
a mature and stable period for two or three decades; and,
a period of decay and decline at some point after the
homes are 40 or more years old.
This principle was formulated on the basis of early 20th century analyses
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of metropolitan growth in the United States which observed a "succession of
higher and better uses", i.e., lower density residential development
followed by more intensive commercial and industrial development of higher
value. While metropolitan development in the ensuing decades did not
follow these theoretical patterns, the neighborhood life cycle principles
have still been applied in residential appraising and underwriting. For
example, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac") created
by Congress in the early 1970's had, until recently, a provision in their
underwriting matrix which required special scrutiny for any mortgage in
which the age of the property plus the maturity of the loan exceeded 60
years. Many mortgage lenders have had policies similar to one adopted by
the largest savings bank in western Massachusetts in which mortgage appli-
cants were offered differential rates based on the age of the property pur-
chased. On a new home, applicants were offered a cut rate of 1 percent
below the going mortgage rate; on a home less than 30 years old, market
rate; on a home built prior to World War II, a "high risk" charge of 1 per-
cent above the market rate. Again, while some modifications have been made
in residential appraisal and underwriting practices in recent years, much
of this has focussed on neighborhood revitalization through reentry of
upper income households which is simply the life cycle theory in series:
Decline may cease when...there is an organized effort
to rejuvenate the neighborhood. This renewal period is
comparable to the original growth period. The life
cycle is then repeated with another period of stability
and a period of decline. (Bloom and Harrison, 1978: 102)
Thus, the neighborhood life cycle theory as a cipher used by the residen-
tial appraiser to assess the risk exposure to the mortgage lender is still
- 14 -
relatively intact. The only major modification in this theory has been the
introduction of neighborhood rebirth, that is, older housing stock recycled
to upper income occupants.
There has been very little change in this metropolitan development
gestalt of the residential lending industry since the 1920's and 1930's.
It was during these decades that both residential appraising and
underwriting were nationally institutionalized through federal and state
chartered savings and loan associations, federally administered mortgage
insurance and guarantee programs, and through the creation of private trade
associations of residential appraisers, brokers, and lenders. Once
institutionalized, theoretical formulation and practical application have
remained essentially intact.
NEWER PERSPECTIVES ON METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT
Metropolitan development perspectives of other professional
disciplines, particularly city planning and urban economics, espoused simi-
lar Social Darwinistic principles in the 1920's and 1930's. However, in
subsequent decades, these disciplines have offered alternative theories to
the evolutionary determinism of inevitable decline and to socio-economic
segregation in perpetuity. Chapter 2 reviews this literature for two
purposes. One is to provide some insight on the extent to which empirical
research and response to changing social attitudes and mores have led to
modification of professional theory, particularly in city planning. The
other purpose is to set forth metropolitan development theories formulated
by political economists which are fundamentally different from the essen-
tially deterministic theories to which the residential lending industry,
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city planning profession, and conservative and liberal economists
subscribe.
Many political economists engaged in spatial analysis maintain that
metropolitan development patterns are not preordained and inevitable but,
rather, the outcome of institutional investment patterns and
decision-making. To understand development patterns, one must examine the
configuration of institutions - banks, savings and loan associations, real
estate brokers and appraisers, government agencies, and so on -- which
shape the environment in which individual households seek housing and
financing through home mortgages. Thus, these alternative theoretical
perspectives suggest that one should not simply examine whether the theore-
tical principles applied by the residential lending industry are empiri-
cally valid, one should also assess the various institutions, their
financial constraints, economic objectives, and organizational
relationships. Analyses in subsequent chapters are formulated in terms of
institutional structures and their import vis-a-vis the analytical assump-
tions and approaches taken in mortgage risk research, the data generally
available for analysis, and incipient changes in mortgage instruments and
lending institutions.
ANALYSES OF MORTGAGE RISK: THE EMPIRICAL BASIS FOR APPRAISAL AND
UNDERWRITING PRACTICES
Chapter 3 reviews the research to date on the risk experience on one-
to-four family homes. Each study, the research approach and results, is
discussed in terms of the institutional sources of data and institutional
context in which it was conducted.
The first set of published mortgage risk studies in the United States
- 16 -
were those authored by federal government agency staff or consultants to
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or Veterans Administration (VA).
These studies, based exclusively on federally insured or guaranteed loans,
were performed for limited actuarial purposes. That is, they were designed
to assess whether (1) appraisal and underwriting criteria used at origina-
tion were effectively screening out any borrower, property, or neighborhood
characteristics systematically associated with higher risk loans, i.e.,
serious delinquencies and defaults, and (2) the mutual insurance fund ad-
ministered by FHA could be expected to remain sufficiently solvent, i.e.,
mortgage insurance premiums collected exceeded the sums required to compen-
sate private lenders for the outstanding mortgage amount on those loans
which had gone into default. The authors of these studies were not con-
cerned with those borrowers, types of property, or neighborhoods, which may
have been rejected through the underwriting criteria applied at origination
but which may not have been inherently riskier. Their objective was to
ascertain whether, among those mortgages granted, were there any which
should have been denied and, in terms of adverse effects on the FHA
insurance and VA guarantee programs overall, were there any considerable
number of loars likely to default?
A second series of studies, again based on federally insured or
guaranteed loan data, was directed at expanding the scope of borrowers
served by these publicly administered programs. Prior to 1968, both FHA
and VA had favored new construction over existing houses and had actively
discouraged lending in many urban neighborhoods, particularly predominantly
minority or racially mixed areas. Civil rights legislation enacted by
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Congress in 1968 prohibited public and private agencies from rejecting
mortgage applications on the basis of the race of the applicant or the
racial composition of the neighborhood. Congress also mandated in the
Housing Act of that year that the Federal Housing Administration undertake
an affirmative lending program in urban and minority neighborhoods and, to
assure adequate implementation, required that a Special High Risk Insurance
Fund and a homeownership subsidy program be created such that loans ineli-
gible for FHA's ongoing mortgage insurance funds could still be made.
Risk studies done in conjunction with this broadened mandate fall in
three categories. One, done by an outside researcher, analyzed FHA loan
data prior to 1968 in an effort to demonstrate to FHA officials that risk
determinants of their portfolio to date had been the equity investment made
by the borrower, not lower income households per se. A second set, also
done by outside researchers, analyzes the post-1968 experience from the
perspective of the recipients and residents of those neighborhoods which
were inundated with FHA-insured mortgages. Much of this literature,
comprised of case studies and survey research in urban neighborhoods-,
concludes that the high delinquency and default rates experienced were
largely attributable to the institutional behavior, i.e., poor administra-
tion on the part of FHA officials and private lenders at origination, in-
adequate servicing attention given to delinquent loans, and, in some
instances, fast foreclosure practices pursued by some private lenders as a
means to maximize their profits on these mortgages. One final study on
post-1968 data completed in-house by the Chief Statistician of the FHA was
directed at assessing FHA loans issued after 1968 and evaluating how the
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agency might contend with the growing competition from private mortgage
insurance companies.
A third type of study commissioned by the private mortgage insurance
companies (PMI's), had a set of actuarial objectives comparable to the
first set of in-house studies conducted by the federal agencies. While the
results of one major study of PMI's indicated that the loss incidence asso-
ciated with urban-based properties was actually less than that of suburban
properties, no recommendations were based as to how underwriting criteria
might be broadened to be more inclusive of borrowers purchasing types of
properties and/or in urban neighborhoods. The purpose of the study was
accomplished in demonstrating to two federally sponsored credit agencies,
the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation ("Freddie Mac"), that (1) PMI's were engaged
in actuarially sound loans, and (2) these agencies should expand their
institutional criteria for purchasing loans to include those made with pri-
vate mortgage insurance.
A fourth series of published mortgage risk studies have been conducted
by trade associations of private lenders. Historically, these studies were
prompted by a general economic recession in which member institutions have
experienced extraordinarily high rates of delinquency and default. Given
that these studies examine conventional loan data as well as loans made
with private or federal insurance, the data available to these researchers
are more representative of the general mortgage risk experience.
Unfortunately, most of the research simply compiled rudimentary statistics
and few examined urban property or neighborhood characteristics so as to be
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able to offer their membership some insight on any risk experience asso-
ciated with either. In recent years, trade associations have commissioned
research directed at assessing the risk implications of regulatory enforce-
ment of various civil rights, equal credit, and anti-redlining
provisions. One of these studies, based on New York savings bank data in
seven metropolitan areas, provides some particularly useful insights on the
factors used by savings institutions in deciding whether to accept or
reject a mortgage application.
The fifth series, performed by university-based researchers, is a
diverse set of risk studies. Each of these were based on whatever data the
individual analysts could obtain from a private lending institution and,
thus, are generally based on limited data. These studies offer a range of
theoretical perspectives from those who accept the mortgage market as rela-
tively perfect with funds adequately supplied to meet creditworthy demand
and only adjustments in terms (e.g., higher interest rates required by the
lender to compensate for somewhat higher risks associated with the
borrower, the type of property, or the neighborhood) to those concerned
with broadening the range of borrowers, properties, and neighborhoods eli-
gible for conventional mortgage financing.
The final section of Chapter 3 is devoted to the public regulatory
requirements which have shaped savings institutions since the 1930's as the
primary source of residential mortgage funds. Historically, the emphasis
of regulatory agencies has been exclusively on "safety and soundness".
Annual examinations were concerned not with the scope of borrowers and
neighborhoods served or mortgage credit services provided, but with the
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institution's track record at minimizing serious deli.nquencies or defaults
in their mortgage portfolio. In other words, for several decades, public
regulatory agencies encouraged savings institutions to pursue exclusively
risk averse objectives without regard for those creditworthy consumers who
may have been systematically denied credit. Since the 1960's, however,
bank regulatory agencies have been mandated to enforce various civil rights
and consumer protection laws and thus broaden their limited focus. Two key
pieces of legislation in this transition have been Equal Credit Opportunity
Act passed in 1972 and the Community Reinvestment Act passed in 1978. Loan
underwriting criteria applied to all types of consumer credit applications,
including residential mortgages can no longer be justified simply on the
grounds that they have been effectively applied in the past to maintain an
actuarially sound loan portfolio. Any criteria which may have a
disproportionate, and thus potentially discriminatory effect on a class of
borrower, a type of housing, or a neighborhood, must be justified by the
institution as so demonstrably riskier that the use of these criteria
constitutes a business necessity.
MORTGAGE RISK IN METROPOLITAN BOSTON: A CASE ANALYSIS OF CONVENTIONAL AND
FEDERALLY INSURED LOAN EXPERIENCE
Chapter 4 provides an empirical assessment of the residential loan
risk perceptions and experience in one major metropolitan area. This
chapter presents several analyses.
Initially, an assessment is made of the loan data available. This
includes an evaluation of possible biases introduced through the mortgage
application process at banking institutions and of the sampling methodology
which may have some skewing effects and, thus, should be taken into con-
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sideration in the interpretation of any analytical results. For those
borrower, property, loan, neighborhood, and bank characteristics for which
sufficient data were available, an assessment is also made of the relative
statistical strength, the distribution and frequency of these factors.
Next, two series of analyses are formulated. The first is an effort
to identify those borrower, property, lender, and possible neighborhood
characteristics which determine the probability of an applicant receiving a
conventional or federally insured loan. 8 These analyses are focussed on
the mortgage risk evaluations made by the lender at the loan organization.
The second analyzes which factors known to the lender at origination dif-
ferentiate delinquencies and defaults from those loans which remain paid up.
Over the past several decades, savings institutions in metropolitan
Boston have been actively engaged in making both conventional and federally
insured loans on one-to-four family homes. Since federal mortgage
insurance programs were designed to encourage these institutions to lend to
borrowers without sufficient financial resources to make the equity invest-
ment required for conventional loans, federally insured homebuyers have
generally been considered higher risk.
The results of the first series of analyses, however, indicate that
the decision to grant one type of loan or the other has generally not been
based on risk issues associated with the financial resources of the
borrower. The bank's appraisal of the value of the property to be financed
appears to have had a pronounced effect on loan type decisions. The lower
the dollar amount of this appraisal, the greater the likelihood of a
federally insured loan. Also, loans where this appraisal was less than the
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corresponding purchase price that the homebuyer was willing to pay for the
property tended to be federally insured.
Of the financial factors for which banks obtained information on the
loan applicant, household income, measured in terms of dollars earned
divided by the number of persons supported by that income, was not an
important consideration influencing the lender's loan type decision. Only
one household financial factor, installment debt derived from non-mortgage
loans such as personal loans or car loans appeared to have any marginal
effect on this decision. As monthly installment debt, measured as a per-
centage of monthly earnings, increased, the likelihood of receiving a con-
ventional loan decreased somewhat.
Finally, of the institutional lender characteristics, the deposit size
of the bank appeared to have a strong influence on the type of loan
granted, regardless of household finances or other characteristics of the
loan. In other words, if the same borrowers were to apply for a mortgage
at two different banks, they would be more likely to receive a conventional
loan at the smaller bank.
The second series of risk analyses based on loan status (current,
delinquent, or default) concluded that mortgage risk is generally difficult
to predict at the time of loan origination. However, household financial
resources relative to the property purchased and to other installment debt
appear to be most important as determinants of mortgage delinquency and
default risk.
Default, the most serious type of risk, occurs when the borrower has
stopped making mortgage payments altogether, usually for a period of three
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months or more. Factors found most strongly related to default are: the
age of the loan, the amount of the loan relative to the bank appraised
value of the property, and regular earnings per capita. Age of loan, that
is, the number of months a loan has been outstanding, is critical as
defaults tend to occur within the first five years of the loan for both
conventional and federally insured. Among conventional loans, the higher
the loan amount as a percentage of the bank appraised value, the greater
the likelihood of default. On federally insured loans, loan to value
ratios were generally high and, thus, this factor did not serve to
distinguish defaults from non-defaults within this loan type. For both
loan types, the higher the household income per capita, the lower the like-
lihood of default. It should be noted that this does not refer to house-
hold income per se, but to total income divided by the persons supported by
that income.
Delinquencies, loans in which the borrower has failed to make one or
more monthly mortgage payments, do not initially impose substantial risks
of loan losses or administrative expenses to the lender. Subsequently, a
borrower may either make up these overdue payments or continue in arrears
and go into default. The three factors identified as determinants of
default risk -- loan age, loan to value ratio, and regular earnings per
capita -- were also significant factors associated with delinquency risk.
In addition, installment debt to earnings and refinancing are important
determinants of delinquency but not default. For both conventional and
federally insured loans, the higher the monthly debt on personal loans or
auto loans relative to household income, the greater the likelihood of
- 24 -
delinquency. Among conventionals, refinanced loans tend to be more prone
to delinquency than loans originally made to purchase the property.9
In both the first and second series of risk analyses, property
characteristics, neighborhood characteristics, and nonfinancial attributes
of the borrower were evaluated after statistically controlling for the
influence of financial characteristics of the household and loan terms. 10
Given that, as discussed in Chapter 1, traditionally residential appraisal
and underwriting criteria have placed considerable emphasis on these non-
financial factors, to what extent (1) have metropolitan Boston savings
institutions used these factors in their original underwriting decision
between conventional and federally insured loans, and (2) have these fac-
tors subsequently proved to be important determinants of delinquency and
default?
Property and neighborhood characteristics for which sufficient data
were available by census tract or zip code area for analysis included:
.- the number of units (single versus two-to-four family);
. property location (urban versus suburban);
. average household income in the neighborhood;
. proportion of minority residents in the area; and,
. percentage of older residential structures.
In the first series of analyses on the lender's origination decision, most
of these property and neighborhood characteristics bore some relationship
to this decision but were overshadowed by bank appraised value. As
discussed in Chapter 1, traditional appraisal practice has been to arrive
at an estimate of value which incorporates any negative property and neigh-
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borhood factors by lowering the appraised value. Only the most recent
appraisal textbooks have rejected such practices concluding that
A house is an integral part of its neighborhood...
its market value is affected substantially by the
neighborhood in which it is located....The primary
purpose of neighborhood analysis is to identify the
geographic area which is subject to the same influ-
ences as the property being appraised. Prices paid
for comparable properties in the defined area theo-
retically reflect the positive and negative influ-
ences of the particular neighborhood....LIJt would
be incorrect to adjust value for neighborhood influ-
ences because these influences can be assumed to be
reflected in the observed market prices. (Emphasis
added.) (Bloom and Harrison, 1978: 85)
In metropolitan Boston data based on the past several decades, appraised
value as a factor appears to incorporate the bank's assessment of neigh-
borhood factors. Some evidence of this is also provided by the fact that
loan applications where appraised value is markedly below the purchase
price tend to be awarded federally insured loans.
The second series of analyses on determinants of delinquency and
default risk indicate that savings institutions which have not modified
their appraisal and underwriting emphasis on property and characteristics,
as recommended in texts published by major trade associations such as the
one quoted above, may be well advised to do so, particularly for conven-
tional loans. After controlling for household financial characteristics
and loan terms, none of the property or neighborhood characteristics nor
appraised value of the property were important for conventional loans. For
federally insured loans, the overall results were extremely weak.
Household financial and other economic data available were inadequate in
explaining much of the variation in risk outcomes of these loans. Number
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of units and proportion of minorities indicated some marginal association
with risk outcomes, but none were sufficiently significant to account for
much of any federally insured loan risk. Either delinquency and default
outcomes on these loans are more random occurrences than conventional loans
or the factors for which data were available were particularly inadequate
for this loan type. Research in other metropolitan areas on lender and
investor behavior on loans with full risk coverage provided by the federal
government has concluded that no risk exposure on the part of the lender
often means inadequate servicing provided to assist borrowers in arrears
and, ultimately, higher risks assumed by the borrower as the lender is less
concerned about default on loans for which the full loan amount outstanding
can be recouped from the federal government.
In sum, the conventional loan status outcomes indicate that economic
data on the household, rather than non-financial borrower attributes and
property or neighborhood characteristics, provide the soundest information
on risk probabilities associated with an individual mortgage. Federally
insured loan status outcomes are either more random occurrences than their
conventional counterparts or the factors for which data were available were
particularly inadequate for this loan type.
Findings in these analyses are limited to the extent that they are
based on loans which metropolitan Boston savings institutions decided to
originate as conventional or federally insured mortgages. These analyses
are predicated on assumptions that (1) lenders are most averse to default
as they must recoup the loan amount outstanding through means other than a
repayment schedule with the borrower; and (2) lenders seek to avoid loan
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commitments to applicants likely to be delinquent as they may either
default or, as chronic delinquents, impose substantial servicing costs. If
one subscribes to liberal or structuralist theories of housing markets,
underwriting practices of these mortgage suppliers may have had con-
siderable influence on the household mortgage demand which is the subject
of these analyses. Despite the limited data base and limitations of such
analyses, the analytical approach developed in this chapter offers a foun-
dation on which subsequent research directed at testing assumptions made in
mortgage underwriting may be further developed.
TOWARD ALTERNATIVE LENDING POLICIES: REFORM AMIDST UPHEAVAL IN RESIDENTIAL
MORTGAGE MARKETS
Chapter 5 introduces a new series of mortgage risk considerations.
One set of risk factors is introduced by the alternatives to the fixed-rate
mortgage instrument currently being implemented by savings institutions
nationally. A second set of risk considerations is related to new institu-
tional sources of mortgage funds. To what extent will these institutions,
which are subject to less public scrutiny and regulatory authority adopt
and perpetuate anti-urban underwriting standards?
Analyses in the preceding chapters focus primarily on individual loan
risks associated with one type of mortgage instrument -- the fixed-rate
long-term mortgage introduced in the 1930's. Empirical research in
Chapters 3 and 4 is limited to this mortgage instrument since it has been
the only one commonly used by savings institutions and other mortgage ori-
ginators over the past several decades. However, since the mid-1960's,
thrift industry interest in alternative mortgage instruments such as the
variable rate mortgage and five-year renegotiable mortgage has increased.
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These alternative instruments would enable savings institutions to better
match assets with short-term liabilities, and, thus, minimize their port-
folio risk.
Alternative mortgage instruments introduced by savings institutions in
the past several years generally assume that household financial resources
either (a) are presently adequate to cover any increase in monthly mortgage
payments, or (b) will increase over time. Only a few researchers have ven-
tured to assess the impact on lenders if household finance resources do not
increase commensurately or, conversely, the impact on households if lenders
make loan origination requirements more stringent in anticipation of
increasing monthly mortgage payments. Moreover, little analysis is devoted
to the importance of the seasoning effects in reducing loan risk. As indi-
cated in Chapter 4 and the risk literature reviewed in Chapter 3, loans
aged five years or more are the least likely to default. If this seasoning
effect is attributable simply to track record of repayment, alternative
mortgage instruments may not introduce a new set of portfolio risks.
However, if these effects result from fixed mortgage payments relative to
stable or a rising household income, new portfolio risk factors, yet to be
considered in the alternative instrument literature, may be introduced.
Risk implications of new institutional investors ir, residential
mortgages are also examined in Chapter 5. The growth in the mortgage
securities markets, both through mortgage-backed bonds and pass-through
certificates, has introduced a new set of investors with potentially dif-
ferent set of portfolio risk considerations from the savings institutions.
Moreover, the underwriting standards adopted by these institutional
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investors have raised some concern where they appear to adopt traditional
anti-urban lending standards. For example, the Standard and Poor rating
report published in 1978 and used by many of these institutional investors
states:
A two-to-four unit dwelling, even if owner-occupied
is partly an investment property and as such the payment
record has been inferior to that of single family homes
where the owner's emotional attachment contributes to
the excellent payment record on these properties. There-
fore, we prefer loans...on one-family properties.
(Standard and Poor, 1978: 15)
Thus, Chapter 5 examines both the mortgage instruments and institutional
investors on the horizon in an effort to assess how research on mortgage
risk myths and realities of the past may be brought to bear on mortgage
credit availability in the future.
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NOTES TO INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
The Boston Urban Mortgage Review Board was comprised of six voting
members, three savings bankers and three community leaders from urban
neighborhood organizations. There were also two ex officios, the Banking
Commissioner and a representative of the Mayor of Boston. Originally,
there were twelve participating savings banks, the largest residential
mortgage lenders in the city; subsequently, most of the smaller cooperative
banks joined as well.
2Originally used to refer to areas delineated on a map in red crayon
where bankers would refuse to lend, "redlining" is a term now applied to
lending practices which may be less overt but which may discriminate
against urban neighborhoods in favor of suburbs.
3At the inception of the Mortgage Review Board, this was the stated
policy of the Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, the second largest savings
institution in Massachusetts.
4There were a series of cases before the Mortgage Review Board where
appraised values were as low as 50 percent of the sales of neighboring
homes of identical design and construction.
5Cases before the Review Board included situations in which a savings
bank would refuse to lend any amount on the grounds that while there was
some market for the property, its true economic value was zero.
6See, for example, the FHA, FNMA, and FHLMC appraisal manuals and lead
articles by F. Gregory Opelka in the Savings and Loan News.
7See references to empirical work on post-World War II development in
Chapter 1. Even during earlier decades when these theories were developed,
empirical analysis (e.g., Davie, 1932 in Hat and Reis, 1951) questioned
these assumptions.
8Federally insured loans, most of which are now made under programs of
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) are not particularly advantageous
for the borrower. Clearly, if borrowers do not have the funds to make a
large enough downpayment to qualify for a conventional loan, an insured
loan may be the only means through which they can purchase a home.
However, for those borrowers who may qualify for a conventional loan, pos-
sible disadvantages of a lender deciding to grant only a federally insured
loan include: higher costs of dual processing of the loan by both the
lender and the insuring agency; mortgage insurance premium charges of one-
half percent on the outstanding loan amount; "points" levied on the seller
as well as those charged to the homebuyer (which in recent years may be no
greater than those charged on conventional loans); and considerable time
delays often associated with obtaining final loan approval. Thus, there
are no financial incentives for an applicant qualified for conventional
financing to pursue a federally insured loan.
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9This may occur because refinancing is an indicator that a household
needs additional funds (and by refinancing can realize the dollars accumu-
lated through principal repayment and appreciation in the property value).
Also, refinancing may have been initiated by the bank on a previously
delinquent loan as a means of extending the period over which past and
future mortgage payments are due.
10The borrower attributes examined included age, occupational
prestige, employment status, sex and marital status of the primary wage
earner. Data on race of borrower were inadequate for analysis.
Information was missing in 75 percent of the cases selected for final
analysis. Whether the household income was provided by one or two or more
wage earners was also assessed. None of these factors were generally
important in predicting risk outcomes. Only occupational prestige showed
any relationship to conventional loan status -- the higher the prestige of
the primary wage earner, the lower the probability of delinquency or
default. Multiple wage earners, contrary to conventional wisdoms held by
some segments of the mortgage lending industry in the past, actually appear
to be less prone to delinquency than single wageearner households.
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CHAPTER 1
TRADITIONAL APPRAISAL AND UNDERWRITING STANDARDS:
APPLIED THEORIES OF METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
A residential mortgage application is evaluated by the lender on the
basis of two types of risk, one related to the financial soundness of the
loan and the other related to the value of the subject property which is to
serve as collateral security. While the weight given to either con-
sideration varies from lender to lender, traditionally substantial emphasis
has been placed on the value of the property, as determined by the real
estate appraiser employed by the lender.
The appraiser is responsible for estimating the value of the home. To
do so, the appraiser begins by applying one or more of three methods: the
market method, which compares the sales prices of similar properties; the
income method, which bases value on the rental income of the property; and,
the replacement method, which sets the value at the cost of rebuilding the
house. The initial estimates of value arrived at through any one of these
three methods may be adjusted on the basis of the "as is" physical con-
dition of the property and the cost of capital improvements necessary or
desirable in the near term. Subsequently, this initial estimate may be
further modified by a negative prognosis for future trends in value in the
neighborhood where the property is located. 1
Valuation of property thus influences the mortgage lending process in
two ways. First, on specific mortgage loan applications, a lender may
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either reject a loan or approve it only with modifications indicative of a
higher degree of estimated risk, such as a larger downpayment, higher
interest rate, or shorter repayment period. Second, as a matter of general
loan underwriting policies, any of these modifications in loan terms may be
categorically required based upon a lender's assessment of certain classes
of properties or neighborhoods as inherently riskier. For example, larger
downpayments have been required for two-to-four-family, as opposed to
single-family, properties by some Boston area institutions. Other banks
have simply refused to even consider applications on any but single-family
property (Taggart, Smith, Phenix, 1977). As documented in a study done
for the New York Banking Department on Rochester, New York, financial
institutions collectively required shorter repayment periods on the basis
of the age of the property (Benston, 1977). Differential interest rates
have been charged, for example, by a major urban bank in Springfield,
Massachusetts where mortgages made on properties built before 1945 were
charged 1 percent above market rates as a matter of policy.
Mortgage underwriting standards of individual institutions histori-
cally have not been accessible to the consumer or researcher. However, the
manuals of professional appraiser associations and of federal agencies
engaged as mortgage insurers and purchasers through the secondary market
are available. These serve to elucidate the theoretical framework as well
as the practical application of property and locational criteria used by
the mortgage loan industry.
This chapter examines the origins and development of residential
appraisal theory and practice at the turn of this century in the United
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States. Early treatises of a mortgage banker in New York City and that of
sociologists at the University of Chicago applied the principles of Social
Darwinism to metropolitan development. These principles have served as the
theoretical framework for much of the residential appraisal literature in
subsequent decades. In the 1930's, these principles were institutionalized
in training handbooks and textbooks of professional appraisal societies and
in the underwriting manuals of the mortgage insurance programs administered
by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). While there have been con-
siderable revisions in these documents over the past 50 years, the basis
for the appraisal of the neighborhood in which the property is located has
remained essentially the same. Understanding the historical and institu-
tional context in which this theoretical framework was formulated is essen-
tial to assess its empirical validity and applicability to mortgage risk
issues in metropolitan areas today.
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF MORTGAGE APPRAISAL THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES
Origins: The Work of a Mortgage Banker in the Early 1900's
The basic theorems of metropolitan growth applied to real estate
appraisal were initially formulated by Richard M. Hurd in his book
Principles of City Land Values first published in 1903. As a mortgage
banker, Hurd stated his reasons for writing such a book as follows:
"When placed in charge of the Mortgage Department of the
U.S. Mortgage & Trust Co. in 1895 the writer searched in
vain, both in England and this country, for books on the
science of city real estate as an aid in judging values.
Finding in economic books merely brief references to city
land and elsewhere only fragmentary articles, the plan arose
to outline the theory of the structure of cities and to
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state the average scales of land values produced by dif-
ferent utilities within them.
The material for this study of the structure of cities --
including their locations, starting points and lines of
growth -- has been gathered from a large number of local
histories of American cities, old maps, commercial
geographies, etc.
The material for the study of average scales of values has
been drawn from the mass of valuations of land and buildings,
rentals and mortgages, obtained in about fifty cities in the
course of the mortgage business of the U.S. Mortgage & Trust
Co. and also from many visits to these cities.
The viewpoint is that of a conservative lender on real
estate, and, while the examples cited are chiefly from the
smaller cities, it is believed that the principles stated
are universal and differ only in application and in
resulting combinations." (Hurd, 1924: v)
These premises reflect both the historical and institutional context
in which they were formulated. Practically speaking, business firms such
as Hurd's were financing the rapid expansion and real estate development in
urban centers outside the northeastern United States. Mortgage investment
decisions were no longer limited to local real estate markets familiar to
the lender. Universal principles of metropolitan development offered a
means to systematize and rationalize the process by which real estate
financing decisions could be made on a national basis. This practical
perspective was reinforced by more generally held concepts that universal
laws of evolution could be applied to society as they had been to physical
phenomenon in the natural sciences. In this context, Hurd's quest for a
"science of real estate" predicated on laws of metropolitan evolution was
simply a practical application of the social science of that period.
The laws of metropolitan evolution which Hurd arrived at in this
treatise may be summarized as follows:
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"Cities originate at their most convenient point
of contact with the outer world.... The point of
contact differs according to the methods of
transportation, whether by water, by turnpike or
by railroad";
"Growth in cities consists of movement away from
the point of origin in all directions, except as
topographically hindered.... Central growth takes
place both from the heart of the city and from
each subcentre of attraction and axial growth
railroads, turnpikes, and street railroads";
"Residences are early driven to the circumfer-
ence, while business remains at the centre, and
as residences divide into various social grades,
retail shops of corresponding grades follow them
and wholesale shops in turn follow the retailers
...and the banking and office section remains at
the main business centre." (Hurd, 1924: 13, 14,
15)
Hurd perceived that "all value in city land undergoes a continual evolution
from a state of non-existence (i.e. non-urban) through a cycle of changes"
to higher and better uses (Hurd, 1924: 17). He concluded that metropolitan
growth would continue contiguous to transport routes with an ever expanding
commercial and industrial core.
With specific regard to residential development, Hurd postulated that
"there will be as many residence neighborhoods in a city as there are
social strata". He saw this tendency to speciate as being "in harmony with
the law of evolution, that increasing differentiation is accompanied by
increased integration" (Hurd, 1924: 78, 82). Hurd also equated social sta-
tus of the residents with property values:
"The value of residence land varies directly according
to the social standing of its occupants.... The ultimate
aim in residence location is to be as close as possible
to those of highest social position.... Business property
is selected by the man from an economic standpoint
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and residence property by the woman from a social
standpoint." (ibid.)
Thus, residential growth in a metropolis would be directed by the gravita-
tional pull of the upper class neighborhoods in outlying areas. Commercial
retail development would follow the residential population served. The
central business district would continue to expand and push these lower
order uses away from premium locations at the core of the metropolis.
Hurd's laws of metropolitan evolution are an amalgamation of two
schools of nineteenth century thought: one, social Darwinism; the other,
value theory promoted by some early economists over the subsequently domi-
nant utility theory. The importance of social Darwinism applied to land
use patterns in the metropolis was that it provided real estate investors
with laws of spatial determinism to guide and to justify their investment
decisions. Financing real estate transactions on residential development
in outlying areas would be encouraged as that development would house the
better socio-economic stratum of society. By virtue of creating value
through the conversion of non-urban land to urban (or suburban) uses, these
were likely to be speculative and profitable investment. Conversely,
financing commercial and industrial expansion in the developed urban areas
would be recommended as these uses were appropriately situated in the urban
core. However, investment in existing residential properties, particularly
those in proximity to the urban core, would not be advisable, as these pro-
perties would be occupied by lower order social groups and, in accordance
with the laws of metropolitan evolution, residential land uses in these
areas would be inevitably supplanted by higher and better commercial or
industrial uses.2
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An essential corollary to the application of these laws of spatial
determinism is an economic theory of ideal value in which value is defined
in terms of future highest and best use (Weimar, 1960: 471). The applica-
tion of the ideal value theory to real estate practice permitted appraisers
to deviate considerably from market prices of property in their assessment
of value. Market prices were viewed as only one indicator of future value.
Subscribing to this platonic theory in which prices were only a shadow of
true value, Hurd and subsequent appraisal theorists rejected the prevailing
objective theory of value in which "value was defined as the ratio of
exchange between goods and services", or market price (Weimar, 1960: 471).
In this respect, twentieth century real estate appraisers adopted theories
of value which had largely been rejected by economists by the end of the
nineteenth century. Appraisers would argue that their departure from
generally accepted economic theory was well founded in that the long term
nature of real property and real estate investment, unlike many other eco-
nomic goods, made future rather than present value paramount.3 Critics,
however, would maintain that appraisers were no more omniscient than those
engaged in real estate transactions. Appraisers were simply discounting
market prices which buyers and sellers had already adequately discounted.
Nonetheless, the ideal theory of value as Hurd applied it to real
estate appraisal, remained intact. This, combined with his application of
the principles of social Darwinism to metropolitan development, formed the
basis of residential appraisal theory and practice for decades.
Academicians, particularly the Urban Ecologists at the Chicago School of
Sociology, further developed the laws of spatial determinism in metropoli-
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tan evolution. Practicing appraisers, particularly those based in Chicago
who were actively engaged in the creation of national professional
appraisal societies headquartered in that city and in the development of
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), continued to build on Hurd's
axioms of spatial determinism and ideal value.
The School of Urban Ecology and Its Disciples
In 1916, a sociologist at the University of Chicago, Robert E. Park,
published an article in the American Journal of Sociology in which the
theoretical premises of an urban ecology, the natural patterns of spatial
distribution in the urban environment, were set forth (Park, 1916).
Subsequently, Park and his academic associates, Ernest W. Burgess and
Roderick D. McKenzie, developed specific theories of neighborhood evolution
within a metropolis. These theories were largely defined in terms of plant
ecology. Central city neighborhoods were successively "infiltrated" by
lower user groups and, subsequently, "higher and better commercial and
industrial uses" supplanted residential uses altogether (Park, Burgess, and
McKenzie, 1925).
According to the ideal urban form postulated by Park's associate,
Burgess, there were a series of five concentric zones. The first zone,
which served as a common center, was the central business district. The
second, "zone in transition" adjoined the first and was allowed to
deteriorate as its primary value was speculative based on future expansion
of the central business district. The third zone was labeled "the zone of
workingmen's homes"; the fourth, one of "better residences"; and, the
fifth, the "commuter's zone" which housed the well-to-do (Reissman, 1970:
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105-107).
This theory of urban ecology was the subject of empirical studies on a
number of metropolitan areas in the United States. The most comprehensive
of these, authored by Maurice Davie, was based on direct observation of
spatial patterns in New Haven and a careful study of land use maps of 20
other cities in the United States and Canada. Contrary to the Urban
Ecologists' quest for universal principles of metropolitan evolution, Davie
concluded that the spatial patterns of the urban areas examined varied
considerably. The only unifying principles of development identified in
his research were:
"(1) a central business district, irregular in size but
more square or rectangular than circular, (2) commercial
land use extending out the radial streets and concen-
trating at certain points to form sub-centers, (3) indus-
try located near the means of transportation by water or
rail, wherever in the city this may be -- and it may be
anywhere, (4) low-grade housing near the industrial and
transportation areas, and (5) second- and first-class
housing anywhere else..." (Davie quoted in Riessman,
1970: 108)
Other empirical research included studies of Cleveland (Green, 1932), Long
Beach, California (Longmoor and Young, 193 ), St. Paul (Schmid, 1937),
Seattle (Schmid, 1944) and a sixteen-city study (Bartholomew, 1932). From
the results of these studies and his own work, Davie maintained that "there
is no universal pattern, not even of an 'ideal' type" (Javie, 1951: 259).
Nonetheless, the quest for a universal urban spatial pattern of devel-
opment continued beyond Burgess' concentric circle theory. The most
notable of these subsequent theories was Homer Hoyt's sector analysis.
Hoyt maintained that metropolitan development occurred in wedge-shaped
- 41 -
sectors, with high rent neighborhoods attracting middle-income households,
leaving low-income households in the core areas (Hoyt, 1939). Hoyt
generally described the metropolitan housing market in terms of "push"
forces, or "infiltration of lower user" groups, and "pull" forces, or
attraction of groups of more modest means into higher rent areas (Hoyt,
1933).
Practical Application of Urban Ecology Theories
Much of the work of urban ecologists is likely to have had a limited
readership, largely among academic social scientists, were it not for the
fact that practitioners published professional textbooks which applied
these theoretical perspectives, particularly the neighborhood life cycle
and conformity principles. One of the more prolific publishing prac-
titioners was a Cleveland real estate broker, Stanley L. McMichael.
In 1923, McMichael co-authored a work entitled City Growth and Values
(McMichael and Bingham). In this text, he offered a practical means for
the appraiser to apply the life cycle theory through historical documen-
tation and visual surveys of retail district development. In Chapter 14,
entitled "Shifting Business Districts: Change in Location a Natural Law of
Growth taking From 10 to 40 Years", McMichael provides the appraiser with
three case examples -- Cleveland (1820-1920); Los Angeles (1900-1923); and
New York City (1910-1923) -- in which he correlates the shifts in prime
retail locations with the shifts in prime residential locations.
In this first and subsequent texts, McMichael also provides the prac-
ticing appraiser with a means to apply the principles of neighborhood
conformity. Over the decades in which McMichael's Appraisal Manual was
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revised and republished, civil rights legislation and court decisions made
it somewhat more difficult to adhere to social conformity, i.e., ethnic and
racial homogeneity, principles. Prior to his work in the 1920's, the U.S.
Supreme Court had struck down a Kentucky state law prohibiting Negro occu-
pancy of areas not already inhabited by Negroes. As an alternative,
McMichael and his co-author recommended the use of racially restrictive
covenants or informal agreements among neighborhood homeowner associations
(McMichael and Bingham, 1923: 181). In 1948, the court further decided
that racially restrictive covenants could exist as private agreements be-
tween homeowners but that they could not be enforced by the courts. At this
point, McMichael introduced a new chapter to his appraising manual entitled
"Racial Covenants" in which he strongly advocates the use of such covenants
as the best means to assure maximum property values (McMichael, 1951:
156-163). To reinforce his position, McMichael draws heavily from Homer
Hoyt's One Hundred Years of Land Values in Chicago as a "comprehensive sur-
vey of the infiltration of foreigners into that city...[and of] the effect
of racial and national movements upon Chicago land values". (McMichael,
1951: 159). As a practical reference for the appraiser to assess the rela-
tive impact of racial and ethnic groups on land values, McMichael recom-
mends a ranking system in which each group is identified, in descending
order, from those considered most desirable to those which have the most
adverse effect on property values:
(1) English, German, Scotch, Irish, Scandinavian
(2) North Italians
(3) Bohemians or Czechs
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(4) Poles
(5) Lithuanians
(6) Greeks
(7) Russians, Jews (lower class)
(8) South Italians
(9) Negroes
(10) Mexicans
In the most recent revised edition of his manual, McMichael who by then had
moved from Cleveland to California suggested this same ranking system with
the addition of Japanese and Chinese (1975).
As an eminent practitioner and author, McMichael's adherence to the
life cycle and conformity principles of urban ecology was not only influen-
tial but also indicative of the extent to which professional appraisers
continued to subscribe to these theoretical principles which were for-
mulated in the 1920's and essentially unmodified in the following decades.
In fact, apart from individual publications, such as those authored by
McMichael, national associations of appraisers were instituted in the
1930's. These associations not only published textbooks but also sponsored
courses and professional licensing exams based on these instructional
materials. Thus, some degree of uniformity was achieved in the training of
professional fee appraisers and staff appraisers employed by mortgage len-
ders throughout the United States.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF MORTGAGE LOAN APPRAISAL AND UNDERWRITING PRINCIPLES
Overview
The theories of value and the laws of evolution of the metropolis
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applied by residential appraisal and underwriting practices appear to have
remained essentially intact since the 1930's when they were initially
institutionalized. Chicago served as the spawning ground for national real
estate industry associations with professional appraisal societies as sub-
sidiary affiliates. Two prominent appraisal organizations were formed at
that time. One, the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers
(A.I.R.E.A.) was created as an adjunct of the National Association of Real
Estate Boards (now known as the National Association of Realtors). The
other, the Society of Real Estate Appraisers (S.R.E.A.) was created under
the U.S. Savings and Loan League.
Another institution created in the 1930's, the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA), was instrumental in the development of residential
appraisal and underwriting practices. Created as a measure to stabilize
the home mortgage market during the Depression, the FHA generated manuals
and texts which subsequently became a mortgage lending industry standard.
Key administrators in the formative years of the FHA were well versed in
the life cycle and conformity principles of urban ecology. The adoption of
these principles by the FHA thus sanctioned their application in private
appraisal practice as a matter of public policy for several decades.
Professional Appraisal Societies Develop Within National Organizations of
Savings and Loan Associations and Real Estate Brokers
Residential appraisal as a profession grew in response to needs of
real estate brokers and institutional investors engaged in facilitating or
financing real property transactions. Both the A.I.R.E.A. and the S.R.E.A.
developed textbooks to be used in their training courses and as preparation
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4for any professional qualifying exams. The evolution of philosophical
premises of these organizations may best be explicated by comparing texts
of different generations. Those published in the early 1970's generally
had changed little since the 1930's. By the late 1970's, considerable
public scrutiny and some civil rights litigation had introduced some
modifications, particularly regarding racial or ethnic conformity. Also,
the concept of recycling through urban revitalization introduced the notion
that metropolitan development did not necessarily occur under inevitable
natural laws of evolution. Rather, historical and institutional change
could have a pronounced effect on metropolitan housing markets. Rather
than residential uses necessarily deteriorating and replaced with denser
commercial development, existing buildings could be rehabilitated.
However, these developments are regarded as deviations and the life cycle
and homogeneity principles otherwise regarded as the norm applicable to
most neighborhoods.
Life Cycle Principle: Inevitable Deterioration of Neighborhoods
As recently as 1974, an A.I.R.E.A. residential appraisal manual
(Knowles) maintained:
Neighborhoods pass through three life stages similar to
the life cycle of all nature: integration, equilibrium,
and disintegration. Neighborhoods start to develop
after the land has been subdivided and improved with
streets and public utilities. At first, dwelling con-
struction progresses at a rapid rate and then continues
at a slower rate until the area is fairly well developed,
at which point integration is reached. In the following
period there is little or no new construction; and dur-
ing this time, as the houses grow older, a state of
equilibrium is reached in which there is neither increase
nor decrease of desirability and value. Later, because
of infiltration of lower user groups, inharmonious land
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uses, and/or greater appeal of newer and more attractive
houses elsewhere, properties decline in desirability and
value, and the period of disintegration is reached.
(Knowles, 1974: 26)
The organic imagery and neighborhood biological determinism had clearly
remained intact for decades.
Nonetheless, both the A.I.R.E.A. and S.R.E.A. had already begun in some
of their texts to modify their presentation of the life cycle theory by
adding a fourth stage labeled "renewal" or "rehabilitation". An S.R.E.A.
text in 1975 portrayed the life cycle theorem thus:
All neighborhoods exhibit a life cycle which varies only
in the intensity and duration of each phase. The phases
are:
(1) Development and Growth. This is the period during
which prices are increasing, and the neighborhood
is built up.
(2) Stability. This period may last from approximately
the 10th to 15th year of the life of the neighbor-
hood, perhaps through its 40th year. This is gen-
erally the period of highest value and attractive-
ness of the neighborhood.
(3) Transition and Decline. This occurs as the
attractions of the neighborhood are offset by
those of new, competitive areas. The properties
become functionally obsolescent, as does the
pattern of the neighborhood. New uses begin to
move in, and transition frequently results in lower
val ues.
(4) Renewal and Rehabilitation. In some instances, it
is possible to renew and revive a neighborhood.
Examples may be found in nearly every city: e.g.,
Old Town in Chicago, and Society Hill in Philadel-
phia.11 (S.R.E.A., 1975: 6-16)
By 1978, A.I.R.E.A. text also described the life cycle theory as including
a fourth stage:
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Neighborhoods go through life cycles that start when
the neighborhood is developed. This is called the
growth period. When construction slows down or stops,
a period of stability follows. This period ends either
because the housing stock deteriorates or changes occur
in the economic, social, or physical and governmental
forces that affect the neighborhood. Decline may cease
when these forces change again or when there is an
organized effort to rejuvenate the neighborhood. This
renewal period is comparable to the original growthF
period. The life cycle is then repeated with another
period of stability and then decline. If the period of
decline is not reversed, the neighborhood will come to
the end of its economic life and usually will change to
another use. (Emphasis added.) (Bloom and Harrison,
1978: 102)
The A.I.R.E.A. text makes it clear that the principles of neighborhood evo-
lution still ultimately apply to all neighborhoods. The fourth stage
simply allows for exceptions where the same physical structures may house
two sequential socio-economic evolutions, thus "filtering" from upper
socio-economic occupancy ("the renewal period is comparable to the original
growth period") to lower income occupancy twice in the same housing stock.
As stated in the final sentence of this passage, expectations are that
eventually the neighborhood structures will be succeeded by higher and
better uses as dictated by the original laws of metropolitan evolution.
Some leading appraisers have maintained that decline is not
necessarily inevitable and have argued that these cultural perceptions have
led to self-fulfilling prophecies:
In the United States, the average life of a home is
generally taken to be 50 years, and apartment offices,
and loft buildings are given a shorter length of effec-
tive life. In foreign countries, however, it is not
unusual to hear of homes, and even communities, which
have maintained their character for periods well over
100 years.
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* * * * *
We have not been a nation of investors -- we have been a
nation of speculators, and that very fact has probably
caused neighborhood blight and slum areas more than
any one factor. (Armstrong, 1938)
Nonetheless, while the 1978 A.I.R.E.A. text acknowledges that an appraisal
"always must be objective, supported by facts and based on current social
standards", there is still an ideal form of metropolitan growth which indi-
viduals or institutions may modify on an interim basis but which will ulti-
mately follow the pattern of development for which it is destined.
Neighborhood Conformity Principle: Socio-Economic and Physical
Homogeneity to Maximize Value
The Sixth Edition Textbook Committee of the A.I.R.E.A. stated the
conformity principle as follows:
The principle of conformity holds that maximum value
is realized when a reasonable degree of sociological
and economic homogeneity is present.... (A.I.R.E.A.,
1973: 40)
And yet, in response to civil rights legislation and litigation, the same
text section entitled "Social Considerations" in the chapter on
Neighborhood Analysis also disclaimed the traditional principles of social
homogeneity:
It was once common practice to examine the racial com-
position of a neighborhood in an effort to detect any
signs of nonconformity or change, which were assumed to
adversely affect value. Such an approach is now regarded
as misdirected. This evaluation in appraisal practice
reflects a corresponding evolution in social attitudes
and public policy and demonstrates that the standards of
conformity are subject to the principle of change. Obso-
lete standards of conformity have no place in modern
neighborhood analysis. Broad federal and state fair
housing laws and changing social standards have encour-
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aged the establishment and maintenance of many stable,
integrated residential areas. There is no factual sup-
port for the assumption that racial or ethnic homogene-
ity is a requirement for maximum value.
* * * * *
Another example of social change of direct concern to
the appraiser is the growing preference for social
heterogeneity in some neighborhoods. In such areas,
the traditional social groupings have little or no
relevance in the appraisal process. In a changing
society, there can be no universal set of social
standards, and the factors that are relevant in one
neighborhood may be irrelevant in another. The
objective of the analysis should therefore be to
identify factors which are relevant and can be
objectively measured, without attempting to assess
deviation from some presupposed social norm.
(A.I.R.E.A., 1974)
These discrepancies appear to stem from the fact that the theoretical pre-
mises of the recommended neighborhood analysis remain fundamentally the
same. Revisions have been made by inserting paragraphs which modify the
original premises but essentially leave them intact.
The training manual of S.R.E.A., published in 1975, summarizes the
conformity principle for its members and trainees thus:
(1) Similar styles of houses.
(2) Houses of similar utility.
(3) Similar age and size of houses.
(4) Similar quality of houses.
(5) Similar price range of houses.
(6) Residents' income in the same general bracket.
(7) Residents of similar cultural, educational, ethnic
and social backgrounds.
(8) Similar land uses. (S.R.E.A., 1975: 6-11)
The traditional appraisal form of the savings and loan associations, com-
monly known as the "Green Hornet", has asked whether the ethnic composition
of the neighborhood was stable or changing. In a recent defense of this
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form, one influential appraiser wrote in the Savings and Loan News:
Appraisers know ethnic stability or change in a com-
munity is a very real and important economic considera-
tion in the minds of buyers and sellers. Consequently,
it is important for loan underwriters to know about and
appreciate this value trending factor. The 'Green Hornet',
through its ethnic composition statement, served this
purpose. (Opelka, 1975)
Note that the author defends the use of data on neighborhood racial and
ethnic composition by saying appraisers as professionals per se do not need
these data but loan underwriters, the residential appraiser's clientele,
need to know them since homebuyers and sellers, that is, free agents in the
marketplace (not institutional providers of financing), evaluate the worth
of real estate based on racial and ethnic composition.
However, the general consensus of the professional appraisal societies
today seems to be that social aspects of the conformity principles, at
least ethnicity and race, should not be incorporated in the appraisal
report. Other aspects of the conformity principle, economic and physical
considerations, are still subscribed to as generally valid principles.
Genesis of FHA Appraisal and Underwriting Standards
The Federal Housing Administration was created in the early 1930's as
a measure to stimulate the housing market. Housing construction had come
to a halt. Unemployment had forced many homeowners to default on their
mortgages. Financial institutions which had survived the Crash of 1929
were reluctant to provide funds for either new construction or home
purchase.
New housing construction was identified as a labor intensive sector of
the economy in which unemployment rates were particularly high. FHA was to
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administer a mortgage insurance fund created to leverage private loan funds
for new construction and home mortgage financing. By providing assurance
that in the event of default the lender would recoup at least a substantial
portion of the unpaid balance of the mortgage, it was anticipated that
financial institutions would make funds more readily available for these
purposes and, hence, stimulate employment and capital investment in
housing.
The FHA insurance fund was designed to be replenished through premiums
paid by borrowers in conjunction with their monthly mortgage payments. The
fund was dependent on most loans remaining paid up, in order to accumulate
enough to meet claims and remain solvent without subsidy from the U.S.
Treasury. As a result, FHA officials were immediately concerned with mini-
mizing the risks associated with any insured loan so as to assure sclvency
of the fund and continued operation of the program.
An administrative history of the FHA credits Frederick M. Babcock
with recognizing "the need for the FHA to set up an uderwriting system" and
authoring "the underwriting manual that has been the FHA Bible ever since."
(F.H.A., 1960: 11) Babcock came to the FHA in the mid-1930's after prac-
ticing as an appraiser in his father's firm in Chicago and formal study of
real estate appraisal at the University of Michigan.5 Both of these
experiences had contributed to Babcock's conviction that (1) the function
of the appraiser is to determine the future ideal value of the real estate
under appraisal, and (2) the conceptual framework which enables the
appraiser to extrapolate from present to future land uses and the laws of
metropolitan development articulated by Park, Burgess, and MacKenzie (1916)
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and their disciples. As stated by one of Babcock's university mentors in a
foreword authored for McMichael's City Growth Essentials (1928):
"Another impulse in professional appraising has come
from the study of sociologists of what has come to be
known as human ecology.... The relationship between this
approach and that of the student of land and its uses
is too obvious to need any comment." (Fisher in
McMichael, 1928)
In 1932, Babcock published his first major work on appraisal in which he
further developed the application of these two principles to appraisal
practice.
In his underwriting manual for the FHA first published in 1936,
Babcock advocated an approach to residential real estate investment analy-
sis which made the appraiser's assessment of "long term warranted value" a
keystone of FHA's decision to insure or not to insure. Babcock's defini-
tion of value, based on the appraiser's prediction of highest and best use
for the site, became "the central value concept influencing residential
appraisals" for decades (Wendt, 1974: 34). Babcock also introduced the
concept of rating the borrower, "appraising the moral risk" as well as the
property and location (McMichael, 1951: 151).
The underwriting procedures for FHA personnel developed by Babcock
consisted of three preliminary rating grids, one devoted to location
factors, a second to property characteristics, and a third to borrower
attributes. A fourth grid, entitled "mortgage patterns", provided a sum-
mary rating for the loan application with particular emphasis on the loca-
tion grid.
Babcock's location grid, presented in Exhibit 1-1 on the following
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page, incorporated both Social Darwinist assumptions about the life cycle
of urban neighborhoods and the impact succession of inhabitants on property
values. Sixty percent of the possible points in this grid were devoted to
"relative economic stability" and "protection from adverse influences".
Economic stability was defined as the stability and sufficiency of family
incomes,* the "social characteristics of neighborhood occupants", and "the
stage and trend of neighborhood development" (FHA, 1938: 188). Protection
from adverse influences included racially restrictive covenants and
"surrounding homogeneous neighborhood" (FHA, 1938: 189). This grid was
used by FHA appraisers until 1963 when FHA officials abandoned this system
as a result of civil rights activities and Congressional action.
Since 1963, the FHA has gradually eliminated references to race,
ethnicity, and religious heritage. However, other aspects of the physical
and economic conformity have been retained. For example, as of the late
1970's, the FHA Valuation Manual still read:
To obtain its maximum value, the property must conform
to its existing surroundings in size, age, condition,
and style, and should attract an occupant of similar
economic status.
Thus, conformity principles have been maintained as an integral part of
FHA's appraisal and underwriting procedures despite Congressional mandates
to the contrary.6
While conformity principles have remained relatively intact in FHA's
procedural manuals, recent analytical work entitled Techniques of Housing
Market Analysis does reflect modifications in the original models of metro-
politan determinism in preordained and universal patterns of successive
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EXHIBIT 1-1
RATING OF LOCATION
Rating of Location
Total
Weight
Feature Reject 1 2 3 4 5 Rating Assigned
Relative Economic
Stability 40 40
Protection from
Adverse Influences 4 8 12 16 20 20
Freedom from
Special Hazards 1 2 3 4 5 5
Adequacy of Civic,
Social, and Commer-
cial Centers 1 2 3 4 5 5
Adequacy of Trans-
portation 2 4 6 8 10 10
Sufficiency of
Utilities and
Conveniences 1 2 3 4 5 5
Level of Taxes and
Special Assessments 1 2 3 4 5 5
Appeal 2 4 6 8 10 10
Total Rating of Location 100%
Source: FHA. Underwriting Manual. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1938. Part II. Section 9. pp. 186-198.
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land uses (FHA, 1970). First, "filtering" as a concept is defined in eco-
nomic terms as "a change over time in the position of a given dwelling unit
or group of dwelling units within the distribution of housing rents and
prices in the community as a whole". Previously, the filtering process had
been "defined in terms of the occupants, by occupation, ethnic group, or
social status classifications". This reference advocates the use of the
first definition as it "avoids confusion between the process of filtering
(changes in price) and its effects (changes in occupancy) and provides a
guide to measurement" rather than subjective evaluation (FHA, 1970: 103).
Second, the metropolitan housing market is portrayed as consisting of many
submarkets cross-linked in complex patterns. 7 Regarding traditional loca-
tion theory, the text acknowledges that "the delineation of the housing
market area and submarket areas therein, involves consideration of the phy-
sical structure and growth of the urban community". The reader is referred
to the classics on this subject by Burgess, Fisher, Hoyt, and Hurd.8
However, the text concludes that (1) "modifications in the theories and
principles of urban growth and structure have become necessary" 9 and, (2)
each metropolitan analysis should be carried out by careful observation of
"the present pattern and trends of development against the background of
historical perspective" (FHA, 1970: 11).
In summary, the FHA developed a systematic formulation of appraisal and
underwriting standards predicated on the principles of neighborhood confor-
mity and inevitable decline. While these standards incorporated other
factors, such as "moral considerations" related to the creditworthiness of
the borrower, property and location factors remained paramount. This
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emphasis continued despite actuarial evidence to the contrary. In 1963,
FHA researchers concluded that "the general bias in property (and location)
ratings may have had a tendency toward encouraging acceptance of cases
which were marginal in other respects, particularly with respect to loan-
to-value ratio and quality of the borrower" (FHA, 1963: 69). Yet, five
years later, the agency's special high risk mortgage program (which was not
subject to the solvency requirements of the original mutual insurance fund)
was premised on urban neighborhood characteristics rather than borrower-
related and loan factors as the source of delinquency and default risk. 10
FHA appraisal and underwriting standards favoring new construction and
discouraging loans made in older urban areas had a pronounced effect not
only on the availability of federally insured loans, but also on the pri-
vate industry standards formulated for conventional loans.11  If the
federal government perceived a type of property or neighborhood as too high
risk, why would a private institutional lender invest?
CONCLUSIONS
Mortgage risk evaluation methods on which current underwriting proce-
dures are based were first formulated in the early 1900's. To make
mortgage lending a science, initial efforts such as Richard Hurd's sought
to discover universal laws of metropolitan evolution comparable to those on
which modern biological and physical sciences were based. Thus, the focus
on the permanent (i.e., the location of the site without present improve-
ments as the use of the land was subject to change) rather than the tran-
sient (i.e., the borrower and the buildings). The three rules of real
estate were axiomatically summarized as "location, location, and location".
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As a result, the valuation made by a real estate appraiser became an
integral and often preeminent concern in a lender's decision to grant or to
deny a loan. Moreover, real estate value theory rejected market prices as
inadequate indicators of property values. To develop a systematic means to
determine long term value, practicing appraisers worked closely with acade-
mic social scientists who were applying theories of human ecology to spa-
tial development patterns in metropolitan areas. Several of these leading
practitioners, such as Frederick Babcock, and applied theorists such as
Homer Hoyt and Ernest Fisher, were instrumental in the development of
appraisal and underwriting guidelines of the Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) during the 1930's. In subsequent decades, FHA had a pronounced
impact in the standardization of mortgage loan practices nationally. Thus,
FHA served to transmit the emphasis on real estate appraisal with generally
negative ratings on urban locations not only on federally insured loans but
on conventional loans as well.
Value theories on which appraisal principles are based were largely
formulated by nineteenth century economists. Twentieth century neoclassi-
cal and liberal economists have generally rejected value theories in favor
of price theories in which the value of economic goods and services is
defined by the prices paid to sellers by willing buyers in arms-length
transactions. The following chapter examines the evolution of price and
value theories and theories of metropolitan development in other disci-
plines, particularly economics, urban studies, and planning. Special
attention is given to urban neighborhood research in these fields which
offer empirical insight on the historical validity of real estate appraisal
principles of neighborhood conformity and inevitable decline.
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NOTES to Chapter 1
1For example, in one bank appraisal of a home in a predominantly black
middle-income neighborhood in Boston where recent sales of comparable
properties, identical in type and age of construction, ranged from $25,000
to $32,000, an estimate of value of $12,000 was justified on the basis of
(1) necessary repairs, such as gutter work and painting, which would amount
to a few thousand dollars, and (2) an adverse assessment of the neighbor-
hood. Notwithstanding the fact that according to the market comparable
sales method, home prices had steadily increased in the neighborhood, the
bank appraiser maintained that price was not necessarily value and that his
charge was to assess future value, not to predict prices on the basis of
present market trends (Parkman Center, 1977).
2Many residential neighborhoods remain in the core urban areas and
commercial and industrial uses have often leapfrogged to suburban areas
today. However, if the appraiser operates on the assumption that there are
inexorable laws of metropolitan growth under which each residential neigh-
borhood exhibits a life cycle which must be equal to or less than its phy-
sical life, it is not improbable that the appraiser may consider
structurally sound inner city housing as having outlived its "economic
life" and hence, "functionally obsolete" with no "market value", regardless
of the fact that there is still identifiable buyer demand through tran-
sacted sales and prices indicating marketability.
3As stated in the Sixth Edition of American Institute of Real Estate
Appraiser's textbook entitled The Appraisal of Real Estate:
"The characteristic of permanence complicates the esti-
mation of the value of real estate.... Land and its improve-
ments have a useful life extending over decades. The
value of real property, consequently, is equal to the
present value of the future benefits forthcoming from the
property. Estimating the market value for the highest
and best use is the paramount problem in the valuation of
real estate. Any such estimate must take into considera-
tion social and economic trends which may influence the
value for its highest and best use. It is essential to
have a clear understanding of current conditions and the
perception to recognize the forces that modify and change
these conditions." (Emphasis added) (A.I.R.E.A., 1974:
22)
4Both A.I.R.E.A. and S.R.E.A. also maintained professional journals.
The articles published in these periodicals are attributable to individual
authors, many of whom subscribed steadfastly to principles of neighborhood
conformity, including those of race and ethnicity, and inevitable decline
even after civil rights laws had been enacted. (Opelka, 1978.) The
Appraisal Journal, first issued in 1932, has published articles not only by
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some of the patriarchs of metropolitan determinism and applied appraisal
theorists (Babcock, 1935 and 1952; Fisher, 19 ; Hoyt, 19 ) but also by
latter-day critics of these principles which will be discussed in greater
detail in the next section (Abrams, 1951; Firey, 1950, Rodwin, 1950a and
1950b).
5Frederick M. Babcock, who had practiced as an appraisal consultant in
the firm of his father, Henry Babcock, in Chicago. Subsequently, he went
to study under Ernest M. Fisher at the University of Michigan. During this
period, Frederick Babcock produced a theoretical tome on appraisal, The
Valuation of Real Estate (1932). Fisher went to Washington, D.C. to work
on a real property inventory undertaken by the Commerce Department and in
1934 joined the newly created Federal Housing Administration (FHA).
Babcock was brought in to the FHA by his mentor as chief appraiser and
later became Assistant Administrator in charge of underwriting.
(F.H.A., 1960: 11)
6For example, under the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act the
FHA is mandated to foster "the reduction of the isolation of income groups
within communities and geographical areas and the promotIon of the increase
in the diversity and vitality of neighborhoods through the spatial decon-
centration of housing opportunities for persons of lower income and the
revitalization of deteriorating neighborhoods to attract persons of higher
income".
7
"Within a housing market area, dwelling units are linked in various
patterns on the basis of aggregates of individual scales of preferences as
to the type, quality, location, etc. of the dwelling unit desired.
Submarkets are distinguished by specific characteristics, e.g., tenure
(sales and rental housing), price, rent, size in terms of bedrooms,
high-rise, special purpose (e.g., elderly, military) and location. Many
more segmentations are conceivable, but those identified above are the most
commonly used in current market analysis practice." (FHA, 1970: 10)
8The works cited by the FHA textbook for further reference include:
Weimer, Arthur M. and Homer Hoyt. Principles of Real
Estate, 4th Edition, N.Y.: The Ronald Press Co., 1960.
Hurd, Richard M. Principles of City Land Values, 1924.
Burgess, E. W. "Urban Areas" in Chicago: An Experiment
in Social Science Research. T. V. Smith and L. D. White,
eds., Univ. of Chicago Press, 1929. pp. 114-123.
Fisher, Ernest M. Advanced Principles of Real Estate
Practice. N.Y.: The MacMillen Co., 1930, Chapter VII.
"Types of Real Estate and Their Uses", pp. 125-128.
Hoyt, Homer. The Structure and Growth of Residential
Neighborhoods in American Cities. FHA, Washington, D.C.,
1939.
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9Refers reader to Homer Hoyt's "Recent Distortions of the Classical
Models of Urban Structure". Land Economics (Madison, WI, Univ. of
Wisconsin, May 1964). pp. 199-212.
10FHA's "high risk" mortgage program 223 (e) was premised on risk fac-
tors associated with the neighborhood in which the subject property was
located where:
"economic soundness and economic life requirements with
respect to location and term of the mortgage are waived",
presumably because FHA personnel, using standard appraisal
techniques have predicted that the property value will not
be sustained over the term of the mortgage (HUD Handbook
4260.1, Sec. 3-1-e)
"the substitution of physical life for economic life is
justified because the Section 223(e) special risk provi-
sions compensate for those environmental factors which
adversely affect the property (Ibid., 4-8).
11As summarized by Henry Aaron in Shelter and Subsides: Who Benefits
from Federal Housing Policies? (1972):
Typical home mortgage terms have changed radically since loss protec-
tion offered by FHA and VA was introduced. VA and FHA loans any
higher loan-to-value ratios than does conventional credit. In addi-
tion, terms on conventional mortages have become more liberal. Terms
on conventional mortagages may have changed because the government's
ability and willingness to present severe economic slowdown have made
home mortgages safer. On the other hand, conventional terms may have
been liberalized because, the FHA and VA programs revealed that more
liberal terms increased risk only slightly...." (80-81).
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CHAPTER 2
PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN DEVELOPMENT OFFERED BY OTHER DISCIPLINES
INTRODUCTION
The traditional emphasis placed by mortgage lenders on location and
prediction of neighborhood trends discussed in Chapter 1 has not been
substantiated by analyses of their experience to date. It is curious,
given the real estate industry adage about the three rules by which an
investment decision should be made, "location, location and location," that
locational characteristics have seldom been tested in mortgage risk
research. Perhaps locational factors have been considered too obvious to
warrant research efforts and, hence, the emphasis on problems associated
with types of loans, lenders, or borrowers. Lenders may also have so con-
sistently screened out and rejected applications for properties in "adverse
locations" that the loans in their mortgage loan portfolios could not be
tested for these considerations. Or, the data for the individual borrower,
lender, property, and terms of the loan max have been readily available
from the mortgagees' files, while locational data (as developed and
interpreted by the mortgage lender) were too difficult to obtain.
Given the absence of empirical analyses in the mortgage risk
literature, it may be worthwhile to examine relevant urban neighborhood
literature, particularly those works which have examined the role of
mortgage lenders in neighborhood housing markets. Most of these studies
view the lending function from one of three perspectives:
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1) Disinvestment on the part of mortgage lenders is
in response to neighborhood decline. It is an
effect, not a cause, as mortgage suppliers are
passively responding to dwindling mortgage
demand. Reinvestment is money down the drain,
good money after bad.
2) Disinvestment on the part of mortgage lenders
occurs prior to manifestations of decline. It is
a cause, but one among many, of further decline.
Analysts differ as to whether (a) reinvestment
is sufficient to prevent and even reverse decline
or (b) insufficient, at least as the only source
of reinvestment.
3) Disinvestment on the part of mortgage suppliers,
particularly conventional lending by depository
institutions, is a primary cause of neighborhood
decline. Reinvestment could arrest decline and
revitalize the neighborhood.
Each of these perspectives is formulated on the basis of a dis-
tinct set of theoretical assumptions about economic development
generally and housing markets specifically. This chapter exam-
ines relevant urban neighborhood literature developed from each
of these perspectives and then examines the implications for
residential appraisal and underwriting practices and related
professions such as urban planning.
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URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD LITERATURE RELATED TO ISSUES OF MORTGAGE RISK
Neoclassical Paradigm and Neighborhood Decline
The first perspective corresponds to the orthodox or neoclassical
paradigm. Neighborhood decline is inevitable given shifts in household
demand within metropolitan regions for newer and better housing and access
to jobs in suburban areas (e.g., Berry, 1975; Downs, 197 ; Hoover and
Vernon, 1960) and even between metropolitan regions, as newer growth
regions attract households from older industrial regions (e.g. , Birch,
197 ). These analysts subscribe to the tenets of spatial determinism and
would argue that neighborhood housing markets must be analyzed in the con-
text of known housing choices of households. Given the availability of
newer housing, older housing will "filter" down to lower socioeconomic
groups. This process is perceived as inevitable, not because of decisions
made by mortgage suppliers, but rather choices made by households of econo-
mic means and the financial inability of succeeding households to support
mortgage financing, insurance, taxes, property maintenance and any capital
improvements required (e.g., Muth, 1969; Sternlieb, 1970; Sternlieb and
Burchell , 1973).
However, the empirical housing market literature has modified the
theoretical premises on which this perspective was originally based. As
discussed in Chapter 1, it was assumed that after older housing stock had
filtered through the lowest socioeconomic groups, residential land uses
would then be supplanted by higher and better uses. In this respect, an
investor would never lose out. Even if property owners defaulted, land
values would increase such that the speculative value of the property would
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preclude any risk. These theoretical premises did not correspond to market
realities. Empirical studies based on data drawn from this era and sub-
sequent decades indicated that outright property abandonment was evident or
on the horizon in many urban areas and the private market did not appear
capable of redevelopment without some form of public intervention (e.g.,
Grebler, 1952; Linton, Mields, and Coston, 1971).1 Also, while some ana-
lysts have adhered to the age-determined life cycle philosophy (Hoover and
Vernon, 1962), others have departed from theoretical tradition and offered
empirical evidence that filtering and, in turn, mortgage risk is not deter-
mined by "the relentless passage of time" but to "human agency" (Lowry,
1970:370).
Liberal Theories of Neighborhood Decline
Another perspective in neighborhood literature corresponds to the
paradigm used by liberal economists. In this analytical framework, the
housing market is perceived as generally functioning well, but with flaws
which require remedial alteration. To date, much of this literature
related to mortgage lending has focused on racial discrimination and the
extent to which it is based on perceived rather than actual risks. Some of
this literature has focused on the inability of white landlords to obtain
financing, particularly on properties with black tenants, notwithstanding
the fact that discriminatory barriers allow for higher rentals than those
for comparable units in white neighborhoods (Sternlieb and Burchell, 1973;
Kain and Quigley, 1975; Rapkin, 1959). Recent literature has also examined
the inability of urban homebuyers, black or white, particularly in racially
mixed neighborhoods, to obtain mortgage financing (e.g. , Stegman, 1972).
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These studies document the succession of types of mortgage lenders from
traditional depository institutions to mortgage companies to land contract
sales. Some question, in part based on this institutional succession,
whether inner-city borrowers are such poor risks:
How can a black buyer who pays from $130 to $165
a month to a speculator be a poor credit risk at $90
to $100 a month for a house with a legitimate mort-
gage at a fair market price? .... A substantial
number of lower income and moderate-income families
participating in land installment transactions are
successfully coping with higher monthly carrying
charges than would be necessary under more tradi-
tional forms of mortgage financing. That is to say
...overestimation of mortgage risks of both borrower
and property have caused traditional lenders and the
FHA to withdraw their support from the inner-city
market. (Stegman, 1972:207)
These neighborhood analysts have also maintained that high foreclosure
rates by neighborhood are not bonafide measures of risks associated with
location. These foreclosures may be attributable to "the abnormal finan-
cial situation often associated with redlining, such as lending to
speculators" or to other individual loan factors which would not warrant
dismissing the neighborhood as categorically high risk (Urban-Suburban
Investment Study Group, 1977:84).
Neighborhood analysts have generally not had access to general loan
portfolio data. However, their critical analyses of housing price trends,
particularly of racially mixed areas, and case studies of individual lend-
ers offer some extremely useful insights applicable to evaluating mortgage
risk experience of private institutions generally
Price Trend Studies. Price trend studies are particularly relevant,
as they offer empirical tests to the theoretical assumptions about property
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values in traditional appraisal and underwriting practices. Contrary to
conventional wisdoms about the negative impact of minorities on housing
price trends, most of the major studies "conclude that home value trends
either remain unchanged or increase" (Urban-Suburban Investment Study
Group, 1977:Part III, 42). Many of these studies found that blacks
generally had higher income levels than previous white residents and thus
could better support the mortgages required for purchasing homes in these
neighborhoods (Chicago Urban League, 1977; Gillette, 1957; Hunt, 1959;
Laurenti, 1952; Laurenti, 1960; Palmore, 1966; Palmore and Hoave, 1962).
Only one concluded that blacks had a pronounced negative impact on property
values (Berry, 1976). This study, which observed that prices drop when
blacks move in, then rise for a short time and finally decline again, was
subsequently challenged by another study "using many of the same tech-
niques, covering the same area during roughly the same period, and
concluded that values do not decline" (Chicago Urban League in Urban-
Suburban Investment Study Group, 1977:Part III, 42). In the only other
study where prices did not rise after black entry, the author found that
values were declining prior to black entry (Schietinger, 1964).
These studies of price trends have seldom been juxtaposed with insti-
tutional lending patterns and perceptions of risk. In two instances, a
symposium of bankers, public officials, and neighborhood leaders in Boston
and an extensive tri-city study funded by HUD, lenders, appraisers, and
real estate brokers, perceptions of declining property values were
contradicted by actual market data (Parkman Center, 1977; Hammer, Siler,
George Associates, 1979). The HUD study found that only two-thirds of the
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responses were within the range of tolerance (plus or minus 10 percent) of
actual property value trends (Exhibit 2-1). More importantly, over
one-fourth of real estate industry representatives underestimated the five-
year trends. The analysts concluded that these distorted perceptions of
property value trends had a pronounced effect on lending patterns:
In Neighborhood B, "understated property value
trends may have contributed to the decision on
the part of depository institutions to origi-
nate more mortgages with FHA insurance or VA
guarantee: with equivalent property value
appreciation over a five-year period, there was
a 20 percent differential between Neighborhood
B and its control neighborhood in the propor-
tion of depository institution mortgages orig-
inated on an FHA/VA basis. Though this link
cannot be clearly established, any greater risk
associated with perceptions of weakened pro-
perty value appreciation would be assigned by
the federal government rather than the institu-
tion itself." Conventional loans granted were
not affected as they were made on terms com-
parable to the control neighborhood.
In Neighborhood D, "not only were more deposi-
tory institution mortgages originated on an
FHA/VA basis, but the terms on conventional
mortgages were more stringent than the control
neighborhood."
For the other neighborhoods in which 17 to 25
percent of the actors misjudged the strength
of value appreciation, it is difficult to
ascribe broader meaning: there is no standard
of comparable perceptual accuracy in healthy
neighborhoods against which to judge this rate
of error. Nonetheless, for these specific
actors, erroneous property value trend percep-
tions formed one facet of their neighborhood
perspective." (Hammer, Siler, George Asso-
ciates, 1979:282)
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Exhibit 2-1
Real Estate Actor Accuracy in Five-Year
Property Value Trends by Neighborhood
Response Distribution
Change in Over- Within Under- Number
Mean Value estimated Range of a estimated of
1970-1974 Trends Tolerance Trends Responses
Norfolk, VA
Neighborhood A 50.4% 0.0% 75.0% 25.0% 8
Neighborhood B 47.7% 0.0% 58.3% 41.7% 12
Rochester, NY
Neighborhood C 21.8% 3.5% 79.3% 17.2% 29
Neighborhood D 7.8% 3.5% 55.1% 41.4% 29
Dayton, OH
Neighborhood E 5.1% 0.0% 82.4% 17.6% 17
Neighborhood F -1.1% 16.7% 61.1% 22.2% 18
TOTAL 4.4% 68.2% 27.4% 113
aRange of tolerance represented a 20 percentage point band bracketing the
actual percentage rate change. For example, if property values increased 10
percent over the five-year period, any response between zero and plus 20
percent was included. Specific ranges of tolerance are as follows: (1)
Neighborhoods A and B, where property values appreciated roughly 50 percent,
those responding that valuesincreased 30 percent or more were included in
the range of tolerance; (2) Neighborhood C, where property values appre-
ciated by 20 percent, those responding that values increased 10 to 19 per-
cent or 20 to 29 percent were included in the range of tolerance; (3)
Neighborhoods D and E, where values increased less than 10 percent over a
five-year period, those responding that values had not changed at all or had
increased as much as 20 percent were included in the range of tolerance, and
(4) Neighborhood F, where dollar values actually declined, responses indi-
cating no change or an increase or decrease of 10 percent in either direc-
tion were included.
Source: Hammer, siler, George Associates, 1979:280-281.
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As might be expected, given the traditional distinction made by appraisers
between market price and market value, at the Boston symposium the "dean of
real estate appraisal in New England" responded that price trend analyses
were not analogous to an appraisal of market value which is based on pre-
diction of future returns, "not past trends (Parkman Center, 1977).
However, the social scientist counterargument, as presented in the HUD
study is that "future expectations are...rooted in extrapolations of past
trends" and "from this point of view, future expectations of those mis-
judging the past" may be most important where underestimates contribute to
withdrawal of conventional credit, where institutional disinvestment leads
to decline (Hammer, Siler, George Associates, 1979:285). The HUD analysts
would argue that future expectations should be based on past trends within
the particular neighborhood. The veteran New England appraiser would argue
that appraisers should have license to extrapolate from past trends of
other neighborhoods he or she considers analogous; in other words, to make
predictions not yet manifest in trend data of the neighborhood itself.
Professional appraisal manuals revised in accordance with an out-of-
court settlement with the U.S. Department of Justice now warn the profes-
sional appraiser that after he or she "delineates the neighborhood and
obtains an indication of value based on recent prices received for similar
properties in the same neighborhood", it is then incorrect to adjust value
for neighborhood influences, because these influences can be assumed to be
reflected in the observed market prices" (A.I.R.E.A., 1978:85). Thus, in
some recently revised professional appraisal texts, price is defined as
value. However, the appraiser retains considerable latitude in defining
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the relevant "neighborhood" from which to obtain price data.
Alternative Lending Policies: Case Studies of Individual Lenders.
There is some evidence to suggest that sound loans can be made by alter-
native lending policies of individual institutions. These experiences
suggest that (1) individual institutions are not in a "prisoner's dilemma"
wherein they individually can reinvest only if other institutions do, and
(2) capital disinvestment from urban neighborhoods is not a spatial pattern
inherent in present financial structures.
In testimony at Congressional and HUD administrative hearings, wit-
nessess from San Francisco and Washington, D.C. presented evidence that
areas redlined by many institutions were served by individual savings and
loan associations which had delinquency and default rates in these neigh-
borhoods that were negligible. Under the Philadelphia Mortgage Plan (PMP),
commercial and mutual savings banks in that city substantially revised
their appraisal and underwriting standards to permit conventional lending
in any city block, even those with as many as 10 percent of the properties
abandoned. Where abandonment rates were higher, organized neighborhood
revitalization efforts have been taken into consideration in evaluation of
conventional loan applications. While most lenders would consider these
excessively lberal definitions of a sound neighborhood, "the delinquency
rate for the Philadelphia Plan has been as low or lower than for mortgages
in the newer suburban areas around Philadelphia" (Urban-Suburban Investment
Study Group, 1977:86-87).
In Chicago, the South Shore National Bank petitioned its primary
federal regulator, the U.S. Comptroller of the Currency, to relocate its
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main and only office from the racially and economically mixed neighborhood
of South Shore to a suburban Chicago location. The deposit base of the
bank had steadily declined and the bank officials argued that the neigh-
borhood was no longer economically viable, it was "unbankable". The bank's
petition evoked considerable community protest. Several community-oriented
officers of a neighboring bank, the Hyde Park Bank and Trust, initiated a
drive to raise the capital necessary to acquire the bank. When the
Comptroller denied the petition to relocate, this group purchased the bank
and began to radically revamp both its customer services and its lending
policies in the neighborhood. Apart from general reinvestment activities,
the new bank managers also decided that vehicles for revitalization of the
residential and commercial properties needed to be created, capitalized,
and provided with working capital and debt financing. South Shore National
ultimately created such vehicles as subsidiaries of its parent holding
company. This "born again" bank has grown rapidly and invested heavily in a
neighborhood which had been written off by previous management as one where
inevitable decline had set in and, in terms of both deposit base and
lending risks, was no longer bankable. Moreover, the bank has done so
without gentrification, i.e., displacement of lower income and minority
households.
Thus, unlike "urban renaissance" areas such as Society Hill in
Philadelphia which professional appraisal manuals condone as beginning a
renewed life cycle with growing proportions of upper middle class
residents, South Shore National Bank management argue that racially and
economically heterogeneous neighborhoods do not have to turnover to become
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bankable. Finally, South Shore's financial success has been contrary to
the expectations not only of other banking institutions but also of federal
regulatory agencies. South Shore National Bank's reinvestment efforts were
expected to result in an inherently riskier investment portfolio. Yet, the
bank's delinquency and default rate experience has been lower than it was
under prior management and well below national averages. When the new
management took over, the federal bank regulatory agency examiners scruti-
nized the bank's records with considerable skepticism. Now, the federal
examiners appear to audit South Shore as they would any other financially
sound bank.
These individual bank experiences may be exceptional. However, they
offer alternative evidence in support of the liberal assumptions of imper-
fections and avenues for reform within present structures of capital accu-
mulation vested with investment decision-making powers. These case
histories also highlight the extent to which institutional policies and
bank management practices apparently influence lending patterns (versus the
consumer sovereignty assumptions of the neoclassical analysts) and risk
outcomes.
Most lending institutions maintain that some urban areas warrant
exclusion from their portfolio investment for either "risk-related" or
"cost-related" reasons. The risk-related reasons include "(1) poor credit
risk of inner-city families, particularly minority and female-headed
households, (2) low and declining values of inner city property, and (3)
limited mortgage money, occurring in credit crunch periods, forces a
choice made by "comparison of perceived risks between competing prop-
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erties. Cost-related reasons include "high cost of originating and ser-
vicing inner city mortgages; and "less cost effective to originate lower
value mortgages, such as those that dominate inner-city areas, than higher
value mortgages" (Vandell, Hodas, and Bratt, 1974:71-72).
Alternative lenders and empirical studies of liberal analysts argue
that risk-related reasons and the first cost-related reason are based on
perceptions rather than fact, and that these perceptions are applied too
categorically to urban areas and minority homebuyers. The second cost-
related reason, while generally true, may be mitigated somewhat by restruc-
turing the loan origination and servicing fee structure. In addition, many
of these analysts would also argue that public charters and deposit
insurance protection of these institutions warrants further consideration
of social needs, equity and distribution of consumer credit capital.
Radical Perspective on Capital Investment in Urban Neighborhoods
Analysts from this perspective view urban disinvestment and any
subsequent reinvestment as a rational response of capital suppliers. Urban
decline stems from withdrawal of capital and profit maximization through
investment elsewhere. Decline is rational, but not "natural", as the
market itself is a social product (Smith, 1979:543). Rather than an orga-
nic process of inevitable decline, these analysts maintain that neigh-
borhood decline is
...the result of identifiable private and public in-
vestment decisions... While there is no Napoleon who
sits in a position of control over the fate of a neighbor-
hood, there is enough control by, and integration of,
the investment and development actors of the real
estate industry that their decisions go beyond a
response and actually shape the market (Bradford and
Rubinowitz, 1975:79).
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Urban disinvestment is a by-product of capital investment and institu-
tional marketing decisions.
Urban reinvestment may occur where there is a significant gap between
the potential and actual ground rent. Early empirical studies, beginning
with one done by organic theorist Homer Hoyt (1933), indicated troughs in
metropolitan property value patterns. Radical theorists would argue that
while Hoyt aptly observed these patterns, his determinist interpretation
assumed an organic process of spatial development rather than institutional
determinism attributable to capital stock and flows. More recent studies
(Yeates, 1965; Edel and Sclar, 1975) have indicated that "the once steep
rent gradient" observed by Hoyt "is flattening out; and if this is the
case, potential ground rent in inner city neighborhoods may actually have
decreased" (Smith, 1979:547).*
Empirical studies of gentrification assume that this process
occurs when the gap is wide enough that developers can
purchase skills cheaply, can pay builders' costs and
profit for rehabilitation, can pay interest on mort-
gage and construction loans, and can then sell the end
product for a sale price that leaves a satisfactory
return to the developer. The entire ground rent, or
a portion of it, is now capitalized; the neighborhood
has been "recycled" and begins a new cycle of use.
(Smith, 1979:545)
While "the fragmented structure of property ownership" in this process has
made "the occupier developer, who is generally an inefficient operator in
the construction industry, into an appropriate vehicle" in residential
rehabilitation, "professional and landlord developers are important --
contrary to the public image, they were by far the majority in Society
Hill" (Smith, 1979:546). Similar patterns have been observed elsewhere
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(e.g., Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C.; South End, Boston).
In sum, these analysts maintain that "empirical evidence suggests
strongly that the process [of investment or disinvestment] is initiated not
by the exercise of those individual consumer preferences much beloved of
neoclassical economists", but by collective action of either private insti-
tutional investors or these investors in conjunction with public agencies
under programs such as urban renewal (Smith, 1979:545). Reinvestment may
occur only when
one or more financial institutions will reverse a long-standing
redlining policy and actively target a neighborhood as a market for
construction loans and mortgages. All the consumer preference in the
world will amount to naught unless this long absent source of funding
reappears: mortgage capital is a prerequisite. Of course, this
mortgage capital must be borrowed by willing consumers exercising
some preferences. But these preferences are not prerequisites since
they can be socially created (Smith, 1979:545-546).
Given that investment in the built environment is a major vehicle for
capial accumulation, reinvestment on any significant scale may be an early
manifestation (an effect, not a cause) of a larger restructuring of at
least residential space. In terms of risks associated with individual
mortgage loans, from this perspective, institutional lenders are not risk
adverse. They are keen to lend to sectors of the real estate industry
where there are opportunities for substantial speculative gain, e.g., new
construction in outlying suburbs or substantial rehabilitation where there
is a significant spread between original acquisition and resale value.
Yet, as documented in some of the portfolio analyses discussed in the
following chapter, these speculative loans have often been the riskier
mortgages. Any locational risks are largely created by the collective
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decisions of institutional investors, partially as a result of deliberate
disinvestment decisions and partially as a by-product of investment deci-
sions to channel capital resources elsewhere. While there must be property
owners and tenants as well as prospective buyers and renters with suf-
ficient financial resources to support capital investment, real estate is a
capital intensive social product the market for which is largely directed
by institutions which have successfully accumulated capital resources,
including not only those financial intermediaries which serve as mortgage
suppliers but also corporate investors, large-scale industrial employers,
and similar institutions whose capital investments shape metropolitan
space(e.g. Gordon, 1977; Harvey, 1976). Thus, this perspective would argue
that locational risk patterns, to the extent they exist, are largely deter-
mined by, and thus can be deliberately changed by, the overall investment
patterns of capital suppliers.
Conclusions From Empirical Neighborhood Literature
Much of the neighborhood literature related to mortgage risk issues to
date has attempted to isolate causes and effects in the process of neigh-
borhood decline. In neoclassical analyses, it is assumed that bank disin-
vestment is not a cause but a prudent response to neighborhood decline.
Liberal analysts maintain that there are discrepancies in actual risks and
those perceived by lending institutions in urban neighborhoods generally
and minority areas specifically. Lending institutions, as illustrated by
several minority savings and loan associations and banks such as South
Shore National in Chicago, can make sound loans without undue risk in areas
generally perceived by the lending industry as too risky. These liberal
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analyses essentially argue that, unlike the physical sciences, there are
not "natural" causes and effects -- "ceteris" is not "paribus". Radical
literature maintains further that the housing market is essentially struc-
tured by capital providers. Spatial patterns of investment, or capital
accumulation, and disinvestment are not organic processes. The market is
dominated by institutional capital suppliers which generate housing demand
through various "marketing" techniques. This in turn enhances or dimi-
nishes real estate values which are a by-product of capital investment or
disinvestment, a manifestation (not a cause) of withdrawal of capital.
Literature reviews which have attempted to synthesize empirical find-
ings based on these different analytical perspectives have generally found
that (1) the causes of neighborhood decline are still empirically unknown,
and (2) the portrayed sequence of causes and effects depends in large part
on the analytical perspective of the researcher. In one recent literature
review, the authors concluded that the empirical findings in this research
could be summarized in terms of eight basic themes:
1) Lack of demand for the units because of rising
incomes, jobs, and so on (obsolescence image)
2) Lack of demand because the neighborhood is a
bad place to live (social fabric image)
3) Insufficient rents to support normal operating
costs (low-income image)
4) Excessively high costs and vandalism (problem
tenant image)
5) Treatment of property as a wasting asset in
expectation of the above problems even though
cash flow is currently positive (greedy investor
image)
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6) Market disorganization caused by racial transi-
tion (racial image)
7) Public policies such as enforcement of the hous-
ing code without accompanying subsidies neces-
sary to support the costs associated with these
improvements (bungling public sector image)
8) Withdrawal of debt capital that is needed to
finance major repairs or property transfers to
new owners (exploitative system image).
(Grigsby and Rosenberg, 1975: )
Thus, in the neighborhood literature, there appears to be neither suf-
ficient theory nor sufficient empirical evidence related to mortgage risks.
There only appears to be some consensus in these analyses that mortgage
lenders play a role by withdrawing capital at some point. The debate
remains whether this is a cause or an effect.
URBAN PLANNING: (RE)DEVELOPMENT AND (RE)INVESTMENT PROGRAMS
Urban planning developed as a profession in the 1920's, the same time
period as the appraisal profession. The stimuli for the development and
acceptance of these professions were very similar. Both were efforts to
develop an applied science of real estate in a decade of rapid growth in
many metropolitan areas of the United States. However, planning, unlike
appraising, was founded on the assumption that the evolution of
metropolitan land use patterns was not inevitable. Both growth and types
of development could be directed and controlled by governmental institu-
tions.
Physical Planning and the "City Beautiful" Movement
Urban planning gained widespread recognition in the 1920's through the
"City Beautiful" movement. It was this aspect of planning, the physical
design of the overall layout of transportation systems, parks, commercial/
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industrial and residential areas, which garnered the support of local citi-
zenry and resulted in the creation of planning commissions as local govern-
mental agencies throughout the country.
Zoning, the handmaiden of physical planning, embodied many of the
principles of human ecology which had also served as the conceptual foun-
dation for residential appraisal theory and practice. To this day, state
enabling statutes and local zoning ordinances and by-laws are predicated on
the concepts of
... "highest and best use" of the land given its
location within the metropolitan area, i.e., lower
density residential development should be supplanted
with more valuable commercial and industrial develop-
ment as the core city grows and expands.
... "conformity and compatibility" of adjacent land
uses, i.e., incompatible uses such as residential and
industrial manufacturing should not be located in
proximity to one another.
Thus, the terminology and analytical framework of physical planners were
akin to those of residential appraisers. The major difference was the role
of human agency.
Social Planning and the "Progressive" Movement
Social planning was rooted in "progressive" social reform movements
initiated in the mid-nineteenth century. Progressive organizations such as
the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor (AICP) in New York
City subscribed to an environmental interpretation of poverty (Lubove,
1963). They reviled the slums for pernicious influences upon the health
and morals of the inhabitants, they also saw the physical blight and
overcrowded conditions of the slums as a public health menace: -
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"Unless conditions improved, it was certain that the
poor would overrun the city as thieves and beggars,
endanger public peace and the security." (Lubove, 1963)
Thus, the dual objectives of these organizations were to improve the social
behavior and well-being of slum inhabitants and to minimize their threat to
public health and safety.
Social planning did not develop a widespread locally institutionalized
base as physical planning did. However, public housing legislation, first
enacted in the late 1930's, created federal programs designed to clear
existing slums and build new housing for the slum residents. These
programs, which resembled the "model tenement" efforts of progressives in
earlier decades, were directed not only at improving the condition of the
slum dweller but also at creating job opportunities for unemployed trades-
men.
Urban renewal programs evolved from low-income public housing programs
implemented by local housing authorities to central business district revi-
talization programs administered by local redevelopment authorities. By
the 1950's, urban renewal had been taken over by the local Chambers of
Commerce. These programs had been adapted to physical planning objectives
comparable to the City Beautiful movement several decades earlier.
Planners and redevelopment officials maintained that governmental interven-
tion was necessary as the ecological processes had not reached fruition in
these areas through the market mechanism alone. (Grebler, 1952). Public
powers of condemnation and eminent domain were essential to clear existing
residential or mixed land uses and to assemble parcels of land to create
sites large enough for redevelopment.
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Apart from commercial development objectives, many redevelopment
authority programs also were designed to attract middleclass residents back
into the city from the suburbs. Initially, these efforts were manifest
primarily in newly constructed apartment buildings. By the mid-1960's,
substantial rehabilitation programs "recycling" existing buildings from
low-rent apartment buildings and boarding houses to refurbished homes for
middle and upper income households were underway, e.g., Society Hill in
Philadelphia and the South End in Boston. It is these efforts that revi-
sions in appraisal textbooks acknowledged over a decade later as testimony
to the possibilities for revitalization over and above the classical
theories of decline leading to demolition and reconstruction.
Advocacy planning arose as an offshoot of earlier social planning
efforts. However, advocacy planners maintained that efforts of their
predecessors were too paternalistic and shortsighted in their vision that
physical improvements would foster improvement in the social conditions of
low-income residents (Davidoff, 1966). Advocacy planners argued that the
needs of low-income residents could best be met through organizing and
creating community-controlled institutions through which they could exer-
cise greater direct control, ownership and management, of their physical
environment.
Planners and the Principles of Neighborhood Decline and Conformity
Physical planners and traditional social planners subscribed to the
principle of neighborhood life cycles in which housing stock filtered from
occupants of higher to lower socio-economic status and deteriorated as
lower rents were inadequate to support the maintenance and capital improve-
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ments required to keep the building in a decent and sanitary condition.
Social planners further maintained that bad housing did not result from
bad people, but rather poor physical environment resulted in antisocial
behavior. This stands in stark contrast to the early appraisal literature
in which physical deterioration was seen as inevitable with the infiltra-
tion of lower user groups.
Neither physical nor social planners perceived urban development pat-
terns as subject to inexorable laws. Rather, development and redevelopment
were determined by human decision-making. Individual behavior in the real
estate market could be circumscribed by intervention on the part of govern-
mental institutions. In this respect, physical and traditional social
planners subscribe to the liberal perspective on urban development and the
potential for change through public intervention. Advocacy planners who
argue that restructuring of ownership and management control is required to
effectuate significant change view urban development and renewal from a
radical perspective.
Regarding the neighborhood conformity principle, physical planners
effectively implemented this principle for several decades through local
zoning ordinances which mandated and enforced homogeneous land uses.
However, the socio-economic aspects of the conformity principle applied by
appraisers were directly criticized and challenged by leading urban
planning scholars as early as the 1950's. Charles Abrams (1951) and Lloyd
Rodwin (1950a) submitted articles to the Appraisal Journal published by the
American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers (A.I.R.E.A.) in which they
questioned the theoretical validity of neighborhood life cycle and confor-
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mity principles. Both argued that the espousal and application of these
principles, particularly the social conformity principle, was so inaccurate
and societally detrimental that it should be dropped.
In a book entitled Housing and Economic Progress: The Study of
Housing Experiences of Middle-Income Families (1961), Rodwin expanded on
the material presented in his earlier article and devoted an entire chapter
to critique Burgess' concentric circle analysis and Hoyt's subsequent sec-
toral analysis of metropolitan growth commissioned by the FHA (1939).
Rodwin argued that such rigid structural analyses can become self-fufill-
ing prophecies in that
Financial institutions and zoning agencies were
expected to apply the conclusions of the sector thesis.
Presumably 'good' expanding areas were to be identified
for investment and other 'good' areas in which invest-
ments were made were to be guarded. Perhaps Hoyt may
not have had such an intention, but there is strong
emphasis in the study in favor of preserving the better
neighborhoods rather than improving the poor ones. Cer-
tainly at least until 1954 the Federal Housing
Administration, which financed this study, acted on
this basis and resisted attempts to change this
approach. (Rodwin, 1961: 121)
While Rodwin did not categorically state that institutions, private
financial and governmental, play a role in precipitating neighborhood
decline, he did conclude that the unfortunate "end result of limiting
investments to good areas was to accelerate the problems of blight and
obsolescence, not to solve them."
Rodwin challenged the underlying assumptions of ecological behavior,
the motivational characteristics ascribed by Hoyt in Social Darwinist tra-
dition to lower income groups:
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The sector thesis, as formulated and applied, also
tends to encourage the exclusion of certain groups
from the better neighborhoods because of their
alleged 'inharmonious' characteristics. That they
want to 'get in' is generally taken for granted by
the simple assumption of upper-class attraction.
The exaggerated emphasis on this desire could be
corrected, however, by recognizing their equally
important interest in decent housing and salutary
neighborhoods. (Rodwin, 1961: 122)
Rodwin also observed that analyses such as Hoyt's tended not only to
sanction but also to "fuel the hysteria" among investors regarding "racial
mixtures" and "inharmonious groups." (Rodwin, 1961: 122)
Thus, as a public sector profession formulated in the same time period
on the same theoretical principles as residential appraisal, planning
offers some alternative interpretations of urban development to those
instituted and maintained by residential appraisers. Nonetheless, the
issue from the perspective of the lending institution is which theoretical
framework and which of a series of borrower, loan, property, and
neighborhood characteristics, if any, offer the best information on the
probabilities of mortgage delinquency and default. The following chapter
reviews the empirical mortgage risk literature available to date and
assesses study results and the extent to which the institutional context in
which it was authored may influence the type of data obtained as well as
the interpretation of the results.
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS OF MORTGAGE RISK: EMPIRICAL BASES FOR
APPRAISAL AND UNDERWRITING PRACTICES
INTRODUCTION
Residential mortgage institutions, loan instruments, and lending stan-
dards in effect today were largely formulated during the 1930's. Since
that decade, there have been three critical historical periods in the deve-
lopment of metropolitan lending patterns and practices. First, from 1940
to 1965, most of the private and public sector emphasis was on provision of
funds for new construction in suburbia. Second, with the enactment of the
1968 Housing Act and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, there was con-
siderable pressure on public sector institutions to revise their portfolio
objectives to extend their holdings on existing housing, particularly loans
to minorities in urban areas. And third, from 1975 on, public legislative
and regulatory action focused on reforms in private lending practices to
increase urban investment on the part of these institutions on their own
initiative, with or without public protections such as mortgage insurance
coverage. These historical developments have played a critical role in
shaping the questions addressed by mortgage risk research in any given
period.
Institutional authorship or sponsorship of research in each of these
three historical periods has also been a key determinant of (1) the loan
data available for analysis, (2) the types of analyses conducted, and (3)
the interpretation of results. For example, most of the industry-sponsored
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research has been devoted to evaluation of whether underwriting criteria
have been sufficiently exclusionary so as to eliminate holdings of any
substantial number of loans prone to delinquency or default. Little or no
effort was made to assess whether these standards were sufficiently
inclusionary, so as to assure equal access to credit for those of com-
parable risk, until the late 1970's, after traditional underwriting cri-
teria had undergone repeated public challenge. This chapter reviews the
mortgage risk research to date along these two axes -- historical period
and institutional sponsor.
In the first period from 1940 to 1965, much of the published research
was authored or commissioned by federal agencies on federal insurance or
guarantee programs (Kaplan, 1941; Federal Housing Administration, 1963;
and, Housing and Home Finance Agency, 1963). In addition, when mortgage
delinquency rates reached an all time high since those during the
Depression, several national trade associations undertook research to
assess the factors underlying these national trends (Mortgage Bankers
Association, 1971; Herzog and Early for the National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1970; and, Kendall for the United States Savings and Loan League,
1964). Of these, only the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) study, in
which delinquent borrowers were interviewed, introduced additional risk
considerations beyond those of developing underwriting criteria to minimize
or eliminate risk prone loans. The HHFA study introduced borrower-oriented
considerations such as (1) servicing procedures by the lender which would
minimize probabilities of a delinquent borrower going into default, and (2)
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insurance programs which might protect the borrower against loss of home
and/or equity investment in the event of default.
In the second period from 1968 through 1974, three sets of studies
were undertaken. Two of these were on federally insured loans. One set
under FHA sponsorship (Von Furstenberg, 1971; Shaw, 1977) focused on
underwriting criteria and/or credit scoring methods which might assist the
agency in prudently meeting its urban investment requirements. Another set
consisted of investigative critiques of FHA's management of its lending
programs in urban neighborhoods with particular emphasis on the need for
FHA to regulate abuses of its "approved mortgagees" both origination proce-
dures and servicing practices. (Bachman, 1977; Boyer, 1973; Downie, 1974;
FNMA, 1975; Lefcoe and Toten, 1975; Orren, 1973; U.S. Senate, 1971) A third
set were on private mortgage insurance programs which had begun to "cream"
the suburban loans as federal loan programs were directed to meet quotas in
the inner city. In the face of declining volume of suburban FHA loans,
federally sponsored secondary mortgage market agencies were interested in
purchasing privately insured mortgages and commissioned a study to ascer-
tain whether the underwriting criteria of these firms were sufficiently
stringent and the insurance funds solvent.
The third period, beginning in 1975, extended concerns of urban
community-based organizations and public regulatory agencies to conven-
tional loans and private lending practices apart from public insurance
programs. Emphasis on consumerism and corporate social responsibility
resulted in new statutory and regulatory initiatives. With prior legisla-
tion directed at civil rights and general consumer credit protection (Truth
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in Lending, Fair Credit Reporting, and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act),
the federal Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 (HMDA) and Community
Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) introduced new considerations specifically
directed at urban lending performance. The impetus for these initiatives
came from urban neighborhood organizations, many of which had developed a
substantial amount of documentation on bank disinvestment based on case
histories and statistics compiled from property transfer records at county
registries of deeds. These efforts comprise the first generation of stu-
dies of this period (Home Ownership Development Program, 1973; Bradford et
al., 1975; Feins, 1976; McKee, 1974; Center for New Corporate Priorities,
1975; Devine, Winston and Sims, 1973; Northwest Community Association,
1973; and, Public Interest Research Group, 1975). A second generation of
studies, based on bank disclosed data under HMDA or more extensive state
directive, were undertaken by a national coalition of community organiza-
tions (Przbyliski, 1978) and several state regulatory agencies. Both the
first and second generation studies were directed at documentation of the
geographic distribution of mortgage loan investments. While some of these
studies developed measures of demand against which the supply of mortgages
could be assessed, none could address the question that, if institutional
mortgage suppliers were not meeting estimated mortgage demand, why not? To
what extent did perceptions of risk and/or actual risk experience affect
these investment patterns? In response to these questions, a third genera-
tion of studies developed. Thus far, these studies have offered eval-
uations of mortgage risk from three perspectives. One is the cumulative
portfolio risk experience method in which overall delinquency and foreclo-
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sure rates and loan losses are compared between minority-held and white-
held institutions to ascertain whether minority mortgagees and mortgagees
in minority areas are higher risk (Brimmer and Company, 1977). This
approach based on highly aggregated data has some severe statistical
limitations. A second perspective on risk evaluation by the lender is
offered by analyses of loan application data (Benston, Horsky, and
Weingartner, 1978; Sandor and Sosin, 1975; Schafer, 1978; Schafer and Ladd,
1980). A third perspective in this generation of studies is offered by
analyses of delinquency and default experience (von Furstenberg and Green,
1977; Morton, 1974; Schafer, 1978; Williams et al., 1973).
In sum, initial analyses of mortgage risk evolved from actuarial stu-
dies of public insurance programs concerned with whether underwriting cri-
teria were adequately exclusionary so as to minimize risk to analyses
directed at minimizing the requirements of federal mortgage insurance
programs to those required as a matter of business necessity, i.e.,
solvency of the insurance fund. Most recently, risk studies devoted to
private and public lenders alike have been directed at appraisal of the
screening, loan origination and servicing procedures, and individual loan
factors associated with delinquency and default so as to evaluate risk per-
ceptions against risk experience.
RISK STUDIES PUBLISHED FROM THE SUBURBAN BOOM TO THE URBAN
CRISIS (1940 TO 1965)
These studies were sponsored by two types of organizations: one, the
federal mortgage insurance and guarantee agencies; the other, national
trade associations of private mortgage lending institutions. The federal
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agency studies, largely done by inhouse staff, were actuarial in nature.
The objectives of these studies were to assess the adequacy of (1) the
underwriting criteria in screening out higher risk loans, and (2) the mort-
gage insurance premium revenues relative to loan losses covered by these
revenues. The national association studies were prompted by a rapid
increase in mortgage delinquency rates during the early 1960's. Both
federally insured or guaranteed loans and conventional loans experienced an
extraordinarily high incidence of delinquencies in 1962, the highest for
many institutions since the Depression. These trade association studies,
done either in-house or by outside academic researchers on contract,
focused on those factors known to the lender at the time of origination and
the extent to which any were statistically correlated with the probabili-
ties of delinquency or default.
Mortgage Insurance Program Studies -- Federal Insurance:
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA)
Early FHA Actuarial Studies (1940's). Within a decade after the
agency had been established, the first analyses of FHA risk experience
were performed by Mortimer Kaplan, on staff as chief actuary. These were
confidential reports primarily concerned with (1) the soundness of the
insurance funds, (2) the adequacy of the initial assumptions regarding pre-
mium calculations, and (3) policy considerations for future underwriting
procedures (Kaplan, 1940, Kaplan, 1941) Kaplan and Miller, 1945). While
these reports also examined various loan characteristics of borrowers and
of properties, these sections were "essentially theoretical rather than
empirical in nature," i.e., based on assumptions about the risks associated
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with borrowers of lower incomes and properties with lower purchase prices.
With only five years of portfolio experience, FHA did not have a sufficient
data base for meaningful empirical studies (Shaw, 1977: 31, 33).
However, the theoretical framework developed and conclusions reached
in these studies strongly influenced FHA practices and risk analyses in
subsequent decades. First, regarding soundness of insuring funds and ade-
quacy of premiums, Kaplan and his colleagues concluded that the premium
income would be sufficient to sustain anticipated losses from claims as a
result of default. It was also concluded that the "Rating of Mortgage
Pattern" (see Exhibit 1-1 in Chapter 1) was an accurate indicator of risk,
i.e., the lower the rating, the more prone a mortgage was to default.
Second, these Kaplan reports applied principles used in life insurance
to mortgage insurance and, in doing so, formulated what might best be
described as an ex post, or actuarial, orientation premised on the assump-
tion that the ex ante criteria specified in the "Rating of Mortgage
Pattern" used in origination to accept or reject loans, sufficiently pre-
dicted and thus screened out bad risks. Thus, FHA personnel continued to
monitor overall portfolio default rates and to construct actuarial devices
such as decrement tables which indicated probable duration of loans and
periods over the life of the loan when delinquency and default were most
probable. After the initial honeymoon period of two years, it was deter-
mined that there was a high probability of a loan going into default from
the second to the fifth year, and subsequently probability of default
decreased. Much of this orientation was one of risk aversion, particularly
since this fund was mandated to operate without public subsidy. As a
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result, for several decades no consideration was given to the fact that
creditworthy applicants may have been inappropriately rejected on the basis
of Babcock's "Rating of Mortgage Pattern."
Thirdly, Kaplan and Miller formulated a macroeconomic perspective of
FHA's loan insurance experience which has been sustained empirically and
adhered to by FHA analysts decades later (Armstrong, 1971; Armstrong, 1977;
and, von Furstenberg, 1971). In brief, this theory focused on homeowners'
equity as partially dependent on the phase of the business cycle when the
home is purchased, as "equity is built up not only through initial invest-
ment and scheduled payments on the mortgage, but also by property appre-
ciation accruing from desirable neighborhood location and favorable
economic conditions" (Shaw, 1977:33). Under this formulation, homes
purchased in a depression period were less likely to default than those
purchased in a boom period. Given that the first five years of a
mortgage's exposure are the most vulnerable period for the borrower, during
this critical period, based on cycle theory, if economic conditions
improve, a homeowner receives a windfall increase in equity which serves as
a cushion if he or she needs to bail out of the property. According to
Kaplan and Miller
...the impact of title transfers during a bad phase is
greatest on insurance written in the final years of a
good phase...insurance written prior to this bad period
is based primarily upon some inflation of values and
high levels of mortgager's income, both of which can be
expected to decline in the ensuing period (Kaplan and
Miller, 1945:3).
Thus, the cycle theory concludes, the net result can be a forced sale
situation in which the borrower actually has negative equity, i.e., the
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anticipated sales price of the house is less than the amount required to
pay off the mortgage and related sales costs.
FHA and VA Studies in the Early 1960's: Administrative Response to
Congressional Hearings on Extraordinarily High Default Rates. Early in the
1960's, both FHA and VA began to experience defaults at considerably higher
rates than those experienced in the previous decades of their existence.
These events corresponded to the macroeconomic cycle theories of Kaplan and
Miller. Many of the delinquent loans had been originated in a boom
construction period several years earlier, 1957 to 1959. In response to
this public scrutiny and concern regarding the actuarial soundness of these
insurance programs, FHA and VA undertook "in-house" evaluations of their
underwriting system, both origination and servicing policies, as to whether
there were basic deficiencies or poor implementation (FHA, 1963; VA, 1962).
FHA developed an extensive data base through "an underwriting repro-
cessing of 20 percent of the properties acquired through foreclosure bet-
ween July 1, 1961 and March 31, 1962" (FHA, 1963:3). Comparisons of the
"Rating of Mortgage Pattern" at origination and the re-ratings on this grid
system were then made. This study made several major findings:
The halcyon post-World War II period for housing pro-
duction appeared to be coming to a close. Until the
late 1950's, the housing market in the United States
had been a 'sellers' market. There had been tremendous
pent-up housing demand as a result of very low rates of
housing production during the war. The only effective
limits on the volume of home production during post-war
years were the capacity of the building industry to
produce and, more importantly, the available supply of
mortgage funds (FHA, 1963:18). This relationship of
supply to demand was now changing and easing the infla-
tionary pressures on the housing market. Thus, "the
heavy insulation provided by rapidly rising values and
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the ready salability of properties, which had protected
the lender against the normal hazards of mortgage
lending appraising the property or the borrower," had
now diminished; these same factors of an "abnormal
post-war housing market also protected the FHA" (FHA,
1963: 20).
Banks serving as FHA-approved mortgagee from 1948 to 1962
had become more likely to declare the borrower in default
and collect the insured amount of the mortgage from FHA.
Increasingly, lenders holding FHA loans appear to "have
found it more profitable to turn the property over to FHA
and receive debentures than to hold the property as an
investment or sell it themselves to cover their loan" (FHA,
1963: 11).
"The acquisition ratio of FHA insured loans originated by
mortgage companies was somewhat higher than for loans origi-
nated by all classes of banks and insurance companies. This
was true for both new and existing construction. From 1958
to 1960, slightly over three-fifths of new home mortgages
were originated by mortgage companies, but acquisitions from
these mortgages exceeded three-fourths of the total
acquisitions." (FHA, 1963:44)
Acquisition ratios were higher for applications processed by
builders for buyers of homes in newly constructed sub-
divisions than they were for buyers who applied directly to
the lender on newly constructed or existing homes.
Review of the Rating Grid results indicated that defaults
generally had fairly high property and location ratings.
Borrower ratings for acquired properties were relatively low
and credit information often incomplete and inaccurate.
Overall, the general upward bias of property and location
ratings may have had a tendency to encourage acceptance of
cases which were marginal with respect to the borrower.
In these findings, two distinct themes emerge. One, according to the
second, third, and fourth findings, institutions do appear to matter.
These patterns are particularly interesting as they support the concept
that the determinants of mortgage risk may include (1) the institutional
structure of mortgage suppliers, and (2) the "balance sheet" incentives or
disincentives to adequately service loans originated, particularly those
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which are 100 percent federally insured. The other important theme is that
underwriting based on Babcock's Rating Grid resulted in approval of loans
where high ratings on property and location offset low ratings of the
borrower. As stated by the FHA analysts, the results of this study
"suggest that borrower characteristics were considerably more important
than property and location characteristics in contributing to mortgage
mortality" (FHA, 1963:55).
Housing and Home Finance Agency (1963). This study marked a departure
from previously published mortgage risk studies for several reasons. The
research was:
. Conducted by a federal agency which was not responsible
for the administration of the mortgage lending programs
under scrutiny;
. Included data not only from federal agency loan files
but also from survey interviews with federally insured
borrowers in default; and,
. Based on a broader sample of loans from conventional
mortgage portfolios of private lenders as well as both
FHA and VA loans.4
The impetus for the study was the same as the FHA study (1963) discussed
above -- the extraordinarily high default rates experienced in 1961 and
1962. HHFA analysts also concurred with the FHA researchers that the
problem was not simply a short term default crisis period resulting from a
minor economic recession but rather a long term secular trend. As stated
by the authors, "given the upward trend in annual volume of foreclosures
since 1947, a better understanding of the reasons leading to foreclosure is
essential in devising ways to combat rising trends" (HHFA, 1963:1).
However, HHFA analysts determined that to understand the reasons for
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default, one needed to assess the problem from the perspective of the
borrower as well as the institutional lender or insuror.
For federally insured loans, the researchers were able to match the
reasons for default given by the lender with those given by the borrower
for each loan. Overall, the perceptions of the lenders differed from those
of the borrower. The leading reasons given by lenders was "improper regard
for obligations" and, to a lesser extent, "curtailment of income". The
leading reasons cited by borrowers were "curtailment of income", "death or
illness in the family", and "marital difficulties".5 On further examina-
tion of each loan, the authors concluded that "detailed information tended
to confirm the validity of the primary reasons cited by the borrowers"
(HHFA, 1963: 2). In each of the metropolitan areas studied:
"...30 to 50 percent of the borrowers reported income
declines of over 30 percent. There was a markedly dif-
ferent distribution of dollar income at the time of
origination and at the time of foreclosure for all
borrowers who were interviewed or filled out
questionnaires.... As a result of curtailed incomes
and rising housing expenses, the proportion of respon-
dent borrowers with housing expense-to-income ratios of
40 percent or more increased from 12 percent at the
time of loan origination to 49 percent at the time of
foreclosure among FHA cases, and from 13 percent to 40
percent among VA cases." (emphasis added) (HHFA,
1963:2,3)6
The authors concluded that a program of mortgage unemployment insurance in
which interest, insurance, and taxes could be covered and principal payment
deferred should be seriously examined as a means to "prevent foreclosures
resulting from a high incidence of temporary unemployment in an economy of
rapid technological change" (HHFA, 1963:6).
In essence, these conclusions questioned the efficacy of mortgage
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insurance and guarantee programs administered by the FHA and VA in which
the borrower-paid insurance premiums protected the lender from any loan
losses associated with default but provided no assurances to the borrower.
The HHFA study findings indicate that more consumer-oriented insurance
programs to cover temporary inability to meet mortgage payments would (1)
address the primary reason for default (i.e., curtailed income) and (2)
benefit both borrower and lender in limiting foreclosures to those loans
where the household could not support the mortgage on a long-term basis.
Studies Commissioned by Trade Associations of Mortgage Lenders
in Response to Extraordinarily High Default Rates
The catalyst for these studies was the same as that for the federal
agency studies discussed in the previous section. It is interesting that
these were the first systematic studies of mortgage experience published by
financial institutions which had been actively engaged in residential
lending for decades. Apart from any unpublished evaluations that indivi-
dual institutions may have done on their own portfolios, virtually no ana-
lytical work had been done on the underwriting criteria generally used by
the industry.
United States Savings and Loan League (1964). The first study
published from data compiled by the associations from their member lending
institutions was done by a staff economist at the United States Savings and
Loan League (Kendall, 1964). Based on loans sampled from member savings
and loan associations nationally, the stated purposes of this study were:
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. To develop factual data on the characteristics of loans
made by and held in the portfolio of savings and loan
associations...;
. To contrast loan delinquents with loan borrowers whose
accounts are current;
. To test existing beliefs regarding the status and com-
position of current and delinquent loans;
. To make a beginning toward the development of
underwriting rules and guidelines for loan officers
appropriate to today's markets. (Kendall, 1964:12)
The study data were not rigorously analyzed statistically. However, the
descriptive information is useful as a preliminary comparative analysis of
current and delinquent loans. Previous studies had focused exclusively on
defaults.
These analyses corroborated the federal agency study findings on
disproportionate emphasis on property and location and higher risks asso-
ciated with loans made indirectly to homebuyers through builders (Exhibit
3-1). Overall, of the loans on city properties sampled, a greater percen-
tage were current (49 percent) than delinquent (45 percent). Unlike subur-
ban areas, this held true even among types of loans (for builders,
refinancing, and junior financing) which had a propensity towards
delinquency in suburban areas. In the "built-up suburbs", refinancings had
the highest incidence of delinquency. In the "new suburban developments",
builder loans and junior financing for new homebuyers without sufficient
funds for the required downpayment exhibited tendencies toward delinquency.
In sum, these data indicated that the savings and loan associations may
have been overly conservative in urban areas and too liberal on some types
of loans in suburban areas. Evidently, no recommendations for further
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EXHIBIT 3-1
PROPERTY LOCATION
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
LOCATION All Loans
Type of
Loan
Builder
Source: Table 7 (Kendall, 1964:62).
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Loan
Purpose
Refinance
Junior
Financing
Yes
Cur. Del. Cur. Del. Cur. Del. Cur. Del.
In City 49% 45% 27% 18% 59% 51% 48% 38%
Built-up Suburbs 33 37 31 33 32 41 30 32
New Suburban
Developments 18 18 42 49 9 8 22 30
TOTAL 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
evaluation or modification of loan origination policies were made by either
the author or by the trade association which sponsored the study.
National Bureau of Economic Research (1970). Two economists, Herzog
and Earley, at the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) authored a
second study based on data compiled in the early 1960's. This information
was voluntarily provided to NBER by three trade associations -- the United
States Savings and Loan League (USSLL), the Mortgage Bankers Association
(MBA), and the National Association of Mutual Savings Banks (NAMSB). This
study was a distinct departure from previous mortgage risk studies as it
used multivariate statistical techniques (1) to test the significance of
each borrower and loan characteristic while controlling for the effects of
others, and (2) to differentiate current, delinquent, and foreclosed loans
based on these characteristics. The study was also more comprehensive than
its predecessors as it was national in scope, based on a total of 12,581
loans, over 7,000 conventional as well as approximately 5,000 federally
insured loans, from 291 institutions.
In the final results, none of the regression equations explained more
than 13 percent of the variation between characteristics of loans of dif-
ferent status (Exhibit 3-2). Of the characteristics used in these
analyses, loan and borrower characteristics were selected over property
characteristics as "records used provided little meaningful data" on pro-
perty or location.
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EXHIBIT 3-2
STATISTICAL RESULTS OF ANALYSES
BY HERZOG AND EARLEY (1970)
Pairwise Regression 2 F Se(by Data Source) R Ratio N
Current vs. Noncurrent
USSLa .1148 20.35* .0117 6472
MBA .0381 3.29* .01624 3690
NAMSBc .0495 3.77* .01996 2419
Delinquent vs. Foreclosed
USSLL .1299 5.57* .02385 1570
MBA .0667 5.97* .0160 1817
NAMSB .10043 3.99* .02760 1215
Current vs. Foreclosed
USSLL .0505 6.53* .0138 5011
MBA N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
NAMSB N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
*Significant at .01 level.
aUSSLL (United States Savings and Loan League) sample data from 38 savings
banks and loan associations.
bMBA (Mortgage Bankers Association of Mutual Savings 3anks) sample data
from 36 mutual savings banks, 41 commercial banks, and 105 mortgage
companies.
cNAMSB (National Association of Mutual Savings Banks) sample data from 73
mutual savings banks.
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Mortgage Bankers Association (1971). After the Herzog and Earley
study was published, the Mortgage Bankers Association decided:
"The findings of the NBER [Herzog and Earley] study,
though generally useful, are too broad to be of sig-
nificance to the operating mortgage banker. Accord-
ingly, the statistical information collected by MBA and
provided as part of the data used in the NBER study has
been tabulated in a series of tables that provide more
specific insights into the problem of underwriting
mortgage loans". (MBA, 1971:1)
In essence, the multivariate statistical analyses performed by Herzog and
Earley had little meaning to the average mortgage officer. Herzog and
Earley did not present information which could be readily understood and
applied by MBA members to their originating and servicing procedures.
Also, analyses based exclusively on rigorous quantitative data overlooked
potentially useful qualitative information in differentials in institu-
tional lending patterns and servicing practices.
From simpler two-way tables, the MBA concluded:
. The loan with a high ratio of loan-to-value is more
likely to become a defaulted loan, regardless of the
factor that generated the default;
. Forces leading to default tend to be unpredictable at
the time the loan is closed as they are related to
income, health and marital problems of the borrower.
Accordingly, the loan-to-value ratio and the property
itself are properly given greater weight in loan
underwriting; and,
. Forbearance, either directly or through prolonged and
repeated collection efforts, is widely practiced....
The results go a long way toward changing the image of
the mortgage lender from a flintheaded shylock to an
understanding individual who has a stake in saving the
loan as well as a desire to be of assistance to
troubled borrowers. (MBA, 1971:1, 2, and 14)
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The first finding corresponded to the use of the loan-to-value ratio as a
significant variable by Herzog and Earley. This finding also supported FHA
studies in which a seasoned loan of four or five years less risky than the
same loan at origination as the loan-to-value ratio decreased as the
borrower made payments and increased the equity invested. The second
finding upheld the traditional underwriting emphasis on the property as
collateral security and the borrower's equity as the lender's safety margin
for depreciation and any costs associated with processing foreclosures.
However,
"...contrary to the belief held by some mortgage
lenders, the risk of default was not materially
affected by the age of the property.... Proportionately
more loans on properties between 2 years and 10 years
of age were in serious default than current. But the
reverse experience was evident on properties more than
10 years old at the time of closing...." (MBA,
1971:31)
Moreover, among loans of properties 10 years or older, "a larger portion of
these properties carried larger downpayments" thus making the probability
of losses to the lender in the event of default even lower than that for
loans on newer properties (MBA, 1971:31).
Finally, the third finding regarding forbearance appears to be more
applicable to other lenders, as "the commercial banks and savings banks
were somewhat more prone to practice forbearance than mortgage bankers"
(MBA, 1971:14). Moreover, the mortgage banker generally began "the collec-
tion procedure 10 days after the loan was due", while "collection practices
among commercial and savings banks varied widely, but a delay of 60 days"
was not uncommon (MBA, 1971:40). These findings corroborated those of FHA
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(1963) that the ratio of loans acquired to total loans originated with FHA
insurance were consistently higher for mortgage bankers than for other
types of lenders. MBA attributes these patterns to differences in institu-
tional structure. Depository institutions were not subject to the exten-
sive external pressures faced by mortgage bankers. The mortgage portfolio
held by a commercial or savings institution were (1) predominantly loans
serviced for their own accounts (rather than outside investors), and (2)
generally not subject to stringent FHA servicing regulations (as were most
loans originated by mortgage bankers). From the final table presented in
the study, "Collection Activities by Type of Investor", the MBA concluded
that the "large number of contacts made" on any delinquent mortgages were
"obviously a major cost of servicing loans" (MBA, 1971:50):
"Inasmuch as loans in serious default are a small part
of loan servicing portfolios, typically less than 1%, a
relatively small change can generate significant
increases in collection activity and related costs. It
would be worthwhile, therefore, to examine collection
activities not only from the view of their productivity
in saving loans from foreclosure, but from the view of
costs vs. returns." (MBA, 1971:50)
Thus, the final judgment on more extensive servicing to delinquent and
defaulted loans should be made by private lenders on the basis of balance
sheet returns. This is particularly important to mortgage bankers and
mortgage companies which tend to have narrow profitability margins.
After these three analyses, which were prompted by exceptionally high
delinquency rates during 1962 and 1963, there was little work on mortgage
risk sponsored by trade associations beyond overall monitoring of
delinquency rates by type of institution (e.g., MBA, 1971 to date).
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However, a few years hence, considerable public focus on civil rights and
- consumer issues related to mortgage lending would require further industry
research in response.
RISK STUDIES PUBLISHED ON FHA'S URBAN LOAN PROGRAMS AND CONSEQUENT
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN THE MORTGAGE MARKET (1968 TO 1974)
In November of 1965, the FHA Commissioner issued a general policy
statement which mandated:
FHA must stimulate and assist Residential rehabilitation and
financing of property transfers in all neighborhoods where property
values are sufficiently stable and long range prospects sufficiently
promising to make insurance of long term loans a reasonable risk.
Frees should not be excluded from FHA-insured loans because they are
old and located in the central part of the city. (Letter from
Commisioner of FHA U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
to All Approved Mortagages, November 8, 1965).
This policy statement was in by the FHA Commissioner to approve morga-
ges on July 81, 1967. In 1968, Congressional action on Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act and a Housing Act with major program emphasis on sub-
sidized housing in urban neighborhoods gave statutory clout to what had
previously been matters of FHA administrative policy. These events led to
a series of research studies and institutional reactions with some pro-
nounced effects on traditional lending criteria.
FHA-Sponsored Research
The von Furstenberg Studies (1971). This series of studies, based on
FHA and VA loan experience during the decade 1957 to 1966, was designed to
research past risk experience with federally insured loans in order to
address two provisions in the 1968 Housing and Urban Development Act which
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mandated significant departures from FHA's traditional loan insurance
policies. One was the mandate to provide homeownership opportunities for
lower income families under Section 235 of the Act. The other was to eli-
minate FHA "redlining" policies and provide mortgage insurance to pre-
viously redlined areas through a Special Risk Insurance Fund established
under Section 223(e) of the Act.
In one study, von Furstenberg examined original loan terms, the
seasoning effects over the life of the loan, and various borrower charac-
teristics including income. He concluded that lower income families per se
are not inherently riskier. Rather, high loan-to-value ratios associated
with low downpayment loans are the more significant determinant of risk.7
As a matter of public policy, von Furstenberg's apparent objective was to
convince FHA administrators that implementation of the Congressionally man-
dated "235" program for low-income households would not bankrupt the
insurance fund (von Furstenberg, 1971:39). Nonetheless, the author ex
presses reservations without any empirical analysis about the urban invest-
ment component of the program:
"It is conceivable that FHA has hitherto been very
selective in accepting low-income applicants under its
regular 203(b) program.... Before 1966, for instance,
properties located in decaying areas of the center
cities were frequently excluded from coverage through
the practice of redlining entire districts. To the
extent that such selectivity is incompatible with new
programs aiming at broad amelioration of homeownership
opportunities for disadvantaged families, the link be-
tween income deficiencies and default risk may become
stronger in the future." (von Furstenberg, 1971:39)
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However, risk indices developed by the author on income class and housing
type, offer some empirical evidence to the contrary (Exhibit 3-3). First,
both the simple and weighted risk indices are consistently higher for new
construction than for existing homes for all income groups. Second,
regarding the findings in the first study, it appears that loan-to-value
ratio is not always the better predictor of default, but rather the best
predictor of actuarial losses in the event of default. Among lower income
borrowers, income is higher than the loan-to-value ratio as an indicator of
default; it is only when these initial risk indices are weighted by the
expected dollar losses in the event of foreclosure that the loan-to-value
ratio takes precedence as the higher risk indicator for all income groups.
In another study in the series entitled "Risk Structures and the
Distribution of Benefits Within the FHA Home Mortgage Program", von
Furstenberg presents data to support the thesis that "progressive redistri-
bution remains an important feature of the FHA program" (von Furstenberg,
1971:42). Contrary to critical analyses of FHA programs, von Furstenberg
argues that historically FHA has subsidized lower income borrowers with
premiums from higher income borrowers. To support this argument, the
author presents a sample distribution of premium benefits (Exhibit 3-4).
Assuming that the year 1961 is representative, these data indicate that FHA
mortgagors with incomes below $7,500 are subsidized by the premiums paid by
higher income borrowers. Von Furstenberg states the policy issues raised
by these data thus:
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EXHIBIT 3-3
SIMPLE AND WEIGHTED RISK INDICES
FOR SELECTED INCOME CLASSES WITH
INCIDENCE EFFECTS DUE TO INCOME
AND LOAN-TO-VALUE RATIO
Income Class
Dollars Y Value
"New" Home
"New" Home
Mortgages
INDEX OF DEF
L/V Y Combineda
"Existing" Home
Mortgages
AULTED RISK
L/V Y Combineda
Below $4000
5,000 - 6,000
7,000 - 8,000
10,000-11,000
13,000-15,000
3.5
5.5
7.5
10.5
14.0
197
187
172
142
100
320
219
169
127
100
INDEX OF DEFAULTED RISK
WEIGHTED BY EXPECTED LOSSES
PER FORECLOSURE TO FHA
L/V Y Combineda L/V Y Combineda
Below $4,000
5,000 - 6,000
7,000 - 8,000
10,000-11,000
13,000-15,000
aLog-Linear specification:
multiplication of the partial indices.
Source: von Furstenberg, 1971:41.
the combined default index is derived by
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630
410
291
180
100
173
163
151
130
100
250
185
151
121
100
433
302
228
157
100
3.5
5.5
7.5
10.5
14.0
215
201
183
150
100
173
151
137
117
100
372
304
251
176
100
187
175
159
135
100
113
115
113
108
100
211
201
180
146
100
EXHIBIT 3-4
THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF MORTGAGORS
RECEIVING FHA INSURANCE IN 1961 AND
THE DISTRIBUTION OF INSURANCE BENEFITS
Weighted by Weighted by
Annual Effective Income Size of Default Risk
Income Distributiona Default Risk Losses per Foreclosure
Below $4,000b 2.3% 4.2% (+1.9) 2.9% (+0.6)
4,000 - 4,999 9.3 13.6 (+4.3) 10.7 (+1.4)
5,000 - 5,999 17.3 21.8 (+4.5) 20.0 (+2.7)
6,000 - 6,999 19.4 21.5 (+2.1) 21.5 (+2.1)
7,000 - 7,999 15.7 14.9 (-0.8) 16.0 (+0.3)
8,000 - 8,999 12.0 10.0 (-2.0) 11.5 (-0.5)
9,000 - 9,999 8.7 6.3 (-2.4) 7.6 (-1.1)
10,000 - 10,999 5.6 3.5 (-2.1) 4.4 (-1.2)
11,000 - 11,999 3.5 1.9 (-1.6) 2.4 (-1.1)
12,000 - 12,999 2.5 1.2 (-1.3) 1.5 (-1.0)
13,000 - 14,999c 1.9 0.7 (-1.2) 1.0 (-0.9)
15,000 and overd 1.8 0.4 (-1.4) 0.5 (-1.3)
TOTAL 100% 100% (0) 100% (0)
Median: $7,108 $6,484 $6,763
Average $7,611 $6,824 $7,125
aSource: Housing and Home Finance Agency, Fifteenth Annual Report
(Washington, D.C., 1963), pp. 120-21.
bFor the graph in Figure 2, this class is taken to extend from $3,000 to
$3,999 with midpoint $3,500.
cBecause the class interval is here $2,000 rather than $1,000, one-half
the value reported for this class is plotted at $14,000.
dThe upper class boundary is taken to be $19,000 so that one-quarter of the
values reported in this class is plotted at $17,000.
Source: von Furstenberg, 1971:44.
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"In a society reluctant to undertake cash transfers or
outright 'handouts', this is not always undesirable,
nor is it necessarily dishonest. It is merely incon-
sistent with the maximization of efficiency afforded by
a strict user charge system in which all actuarially
separable groups are charged a price to match their
risks. As it is, the lowest [income] group pays about
two-thirds its actuarial cost, but the highest income
group...pays more than twice its cost, at least in the
'new' home category, if the program as a whole is
expected to break even in the median income range of
$7,000-$7,999.... In other words, the lower 50 percent
of the families account for 63 percent of expected
defaults but certainly no more than 50 percent of total
premium income since lower incomes are connected with
smaller average mortgage balances.... Disregard of the
progressive intraprogram redistribution of insurance
benefits can therefore cause one to underestimate the
social significance of the regular FHA program." (von
Furstenberg, 1971:42, 45, 46)
Regarding future underwriting policies of the FHA, von Furstenberg
expresses concern that the FHA non-subsidized insurance fund programs may
be forced to serve fewer lower-income households. One inadvertent effect
of FHA's recent statutory and administrative emphasis on lower-income
households in urban areas had been to foster rapid growth of private
mortgage insurance companies (PMI's). As PMI's bid for the higher income
households with lower loan-to-value ratios, FHA is "subject to adverse
selectivity and the scope of its market operations as well as its ability
to conduct intraprogram transfers are progressively reduced.... The agency
has to drop bad risks as it loses good risks who might have supported them,
or else the requirement of actuarial soundness will have to be modified"
(von Furstenberg, 1971:46).
The Shaw Study (1977). This analysis, done as a doctoral thesis by
the Chief Statistician at HUD, endeavors to develop a credit scoring model
for the 203(b) program. The objectives of developing such a model are to
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(1) reduce "the number of mortgages insured that go into default, as well
as the number rejected that could have proven to be good risks," (2) mini-
mize "the cost of examination" of mortgage loan applications, as "junior
employees could handle more initially," and (3) "improve ability to justify
rejections, i.e., loan denials," at least on the basis of quantitative risk
considerations if not social policy considerations (Shaw, 1977:26).
Shaw's effort, in the aftermath of FHA's subsidized urban lending
initiatives, focused on a limited number of factors including "borrower,
financial, and mortgage characteristics commonly used in the credit-
granting decision process" (Shaw, 1977:28). However, any risks associated
with urban lending under these reformed programs were not addressed as
"neither neighborhood characteristics, location factors,. nor physical
attributes of the property were considered in this analysis" (Shaw, 1977:
28-29). Thus, while Shaw's data base covered post-1968 delinquency and
default experience under the non-subsidized "203(b)" program, it does not
address the policy questions raised by the 1968 reforms.
Shaw's emphasis was pre-1968 in that his major focus was the develop-
ment of a risk rating model, comparable to Babcock's Rating Grid in use up
to 1963. He maintained that his ability to correctly classify 60 percent
or more of the loans sampled as either "paid up" or "in default" indicated
that
"...there was some weakness in the risk-rating system
currently in use, since it had been possible for the
model to detect a significant number of bad risk
mortgages that had been insured as good risks under the
Section 203(b) program. By using a computerized model,
similar to the one developed in this study, it night be
possible to strengthen the underwriting process to more
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nearly approach the level of accuracy of the former
successful (but cumbersome) system, which was abandoned
by FHA in 1963, at a time when there was need for
speedier processing."
However, Shaw acknowledges the inadequacies of credit scoring models in
identification of underwriting standards which lead to rejection of credit-
worthy borrowers (Type II statistical error) and which were the primary
concern of the 1968 reforms.8
External Critiques of Federally Insured Loan Policies and
Management Practices
Critiques of federally insured loan programs prior to 1968 focused on
either (1) the poor quality of newly constructed homes financed with
federally insured loans during the post World War II single-family
construction boom, or (2) the absence of social policy objectives in these
publicly administered programs. The second set of critiques was directed
at FHA's service to the middle bracket of homeowners while private lenders
through conventional loans continued to mortgage the lower as well as
higher priced homes. Why should a public institution serve the middle of
the market? The fact that lenders would issue uninsured loans on even
lower priced homes to lower income households was tangible evidence that
these loans were not high risk and should not require a publicly admi-
nistered insurance fund. This set of critiques, however, is premised on
the liberal paradigm in which the purpose of public intervention is to
serve the objectives of promoting greater equity and access to resources.
From the conservative or neoclassical perspectives, FHA's macroeconomic
emphasis on stimulating housing construction, i.e., creation of new assets
and thereby contributing to national productivity rather than financing
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existing assets, and thus on geographic redistribution of capital intrare-
gionally from cities to suburbs and interregionally from the Northeast to
the South and the West was an even more valid public purpose.
After 1968, critics focused on the effort to overlay socially oriented
programs on what had traditionally been a businessoriented agency. Apart
from Congressional mandates to make minority homebuyers and minority neigh-
borhoods beneficiaries of the traditional 203(b) program, new programs were
directed at low income homebuyers who required public subsidies, Section
235, and at urban neighborhoods, particularly minority areas, which FHA had
traditionally redlined and still perceived as too risky for mutual mortgage
fund insurance, Section 223(e). These works exposed the abuses of federal
funds and full insurance provisions by private lenders, real estate
brokers, and FHA personnel. There were three types of investigations done
in the early 1970's, a few years after this departure in program
orientation.
First, there were a series of Congressional hearings (U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary,
1971 and 1972; U.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee
on the Judiciary, 1971), media exposes, and several books (Boyer, 1973;
D wnie, 1974) devoted to the process by which (1) neighborhoods were
targeted by the real estate industry as ripe for racial turnover; (2) home
sales accelerated through blockbusting, i.e., racial scare tactics used by
real estate brokers to trigger rapid turnover where the brokers themselves
would often buy low and within a matter of days turn around and sell high
to a new homebuyer; (3) FHA loans approved for the new, usually black,
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homebuyers at appraised values inflated by FHA personnel, who were either
in collusion with the real estate brokers or simply trying to meet the
"affirmative minority marketing" quotas established in the Washington, D.C.
office, and (4) little underwriting done by the private institutions origi-
nating the loans as the mortgages were not only 100 percent insured but
often yielded, as a result of points charged, a higher rate of return in
the first few years (and thus the private originator had no long-term
interest in whether the loans were paid up or in default). This muckraking
work led to criminal investigations and indictments served on individuals
involved. Threats of anti-trust suits against groups of lending
institutions were levied where there were collective decisions about FHA
minority loan promotion. More extensive regulations were promulgated both
for FHA personnel and FHA-approved lenders regarding loan origination and
servicing with sanctions subsequently exercised against violators.
Second, several technical studies were performed by outside
researchers under contracts with FHA. Under one by Lefcoe and Toten
(1975), the primary purpose was to explore the causes of defaults (defined
as loans where payment was 30 days or more overdue) and possible foreclo-
sure in three of the single-family insurance programs (203, 221d3, and 235)
administered oy HUD-FHA. A related purpose was "to develop a statistically
based predictor index bx which HUD-FHA can identify prospective mortgagors
most likely to default and, of those mortgagors in default, those likely to
reinstate versus those likely to go into foreclosure" (Lefcoe and Toten,
1974:1). Most of the findings in this research pointed to lender servicing
as a key determinant of default and, particularly, foreclosure. Of the two
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basic methods by which a servicer can accommodate reinstatement of a
delinquent borrower, "lump sum payment" plans (where the "defaulter pays at
one time all delinquent amounts plus any late charges and additional costs
advanced by the mortgage servicer") have a "greater chance of redefault
than do reinstatements effected under repayment plans... where the
defaulter pays, in addition to regular monthly payment, an amount suf-
ficient to eradicate the delinquency, usually over a period of not more
than six months" (Lefcoe and Toten, 1975: 42, 44, 77). Of the three types
of servicers studied, mortgage companies relied upon lump sum payments in
89 percent of their cases while savings and loan associations and banks
relied on this method much less frequently. In multivariate analyses, the
researchers tried to differentiate defaults, foreclosures, loans
reinstated, and recidivist loans and found "the regression runs produced no
equations which could have been used for predicting a particular status
subsequent to the occurrence of default" based on the characteristics of
the borrower, property, or loan itself (Lefcoe and Toten, 1975:49). In
sum, the authors concluded that lender servicing, particularly adherence to
special forbearance regulations, and more rigorous HUD-FHA enforcement
would decrease the number of defaults which ultimately went into
foreclosure. In another HUD-FHA contract, Bachman (1977) commended Lefcoe
and support staff for their application of meaningful institutional ser-
vicer analyses to their evaluation of mortgage risk:
"...almost all previous studies of the problem seemed
to imply by their design that the key to understanding
the causes of delinquency and foreclosure could be
found by examination of characteristics of the
property, the mortgage, or the borrower, while little
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attention, if any, was given to what impact the actions
of the mortgagees and their policies on mortgage ser-
vicing and origination had on alleviating or contri-
buting to the problem of mortgage defaults." (Bachman,
1977:66-67)
Bachman's own analyses of FHA default loan data offered some interesting
methodological insights on the use of factor and cluster analysis, but his
strictly quantitative efforts did not offer either an applicable predictive
risk multivariate model or any further insights on institutional servicing
factors relative to the incidence of risk.
The third type of study addressed concerns of institutional investors
relative to the departure of FHA from traditional underwriting practices
and its effect on their decisions to purchase FHA loans for their
portfolio. Prior to the late 1960's, life insurance companies had been a
major purchaser of one-to-four family federally insured loans. The
"widespread withdrawal of life insurance companies from single-family
financing commitments evident since 1967", has been attributed primarily to
tight money conditions in which competing sectors such as real estate
financing of apartment houses and commercial properties offered higher
rates of return on mortgage financing through "equity kickers" (von
Furstenberg, 1971:62). However, some analysts have noted the coincidence
of this with the urban reinvestment policy initiatives of the federal
government and subsequent changes in FHA program administration during this
period (Orren, 1974:136). At this juncture, federally sponsored credit
agencies such as FNMA and, after 1971, FHLMC began to serve the growing
secondary mortgage market. In 1975, two FNMA staff economists performed a
study to identify "the socio-economic determinants of foreclosures on par-
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ticular types of government assisted mortgages -- specifically mortgages
insured under Sections 221 and 235 of the National Housing Act" (FNMA
1975:1). The study "focused on area or neighborhood effects as they relate
to foreclosures as opposed to microeconomic influences such as the charac-
teristics of the individual mortgagor or the mortgage contract itself"
FNMA, (FNMA, 1975:1). Among the "neighborhood effects" examined were the
number of indictments by metropolitan area for violations of federal law
under these housing programs, most of which involved bribery of FHA
appraisers and falsification of credit reports referred to in the
discussion of Congressional hearings and investigations described above.
This variable, as a "non-economic determinant of foreclosure", proved to be
"the most important variable" in their statistical analyses FNMA, 1975:12,
16).9 These results indicate that from the perspective of an investor
such as FNMA, institutional factors may critically affect loan origination
and servicing and, thus, serve as determinants of the quality of their
mortgage portfolio.
Private Mortgage Insurance Companies: Rapid Expansion in Suburban Markets
as FHA Mandated to Reinvest in Cities.
After 1968, private mortgage insurance companies (PMI's) began to grow
very rapidly. Much of this market expansion, particularly in suburban
areas, was attributed to FHA scandals and indictments which followed poorly
administered FHA efforts to serve previously redlined urban areas and lower
income households. Subsequent expansion of regulatory and paper work
requirements in an effort to avoid such scandals served as further disin-
centive for private lenders to use FHA unless there were no other
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al ternati ve.
PMI's offered mortgage lenders a means to provide low down-payment
mortgages to primarily suburban customers with little more than a day
required in processing time for insurance approval. Most of these PMI
offerings operated as co-insurance programs in which the company insured
that amount of the mortgage over 80 percent of the appraised value of the
property, i.e., the amount extended over conventional statutory maximums.
Insurance coverage was issued on either a short-term basis, over the ini-
tial period until the loan amount outstanding was reduced to 80 percent or
less of the initial appraised value, or on a longer term basis as a
percentage coverage of the outstanding loan amount through maturity.
As a result of the rapid growth of these programs and the extent to
which rapid appreciation in real estate had outpaced many middle-income
homebuyers' ability to put the full 20 percent down required for conven-
tional loans, FNMA and FHLMC commissioned a private consultant study
(Arthur D. Little, 1975) to evaluate (1) the financial soundness of the
companies themselves and (2) the performance of their underwriting prac-
tices in screening loans submitted to them for insurance. The major con-
cern regarding the companies themselves was the extent to which their
predecessors had folded during the Depression, largely as a result of
reserves invested almost exclusively in unliquid real estate investments.
ADL investigated this issue through simulated models and concluded that
"the private mortgage insurance industry is solid with widespread insolven-
cies very unlikely under foreseeable conditions" with some recommendations
for improved underwriting and loss management (ADL, 1975-b:51). Regarding
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the second concern, the research team found that PMI rejection rates on
loans submitted to them by private lenders "are typically twice as high for
rural resort properties as urban properties, and rejection rates for urban
properties are typically ten times higher than rejection rates for suburban
prooerties." (ADL, 1975a:41) While it appears from ADL's subsequent risk
analyses that rural/resort properties are above average risk, in two out of
three policy types, the loss incidence associated with urban based proper-
ties was actually less than that of suburban properties, as shown in
Exhibit 3-5. Each of the major PMI companies were interviewed by ADL on
their property underwriting principles. About half the companies
interviewed placed their primary emphasis on one or more of the following
neighborhood variables:
. Conformity with neighborhood style
. Location within neighborhood
. Quality and trend of neighborhood
The other half placed their primary emphasis on the condition of the pro-
perty (ADL, 1975a:27). In sum, the private mortgage insurance industry
appeared to have adopted traditional appraisal and underwriting standards
with little modification based on their own risk experience.
ADVENT OF CONSUMER PROTECTION: REDLINING AND REINVESTMENT
INITIATIVES (1975 TO 1980)
Traditional Emphasis in Public Regulation of Mortgage Lending
Institutions on "Safe and Sound" Business Practices
Much of the present statutory framework for bank regulation was for-
mulated in response to the bankruptcy of many financial institutions during
the Depression in the 1930's. Under these circumstances, many household
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depositors lost their life savings. As a result, each institution's
charter to meet "public convenience and needs" was defined largely in terms
of ensuring that depositors' savings were protected through prudent
investment. Little or no consideration was given to the public's access to
capital, types of borrowers or creditworthy needs not served by the insti-
tution in the geographic area it was publicly chartered. The concern was
not with exclusion of good risks (i.e., how many mortgages were not made as
a result of overly restrictive underwriting criteria) but rather with
inclusion of any bad risks (i.e., how many mortgage loans might be made
with lax underwriting criteria).
Annual examinations, or audits, conducted by bank regulatory agencies
were consequently designed to evaluate whether the loan origination and
underwriting policies were sufficiently exclusionary. Mortgage loan per-
formance of an institution has generally been assessed by the regulator in
terms of:
. the number of delinquent loans, i.e., those with
payments overdue for 30 days or more;
. the dollar amounts outstanding;
the probability of repayment; and,
for loans where no payments have been made for
90 days or more, the probability of recouping
the unpaid loan amount through foreclosure and
resale of the property or, if the loan is insured,
through collection from a federal or private
insurance fund.
Overall, the regulatory examination of mortgage loan performance has
focused on the delinquencies and defaults, the loans which have gone bad.
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EXHIBIT 3-5
Pol isy
Type
EFFECT OF LOCATION OF PROPERTY ON THE
RELATIVE RISK OF LOSS INCIDENCE,
BY POLICY TYPE
Location of Property
Urban Suburban Rural
80-90 .95 .98 1.32
95(20) .72 1.07 1.84
95(25) 1.08 .93 2.72
aPolicy type refers to the loan-to-value ratio and, parenthetically, the
maturity of the loan.
bl.00 = Average risk for policy type.
Source: Table 11-16 (ADL, 1975a:43).
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Private industry emphasis on property and location has been fostered
by public statutory and regulatory focus. Statutory requirements include:
limitations on the maximum loan amounts that can be
made relative to the appraised value of the property;
. geographic restrictions on the distance over which an
institution could originate mortgages (on the assump-
tion that property appraisals were best done by insti-
tutions in housing market areas with which they were
most familiar);
. requirements that, in the event of a prolonged
delinquency of 60 days or more, to reappraise the pro-
perty in anticipation of foreclosure.
What is most striking about these property appraisal provisions is the
extent to which comparable underwriting requirements for other aspects of
mortgage risk, e.g., borrower's ability to repay or creditworthiness, are
generally not addressed in federal and state banking statutes or
regulations.
Consumer Credit Legislation and Regulation
During the 1970's, major legislative reforms were introduced which
have significantly modified the statutory mandate of the banking industry,
and in turn, banking regulatory agencies. Reforms directed at residential
mortgage lending included:
. the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), enacted in
1972 and substantially strengthened several years
later, which prohibited differential treatment on the
basis of applicant characteristics and source or type
of income not directly related to the applicant's abil-
ity or willingness to pay;
. the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), enacted in 1975
and reauthorized in 1980, which required federally char-
tered or insured institutions to publicly disclose the
geographic distribution of their mortgage loan
portfolios; and
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. the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977, which
stipulated that an institution's charter to serve
"public convenience and needs" was predicated not only
on deposit needs but credit needs served, "particularly
in low and moderate income areas" of the charter
territory.
Cumulatively, the enactment of these laws and consequent regulatory
requirements have had a pronounced effect on traditional banking
regulation. CRA required federal regulators to extend both their annual
examinations and their periodic review in conjunction with any application
for institutional expansion through branching or mergers to include an
evaluation of the credit needs served. Regulators were encouraged to use
the information required under ECQA and HMDA in their CRA evaluations. The
extensive documentation on mortgage lending patterns and practices which
preceded or supported these legislative and regulatory changes is sum-
marized in the following section.
Studies on Urban Mortgage Lending Patterns and Practices
The literature on redlining evolved through three generations of
studies. The first generation was based on data obtained through property
transfer records at local registries of deeds, census data, annual finan-
cial reports of individual banks, and case histories of mortgage applica-
tion experiences of local residents. The second generation of studies have
been based on geographic breakdowns of mortgage loan activity, data
publicly disclosed by individual lending institutions under legal require-
ments of federal or state governments. In some cases, state regulators or
a regional office of federal regulator also required corresponding deposit
data. The third generation is distinctly different from the first two.
Rather than analyses of loan data aggregated by geographic area, this
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generation of studies generally used data from individual loan files and,
thus, for the most part avoided the problems of statistical interpretation
and potential "ecological fallacies" inherent in aggregated data.
Moreover, this generation of studies has been able to focus beyond general
documentation of mortgage investment patterns to issues of risk perceptions
and portfolio experience with mortgage delinquencies and defaults.
First Generation Studies. The more extensive studies in this series
were analyses done on Baltimore (Home Ownership Development Program, 1973),
Chicago (Bradford, et. al., 1975; Feins, 1976), Cincinnati (McKee, 1974),
Los Angeles (Center for New Corporate Priorities, 1975), New York (Devine,
Winston, and Sims, 1973), Philadelphia (Northwest Community Association,
1973) and Washington, D.C. (Public Interest Research Group, 1975). These
studies were performed largely by or for community organizations.
Generally, analyses indicated that there were fewer mortgages and fewer
mortgage dollars, particularly conventional as opposed to federally insured
loans, invested in urban areas as compared with suburban areas. In some
instances, loan volume was assessed against census tract data on housing
and population characteristics. These preliminary study results were used
by neighborhood groups and public interest organizations to persuade
legislators and regulators that measures such as the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA) were needed so that mortgage data could be compiled
and analyzed more systematically (U.S. Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 1975).
Second Generation Studies. Analyses of the mortgage data required
under HMDA were sponsored by three types of institutions -- community
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organizations, state bank regulators, and federal bank regulatory agencies.
Many of the community organizations which had undertaken the initial stud-
ies compiled the data disclosed by financial institutions under HMDA. The
most extensive of these, based on bank data from eight metropolitan areas,
reaffirmed findings of the first generation studies using essentially the
same research methodologies (Przybysky, 1978).
Several state regulatory agencies also assumed responsibility for com-
piling and analyzing this second generation data. In California, an analy-
sis of several cities was performed under the California Department of
Savings and Loans (1978); in Connecticut, the banking department
commissioned a study of each of the metropolitan areas in that state (Gold,
1977); in Massachusetts, the research staff of the Banking Department per-
formed an analysis of mortgage and deposit disclosure data for metropolitan
Boston (Taggart, Smith, and Phenix, 1977); in Michigan, a report on disclo-
sure data analysis performed by the state Financial Institutions Bureau and
results of enforcement activities under a state anti-redlining law
(Michigan Financial Institutions Bureau, 1980); and, in New York, a preli-
minary report on each metropolitan area based on in-house and consultant
research was published by the New York Banking Department (1977). Most of
these studies attempted to develop measures of demand, either statistical
models of expected mortgage investment or other such measures, against
which the disclosed data on applications received and mortgages supplied
could be assessed. The findings of these second generation studies by
state regulators generally indicated that on the basis of aggregate data at
the census tract or zip code level, there appeared to be shortfalls in bank
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mortgage investment in many urban neighborhoods. However, the aggregate
data on which these studies were based only offered observations on cumula-
tive lending patterns. Without data on the individual loans, researchers
could not isolate the associated borrower, property, or loan factors.
Research efforts were limited to analyses of volume and types of loans
(conventional or federally insured) by general demographic characteristics
of a neigh-borhood. Most importantly, one could not control for individual
loan factors and test whether these neighborhood characteristics offered
any further explanation of bank (1) loan origination practices, and (2)
subsequent risk experience with delinquencies and defaults.
Third Generation Studies. These analyses were directed at evaluation
of the urban risk concerns of lenders. There have been three basic analy-
tical approaches in this generation of studies. One is a cumulative
mortgage portfolio risk experience approach (Brimmer and Company, 1977).
Another set is directed at underwriting criteria introduced at the stage of
mortgage application and either rejection or approval with terms and con-
ditions which the lender views as appropriately matched to risk consid-
erations (Benston in New York Banking Department, 1977; Benston, Horsky,
and Weingartner, 1978; Benston and Horsky, 1979; Sandor and Sosin, 1975;
Schafer, 1978; and Schafer and Ladd, 1980). And finally, several studies
have analyzed loans delinquent and in default to assess which borrower,
property, loan, and urban neighborhood characteristics, if any, were most
strongly associated with these riskier loans (von Furstenberg, and Green,
1974; Morton, 1974; and, Schafer, 1978).
In 1977, the United States League of Savings Associations commissioned
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a study from the consulting firm of a former member of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Andrew F. Brimmer (Brimmer and
Company, 1977). In the preface, Brimmer stated the study purpose thus:
"We were asked to appraise '...the risks inherent in
socially-oriented lending'. The assignment was inter-
preted by us as requiring an assessment of the extra
risk -- if any -- which lenders would face if they were
to expand appreciably the volume of loans extended to
inner-city borrowers."
In making this assessment, Brimmer chose to extrapolate from a study done
by a member of the FHLBB research staff on minority-controlled savings and
loan associations in which 31 of these institutions were compared with 31
white owned institutions extablished prior to 1964 of comparable asset size
in the same SMSA or county (Brimmer and Company, 1977:29). In doing so,
Brimmer assumed that "although the study provided no data on loan losses
(which would relate directly to risk), one can infer a great deal from the
institutions' combined balance sheets" (Brimmer and Company, 1977:39).
Specifically, given "the fraction of assets represented by foreclosed real
estate" was somewhat higher for the minority-owned than white-owned insti-
tutions, the study concluded that inner-city lending was inherently riskier
(Brimmer and Company, 1977:43). These findings, based on cumulative port-
folio experience of a select set of savings and loan associations, face
some of the same problems of analytical interpretation as the second
generation of studies. Without an analysis of the individual loan factors
and institutional factors, particularly structural problems such as the age
of the institutions and the relative seasoning of their portfolios, no firm
conclusions on risk could be drawn from these analyses. Moreover, this
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study does not even examine the geographic distribution of these foreclo-
sures and analyze the associated neighborhood demographics as was done in
the second generation studies. The authors assumed that the loans in
default held by minority institutions represented urban risk while those
held by non-minority institutions were proportionately lower representing
lower ratios of investment in urban areas. Finally, the fundamental pur-
pose of the study appears to have been to provide the League of Savings
Associations with an empirical rationale for promoting a series a new
federal mortgage insurance programs. The proposed programs were
unquestionably predicated on the assumption that loans in urban areas
inherently offered higher risk exposure to the lender. They included (1) a
coinsurance program in which 80 percent of the loan would be insured with
only 20 percent at risk by the lender,10 (2) adjustment of interest rates
to reflect differential risks, (3) higher downpayments, homeowner
counseling, variable user charges directly related to transaction costs,
and (4) risk pooling through multi-bank service corporations (Brimmer and
Company, 1977:70; 80-88). In sum, "rising public demand favoring the
expansion of mortgage lending in urban areas" would require new means of
risk reduction to enable savings institutions to prudently respond.
A second series in this generation of studies examined risk
assessments made by lenders at the time of application or loan origination.
These studies provide some insight into the underwriting standards actually
used by tne lending institutions from which these loan data were obtained.
Two major studies of this type were conducted with data from savings insti-
tutions in New York and California where state regulations required record-
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keeping on rejected as well as approved loan applications. Some minor
studies were also conducted elsewhere with more limited data boses.
In 1978, one of these major studies was commissioned by the New York
Savings Bank Association as a part of a research project on "redlining" in
response to first and second generation studies, many of which had been
done on New York banks (Schafer, 1978). The study covered state-chartered
savings banks in the six metropolitan areas in that state. The primary
research question in this phase of the study was whether black mortgage
applicants were treated more adversely than whites. For five of the six
metropolitan areas, the results indicated that blacks had significantly
higher probabil-ities of denial than their white counterparts even after
controlling for key socioeconomic variables such as household income
(Exhibit 3-6).
In a subsequent study, Schafer co-authored an expanded analysis of the
New York data in conjunction with loan application data of state-chartered
savings and loan associations in sixteen metropolitan areas in California
(Schafer and Ladd, 1980). This study found some evidence of adverse
treatment, both approvals with less advantageous terms and outright denials
for classes of borrowers such as minorities nominally protected by civil
rights and ecual credit statutes. Key findings specifically related to
perceptions of urban risks included:
In California, "there is some strong evidence that
certain types of applicants are discriminated
against...." Specifically, "Spanish applicants are as
much as 2.5 times as likely to be denied than similarly
situated whites; other minorities are as much as 5.9
times as likely to be denied." Also, "applications for
mortgages in black or Spanish neighborhoods have a
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EXHIBIT 3-6
Probability of Denial by Race of Applicant
(Controlling for Pertinent Socioeconomic Characteristics)
Metropolitan Area
Albany-
Schenectady-
Troy
N/Aa
N/ Aa
Buffalo Syracuse Rochest
24%
12%
14%,15%
7%
New York &
Nassau-
Suffolk
er (2)
21%
4% 11%
aStatistical analyses indicated that applicants of different races
treated equally at institutions sampled in this metropolitan area.
Source: Schafer, 1978.
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Race of
Applicant
Black
White
higher chance of denial or downward modification than
similar applications in neighborhoods with average con-
centrations of minorities." (Ibid:3-80, 3-82, 3-83, and
3-84).
In New York, the loan denial results were compar-
able to those summarized above as the data were ana-
lyzed in a similar fashion in Schafer's first study
(1978). The results on adverse loan modifications
"indicate that blacks are more likely to be modified
by mutual savings banks and savings and loan
associations. The latter are also more likely to
modify applications from Hispanics." (Ibid:6-63).
Results on denials or modifications on the basis of
neighborhood characteristics held true in some types
of banks in some of the metropolitan areas, but
generally were not strong.
In sum, risk differentiation by race of applicant has been a statistically
significant determinant of a lender's decision to deny or adversely modify
the terms of the loan requested in both states. In California, racial com-
position of the neighborhood also appears to influence these loan
decisions.
Two minor studies in this third generation of studies analyzed
differences in terms and conditions on loans originated. One, based on a
sample of approved mortgages from one California savings and loan associa-
tion tried to evaluate the determinants of mortgage risk premiums -- that
is, the difference between the effective interest rate on the loan and the
effective prime rate on the date the loan was originated (Sandor and Sosin,
1975). This study is formulated on the basis of neoclassical assumptions
that mortgages should be available to riskier borrowers or on properties in
risker neighborhoods at a price -- that is, an interest rate premium. With
relatively weak results from a li ted data base, this study only serves to
question whether neoclassical theories of pricing by interest rates in fact
- 132 -
hold true, in the home mortgage market. The more extensive studies on
California and New York described above and below indicate that variation
is in other loan terms, with effectively higher costs assumed by the
borrower, or outright denial of access to mortgage credit at any price.
Several other minor studies were based on approved loan data offered
voluntarily by savings institutions in Rochester, New York, and some survey
data devel-oped by the researchers (Benston in New York Banking Department,
1977; Benston, Horsky, and Weingarten, 1978; Benston and Horsky, 1979).
These studies corroborated the existence of differential lending patterns,
but interpreted these results as either (1) indicative of the higher risks
involved for the lender, or (2) weaker effective demand on the part of
urban borrowers, either in terms of stated preferences or in terms of
financial resources to exercise a broader range of loan alternatives. One
example of the first set of interpretations arose where study results indi-
cated shorter maturities offered on urban than suburban homes. The authors
attributed this to the fact that urban homes are older, likely to have a
shorter "useful life," and, hence, shorter maturities accurately reflect
risk. The second set of interpretations is illustrated by study results
which indicated suburban borrowers were more likely to receive conventional
loans; urban borrowers, federally insured loans. These patterns were
attributed to suburban borrowers' preference for lower interest rates and
both their willingness and financial ability to make higher initial down-
payments to qualify for a conventional loan.
In sum, this series of studies based on application and loan origina-
tion data indicates generally concludes that there are differential pat-
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terns of investment. Those based on initial application data which
included rejected as well as approved applications, concluded that racial
and other non-economic attributes of the borrower and neighborhood did
appear to influence lenders' perceptions of risk and, hence, disposition of
loan applications (Schafer, 1978; Schafer and Ladd, 1980). Those developed
from data limited to approved applications generally concluded that dif-
ferential terms indicate differential treatment of urban and suburban
borrowers. However, interpretation of these findings vary considerably.
Researchers whose analyses are predicated on neoclassical market theory
assumptions interpret these results as indicative of risks, differentials
in effective demand. (Benston, et. al. 1978; Sandor and Sosin 1975). Find-
ings of other studies indicate that these differential terms do not stem
from financial factors (Schafer, 1978; Schafer and Ladd, 1980). These stu-
dies indicate that empirical evidence supports liberal or structuralist
assumptions that differential lending patterns are not only the result of
weaker demand in urban areas, but also of differential treatment of non-
financial factors on the part of institutional suppliers. However, these
studies of risk perceptions at origination would require analyses of subse-
quent risk experience with delinquencies and defaults in order to assess
the accuracy of the lender's original perceptions.
The final series in this third generation of studies analyzed loans
delinquent and in default in terms of urban borrower attributes and neigh-
borhood characteristics associated with these riskier status categories
(von Furstenberg and Green, 1974; Morton, 1974; Schafer, 1978; and,
Williams, et. al., 1973). The only published precedents for these analyses
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were the earlier FHA anJ VA studies focused on portfolio risk, i.e., were
underwriting standards sufficiently stringent so as to exclude numerous
delinquencies and defaults. One exception in that series was the study
done by von Furstenberg which concluded that loans to lower income house-
holds were not inherently riskier such that FHA could liberalize its loan
origination criteria to include more lower income households. This final
set of analyses, based on conventional as well as federally insured loans,
was generally directed at assessing whether lending institutions could
prudently liberalize their loan origination criteria to extend more loans
in urban areas, particularly in minority communities.
Several of these early studies (von Furstenberg and Green, 1974;
Ibid., 1975; Williams, et. al., 1973) were based on limited data volun-
tarily provided by one or more savings and loan associations from
Pittsburgh. The research conducted by Green and von Furstenberg was speci-
fically designed to assess the mortgage risks associated with minority
residents on the basis of over 7,000 current and delinquent loan from one
Pittsburgh savings and loan association. On the basis of statistical anal-
yses which examined "the extent to which low incomes and a high and rising
percentage of blacks are indeed associated with an increase in lending risk
on single-family home mortgages: -
Since the association with race is quite dispersed
and since there are several characteristics other than
race exerting a significant influence on delinquency
rates, redlining of all areas with more than 25 percent
blacks would be entirely too crude. It would condemn
all such areas alike by the single criterion of race,
while they are, in fact, diverse from the standpoint of
mortgage quality.... [I]f mortgage quality is not clos-
ely related to the income levels of mortgagors or to
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the racial makeup of neighborhoods, wholesale exclusion
of entire areas is an excessively crude method of
screening out high risks, even by the normal standards
of private business. (von Furstenberg and Green, 1974:
165, 176)"
The research done by Williams and his coauthors indicated little correla-
tion between any of the 18 factors used and delinquency or foreclosure.
The two other studies were based on more extensive data. Morton
(1974) examined the delinquency and default experience of 24 Connecticut
banks. Schafer (1978) examined the loan experience of mutual savings banks
in seven metropolitan areas in New York state.
The Morton study, unlike the others in this group, did not explicitly
examine the risks associated with lending in urban neighborhoods. However,
implicitly these public concerns had generated a growing interest on the
part of both the lending industry and public regulatory agencies in the
development of objective credit scoring models which should be used in the
evaluation of mortgage loan applications. This study introduced statisti-
cal techniques to home mortgage credit which had previously been applied to
other types of credit such as business and personal loans. Using 12 fac-
tors related to the individual loan, borrower or property characteristics,
Morton was able to correctly classify most of the loans in his sample as
either current, delinquent or in default. 12 While Morton did not examine
the relevance of neighborhood factors, in addition to the individual
borrower and property characteristics, he also analyzed differences in loan
type (conventional and federally insured) and loan terms by size and type
of institution (mutual savings bank, savings and loan association, or com-
mercial bank). He concluded that, "in general, savings and loan asso-
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ciations tended to be the most aggressive lenders" with more loans with
higher risk characteristics than commercial banks which "appeared to be the
most conservative" (Morton, 1974:53). Also, larger institutions, par-
ticularly among the savings and commercial banks, invest proportionately
more of their mortgage portfolio in federally insured loans than smaller
institutions (Morton, 1974:48). These observations indicate the extent to
which loan origination criteria, appraisal and underwriting standards, may
vary by institution type and size. These results support the structuralist
paradigm that risk evaluations are influenced not only by the effective
applicant demand but by institutional agendas such as the expansion of
mortgage loan portfolios (by savings and loan associations) or extension of
federally insured loans (by larger institutions).
Finally, as a sequel to the analyses of New York loan application data
discussed earlier, Schafer evaluated the mortgage risk experience of the
savings banks in these same six metropolitan areas. Data were obtained
directly from the loan files of the institutions which had commissioned the
study in four status categories: active and current; active and
delinquent; foreclosed loans; satisfied loans, i.e., paid off. Schafer
used these data to address "redlining" issues by (1) controlling for
borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, and "objective" geographic
characteristics such as population decline, and (2) entering several urban
neighborhood factors such as age of housing stock commonly assumed by len-
ders to be associated with higher risk. Of the four defined risk outcomes
(probability of delinquency, duration of delinquency, frequency of
delinquency, and probability of foreclosure), only those on the probability
- 137 -
of foreclosure explained 40 percent or more of the likelihood of higher
risk. The incremental effects of the neighborhood characteristics, after
controlling for individual loan data, were generally weak or equivocal. 13
CONCLUSIONS
Mortgage lending criteria have been predicted both on property and
location standards formulated in the 1920's, and household financial stan-
dards developed by the Federal Housing Administration in 1930's. For the
most part, analyses of mortgage risk have focused exclusively on borrower
economic information. Those studies which have examined urban property and
neighborhood characteristics have generally found that while these charac-
teristics may be used by lenders to differentiate loan applications at
origination, they are generally insignificent in subsequent analyses of
delinqency and default experience. The following chapter provides a series
of analyses which further develop these earlier mortgage risk analyses.
One series of analyses which further develop these earlier mortgage risk
analyses. One series is designed to identify those characteristics which
lenders in metropolitan Boston have used to differentiate conventional and
federally insured borrowers. Given the paucity of information on rejected
loan applications and the fact that subsequent delinquency and default
experience cannot be analyzed on loans which were not made, these analyses
of the lenders' decision-making on loan type offer considerable insight on
risk assessment at origniation. The second series, as a sequel to the
first identifies those borrower and loan characteristics which are sta-
tistically associated with delinquency and default and which generally
138 -
overshadow the property and neighborhood characteristics which Boston area
lenders appear to have traditionally perceived as higher risk.
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER 3
1Today, the Federal Housing Administration, which is within the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, administers four different
insurance funds: the Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, created in 1934 and
since 1938 used only to provide mortgage insurance on one-to-four family
homes under the "203" programs; the Cooperative Management Fund created in
1950 to insure loans on cooperatively owned residences; the General
Insurance Fund established in 1965 as a means of consolidating "a wide
variety of programs of varying risks" (Armstrong, 1977:6); and, a Special
Risk Insurance Fund created by Congress in 1968 for subsidy programs, both
homeowner ("235") and multi-unit rent ("236") programs, and for "the 223(e)
program, which was designed to provide insurance in older declining inner
city areas" (Armstrong, 1977:8). The first two funds were established as
mutual funds, that is, it was anticipated that they would be selfsustaining
with sufficient reserves from premium payments to cover any losses. Thus,
the risk exposure on these loans was envisioned as being minimal , without
requiring public subsidy. The third and fourth funds, however, were not so
structured as it was anticipated that claims might well exceed revenue from
premiums, thus requiring public subsidy.
For purposes of this discussion and analyses of federally insured loan
data in Chapter 4, only those programs under which one-to-four family homes
are insured will be addressed and, within these programs, primary emphasis
will be given to those where neither individual loans nor the fund are sub-
sidized (Mutual Fund, Section "203" loans) and secondary emphasis to those
where the individual loan is not subsidized but the insurance fund may
require some subsidy (Special Risk Insurance Fund, 223(e)). The reasons
for this emphasis are threefold. First, in terms of both volume of loans
and focus of what FHA risk literature is available, the "203" one-to-four
family loan program has been the "bread and butter" program of the FHA and
thus is most representative of FHA's experience. Second, since both the
"203" and "223(e)" programs are unsubsidized loans to owneroccupants of
one-to-four unit houses, there is solid basis for comparison of these loans
with the predominant form of residential mortgage: the conventional loan
on a one-to-four family home. And third, there is only one significant
difference between the "203" and "223(e)" program -- the FHA inspector's
appraisal of location, that is, is the subject property in a "high risk"
urban neighborhood? A bank, or other type of mortgage lender, submit one
set of forms for FHA approval; it is FHA personnel who either reject or
approve the loan, classifying it as eligible under the 203(b) or 223(e)
program.
2The mortgage rating grid still in use at that time was a "collective
or summary judgment" of "the degree of overall mortgage insurance risk
resulting from the relationships between the mortgage, the property
securing the mortgage, and the borrower". In this grid system, so long as
the overall rating for a loan and the rating for each set of charac-
teristics was 50 points or more, it could be approved as a sufficiently
sound and insurable risk. A rating of over 70 on any set of
characteristics or overall was considered to be very sound. The table
displayed below summarizes the frequency of ratings between 50 and 70
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points by the year for loans acquired and type of construction on which
they were issued during the four year period in question (1958 to 1961).
While virtually all of the overall ratings for these loans and most of the
borrower ratings were less than 70 points, generally, location ratings were
higher than 70 points for 50 to 75 percent of the acquired loans; 70 to 95
percent of property ratings exceeded 70 points. (See the table on the
following page.)
hese results indicate a disproportionate emphasis on location and
property ratings not only by FHA personnel but perhaps also by private len-
ders originating FHA loans. The private lender initially compiles the
required information and refers those applications recommended for approval
to FHA for final processing. Thus, given that much of the information for
the Rating Grid was obtained from FHA-approved mortgagees, these results
may reflect location and property biases of participating private lenders
as much as those of the FHA.
4The data base used was owner occupied one-to-four family home loans
foreclosed during a twelve-month period between March, 1961 and March,
1962. Loans from six metropolitan areas -Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, Los
Angeles, New York, and Philadelphia -- were included.
5The table on the following page summarizes the overall discrepancies
in reasons given by lenders and borrowers for mortgage defaults
6These patterns, based on private lenders' files, were also observed
on conventional loans.
7
"The multiple regression analysis of FHA's default experience can
help correct misleading impressions derived from simple cross-
classifications.... For instance, in cross-tabulations, default rates are
found to rise rather significantly as mortgagor income falls. This is true
to a lesser extent also for the age of the principal mortgagor since the
youngest families appear to be the worse risks. We have shown, however,
that the concentration of insured loans in the highest L/V [loan-to-value
ratio] classes rises as the income of mortgagors falls. Similarly, young
families tend to demand more low downpayment loans than older families....
[However, it is neither age nor income but rather the financing charac-
teristics of the mortgage correlated therewith, which account for much of
the observed variation. Income definitely cannot compete with L/V as the
principal variable explaining higher default rates for lower income
rous."
[Emphasis added] (von Furstenberg, 1971:27)
8For example, Shaw notes the surprising insignificance of housing
expense to income ratio in his analysis:
"Any characteristic of the applicant extensively used
by loan officers in choosing loan customers will not
show up as a statistically significant factor." (Quoted
from Hettenhouse and Wentworth, 1971:30)
- 141
EXHIBIT FOR NOTE 2
Frequency Distributions of Ratings at
Time of Insurance for Mortgage Pattern,
Location, Property, and Borrower by
Year of Issue and Type of Construction*
RATING PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION
(less than 70) 1958 1959 1960 1961
Morgage Pattern
(Overall Rating)
New Construction = 100.0% 99.2% 97.6% 86.0%
Existing Construction = 98.4 97.7 98.1 94.3
Location
New Construcion = 45.4 29.3 21.6 43.6
Existing Construction = 32.9 22.1 22.0 22.2
Property
New Construction = 15.7 5.2 4.2 7.5
Existing Construction = 32.1 26.9 25.6 29.5
Morgagor
New Construction = 87.9 89.0 90.7 90.3
Existing Construction = 72.8 82.2 88.3 87.9
*Source: Data summarized from Tables 23,
1963:51-54
24, 25, 26 in FHA,
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EXHIBIT FOR NOTE 5
REASONS FOR DEFAULT:
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF LENDER AND BORROWER
REASONS BY TYPE OF FEDERALLY INSURED LOAN
(Summary Data for all 6 SMSA's)
Reason for Foreclosure per Lender FHA VA
Death of Owner 0.7% 0.8%
Illness of Owner 2.2 6.3
Marital Difficulty 9.5 14.3
Curtailment of Income 22.1 30.0
Excessive Obligations 3.8 14.3
Improper Regard for Obligations 47.1 26.5
Property Unsatisfactory 0.7 0.5
Distort Employment Transfer 1.9 .6
Inability to Sell or Rent Property 3.1 2.2
Other 8.8 4.4
Percent of Total Reporting 100.0% 100.0%
Total Number Reporting 807 4593
Reason for Foreclosure per Borrower FHA VA
Death of Owner 1.9% 0.2%
Illness of Owner 0.9 1.3
Death or Illness in Family 21.8 19.8
Marital Difficulty 11.0 11.6
Curtailment of Imcome 35.3 39.9
Increase in Homeowner Costs 7.2 5.2
Increase in Non-Housing Costs 1.2 2.9
Unsatisfactory Property 5.0 4.0
Inability to Sell or Rent Property 4.5 6.4
Overextensior 8.9 6.7
Other 2.4 2.0
Percent of Total Reporting 100.0% 100.0%
Total Number Reporting 1050 2251
Source: HHFA, 1963:18-19
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9It should be noted that multiple regression analyses based
on data aggregated by geocode are not as statistically sound as
10This coinsurance concept was identical to the programs offered by
the private mortgage insurance companies (PMI's). The reasons for the
League promoting such a program for public sponsorship at this time may
have been:
(1) PMI's had generally adopted suburban-oriented
underwriting policies which discouraged or excluded
urban properties. A comparable program was perceived
as necessary for urban areas, one which would cover not
only the lower downpayment loans, but offer general
insurance against "urban risk".
(2) FHA, in part as a result of lender abuses of
urban reinvestment programs in the late 1960's and
early 1970's, had imposed origination and servicing
requirements which served as disincentive for the
League's member associations to participate in FHA
insurance programs.
Underlying both these rationales is the assumption that for urban loans,
regardless of the loan-to-value ratio, insurance would be necessary to per-
mit prudent lending on the part of the originating institutions.
11This study was published again in slightly different form in journal
articles : "The Effects of Race and Age of Housing or Mortgage
Delinquency Risks" Urban Studies (February, 1975) and "Estimated of
Delinquency Risk for Home Mortgage Portfolios" AREUEJ and Vol. II (Spring,
1974): 5-37.
12Morton introduced the use of linear discriminant function analysis,
a multivariate statistical technique which had been previously applied in
risk analyses of business credit and personal loans (e.g. , Altman, 1968;
Bates, 1973; Myers and Forgy, 1963; Orgler, 1970). His results are sum-
marized in a table on the following page. These results were reasonably
strong for two-way breakdowns (current versus "bad", i.e., delinquent or
default and not foreclosed, i.e., current or delinquent, versus
foreclosed). In these equations, using 12 of the original 43 independent
variables, Morton was able to correctly classify as many as 70 percent of
the loans in his sample.
13See table on following page.
- 144 -
EXHIBIT FOR NOTE 12
Results of Discriminant Function Analyses
in Morton's Study Based on 24 Connecticut Banks
Percentage of Loans
Correctly Classifiedb
Original Holdout
Discriminant Function Analysesa Samplec Samplec
A. "2-Way"
1. Good (current) versus
bad (delinquent and
default) 70.2% 65.1%
2. Not foreclosed (current)
versus foreclosed (delin-
quent and defaulted) 73.6% 71.6%
B. "3-Way"
Current versus delinquent
versus defaulted 55.2% 44.9%
aTwelve of the 43 original independeant variables used in these equations:
5 or more dependents; junior financing; 3- family property; employed as a
professional; borrower with non-real estate debt; self-employed; loan
amount to appraisal; employed unskilled occupation; borrower's age, 25 to
29; borrower's age, 50-59; employed as salesman.
bF Test significant at .05 level for each of these equations.
cLoans sampled from 24 banks on one-to-three family properties with the
following status distribution:
Current 90+ Days Delinquent Foreclosure
Original Sample 224 126 66
Holdout Sample 55 32 22
Total 279 158 108
Source: Morton, 1974 Table 3-3.
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EXHIBIT FOR NOTE 13
Results of Mortgage Risk
Analyses: Summary Statistics
for Each of Four Equations
by Metropolitan Area
Measure of Risk
Metropolitan Probability Duration Frequency Probability
Area(s)a of of of of
Delinquency Delinquency Delinquency Foreclosure
New York/ R2  0.273 0.225 0.229 0.401
Nassau-Suffolk N 274 271 246 113
Albany - Schnectady- R2  0.388 0.328 0.345 0.538
Troy N 144 144 128 117
Buffalo/Rochester/ R2  0.195 0.194 0.284 0.190
Syracuse N 198 187 171 150
aSix metropolitan areas grouped so as to have a sufficient number of cases with data.
__
CHAPTER 4
MORTGAGE RISK IN METROPOLITAN BOSTON:
AN ANALYSIS OF CONVENTIONAL AND FEDERALLY INSURED LOAN EXPERIENCE
INTRODUCTION
Mortgage risk analyses presented in this chapter were designed to
augment previous research. As discussed in Chapter 3, most earlier studies
did not focus on risk issues pertinent to urban investment questions. For
example, many of these earlier studies were based exclusively on federally
insured loan data, while most residential mortgages have been conventional
loans. This distinction between conventional and federally insured mortga-
ges has become a critical one for urban homebuyers. Since 1968,
...with the expansion of FHA insurance [which had pre-
viously been virtually unavailable] in the inner city,
conventional financing was withdrawn more rapidly....
This resulted in the reinforcement of the dual housing
market by making separate types of home financing
available to different neighborhoods....
(Urban-Suburban Investment Study Group, 1977:Part II,
67-68)
Thus, the decision to award a conventional or federally insured loan in
itself may be indicative of the lender's perception of urban neighborhood
risks.
Most mortgage risk studies have not assessed the statistical effects
of neighborhood factors. Analyses limited to borrower, property, and loan
characteristics have not tested mortgage industry assumptions that urban
neighborhoods are inherently riskier than their suburban counterparts.
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The analyses of metropolitan Boston presented in this chapter are
based on two loan samples of roughly equal size, one of conventional
mortgages and the other of federally insured so as to assess the deter-
minants of a lender's decision to award one loan type or the other.
Subsequently, the determinants of delinquency and default risk are
evaluated, separately for each loan type. In both sets of analyses, urban
neighborhood characteristics are examined to assess any statistical effects
they may have after controlling for individual borrower, property, and loan
factors.
These analyses assess aspects of mortgage risk, particularly with
reference to urban lendingwhich have not been examined in prior research.
However, it is important to note gaps in the data base available. Crucial
aspects of screening applicants as well as originating and servicing
approved loans could not be evaluated for lack of essential data in this as
most other risk research. Key risk evaluation stages in mortgage lending
are summarized on the following page with heavy lines highlighting those
few subcategories of loans for which the available data on loan origination
and subsequent delinquency and default experience are representative
(Exhibit 4-1). Given that the vast majority of loans are in good standing,
a stratified sampling procedure was used to obtain an adequate number of
delinquencies and defaults for analysis. Details of the sampling methodol-
ogy and collection procedures used to obtain the data are summarized in
Appendix B.
Risk assessment by the lender often begins with oral inquiries,
either by phone or in person, by the prospective applicant. In the course
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EXHIBIT 4-1
RISK EVALUATION STAGES IN THE MORTGAGE LOAN PROCESS
CURRENT, i.e., loan
payments up to date
WRITTEN APPLICATION
SUBMITTED FOR A
CONVENTIONAL LOAN
MORTGAGE LOAN
INQOIRY MADE BY
PROSPECTIVE
APPLICANT
(orally or in
person)
WRITTEN APPLICATION
SUBMITTED FOR A
FEDERALLY INSURED
LOAN
NO WRif[LN APPLICATION
SUBMITTED
APPROVED (as applied for
or with modifications in
bank terms)
REJECTED (by bank)
WITHDRAWN (by applicant)
MINOR DELINQUENCY
ACTIVE i.e., less than 90
days overdue
MAJOR DELINQUENCY
i.e., 90 days or
more overdue
CLOSED
ACTIVE
APPROVED (as applied for
or with modifications in
bank terms)
REJECTED (by bank)
WITHDRAWN (by applicant)
CLOSED
PAID OFF satisfactorily
DEFAULT
CURRENT, i.e., loan
payments up to date
MINOR DELINQUENCY
i.e., less than 90
days overdue
MAJOR DELINQUENCY
i.e., 90 days or
more overdue
PAID OFF satisfactorily
DEFAULT
At Point in Time
Data Sampled
Throughout History
Since Origination
At Point in Time
Data Sampled
Ever Since
Origination
At Point in Time
Data Sampled
Ever Since Origination
At Point in Time
Data Sampled
Throughout History
Since Origination
At Point in Time
Data Sampled
Ever Since Origination
At Point in Time
Data Sampled
Ever Since Origination
of this informal exchange, the prospective applicant may be discouraged
from submitting a written application either because of a preliminary
judgment made by the loan officer or information about bank underwriting
policies (e.g., no loans on non-single family homes) which would preclude
approval of an application. In both cases, the prospective applicant is
discouraged on the basis of risk perceptions of the lender, either an
assessment of the individual situation or general loan policies. There is
seldom any record of the risk decision-making process which occurs at this
stage. One exception may be, for those who go on to file a written
application, the determination of whether an application should be sub-
mitted for a conventional or insured loan is often made at this stage.
Once a prospective borrower completes a written application, recorded
data is more likely to be available to the researcher. However, much of
the critical information is often available only for those loans which are
fully processed by lender and approved. Even where applications rejected
by the bank are retained, metropolitan Boston bank data on these applica-
tions were generally found to be incomplete as the decision to reject pre-
ceded completion of credit check, property appraisal, and so on. Thus, a
complete analysis of the factors which differentiate approved and rejected
applications within each loan type could not be adequately performed with
the data available for analysis.1
An application is approved subject to certain terms such as required
downpayment, interest rate, and maturity. For the most part, it is dif-
ficult for the researcher to reconstruct what the lender's standard prac-
tice was at the time of loan origination and, thus, to assess whether more
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stringent loan terms were levied by the lender to compensate for perceived
risks.
After approval, each loan has a history of remaining current, lapsing
into a minor or major delinquency or even default. The factors associated
with loans in each of these categories can be readily assembled at a point
in time. However, longitudinal history of a loan is more difficult to
obtain. Minimal information on frequency and duration of past delinquency
experience were available for loans sampled in the metropolitan Boston
data. Moreover, to obtain adequate loan data for major delinquencies and
defaults, (which occur relatively infrequently) for purposes of comparison
with the vast majority of loans in good standing requires stratification
and sampling techniques which necessarily introduce biases in the data.
In sum, the metropolitan Boston analyses offer some insight into
determinants of loan type at origination and determinants of loan status
over the life of the loan. Data limitations result in an analysis of
several key aspects, albeit not a complete picture, of the risk perceptions
and experience of savings institutions in this area over several decades.
DEVELOPMENT OF ANALYSES BY LOAN TYPE AND STATUS
Two basic types of risk analyses are presented in the following
sections. One is based on risk assessment at the time of the mortgage
application, that is, the decision of the mortgage officer to grant a con-
ventional or federally insured loan. The second is a series of analyses
devoted to the determinants of loan status, that is, one's ability to pre-
dict whether a loan will stay current, become a minor or major delinquency,
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have a history of serious delinquency, or go into default.
A federally insured loan traditionally has been issued by a mortgage
lender for any one of three reasons:
e Household's Ability to Make the Downpayment
Required for a Conventional Loan
For the past several decades, if a homebuyer did not
have sufficient funds accumulated to make the down-
payment required for a conventional mortgage, i.e., 20
percent or more of the purchase price of the house, a
lender could offer an FHA insured mortgage for a down-
payment as low as 3 percent and, for veterans, a VA
guaranteed mortgage for 1 percent down.
* Lender's Ability to Sell Mortgages in the
Secondary Market
Federally insured loans have commonly been used where
the lending institution needed to sell loans to outside
investors in order to obtain funds to make more
mortgages. Thus, federally insured mortgages were
actively issued by mortgage companies and mortgage
brokers. Without their own sources of capital growth,
such as the deposit base of a banking institution,
these lenders needed to sell loans to make loans.
Among the major purchasers were private institutional
investors such as insurance companies. Insurance com-
panies were willing to purchase many of these loan
packages on the grounds that, since they were federally
insured, they were virtually equivalent to purchases of
U.S. Treasury securities. Federally insured mortgages
were heavily used by both the mortgage brokerage
segment of the lending industry and by lenders in
rapidly growing areas of the country, such as the West
Coast, where local capital resources were insufficient
to meet demand and sale of federally insured loans in a
national investment market provided an effective means
to import more capital from "capital rich" regions such
as the Northeast. As a result, prior to the late
1960's, federally insured mortgages were not as common
in metropolitan Boston as in less developed areas of
the country.2
* FHA as a "High Risk" Neighborhood Program
Under the Housing Act of 1968, the Federal Housing
Administration was mandated to actively encourage
mortgage lending to minority homebuyers and generally
to homebuyers in minority neighborhoods. Thus, a third
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criterion for promoting FHA insured loans was
introduced. This metropolitan Boston analysis will
assess, after controlling for borrower and property
characteristics, the extent to which neighborhood
characteristics appear to contribute to local banks'
decisions as to whether to grant a conventional or
federally insured loan.
The second series of analyses on loan status will use several dif-
ferent measures of "good" versus "bad" loans. The first of the series is
devoted to testing the probability of a loan being "bad" at the time data
were collected, based on the information available to the lender at
origination. The outcomes used in this series are:
s Probability of Any Delinquency, i.e., Minor and major
delinquencies and defaults versus current loans.
* Probability of Serious Delinquency or Default, i.e.,
Major delinquencies and defaults versus current loans
and minor delinquencies.
* Probability of Default, i.e., Defaults versus minor
and major delinquencies and current loans.
The runs in this series are devoted to evaluating one's ability to predict,
whether a loan, since origination, has ever been subject to a serious
delinquency notice or issued a default warning by the lender servicing the
loan. The outcomes used in this series are:
* Probability that a loan was ever issued a serious
delinquency notice
e Probability that a loan was ever issued a default
warning.
The advantage of these loan servicing contact variables is that they
present a historical perspective on delinquency rather than the more
limited definition of status at the time of loan data collection used in
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the first series. There are two possible limitations of this servicing
information. One is that these data are only available where the lender
has maintained records of oral or written contact with the borrower. A
bank by bank review of contact patterns, however, did not reveal any system-
atic lack of contact information for individual banks. Another is that
lending institution procedures and practices regarding servicing contacts
may differ considerably. For example, one savings institution in the
Boston area several years ago adopted a policy of issuing a default warning
to any borrower who had failed to make two consecutive payments (60 days
overdue) and forwarding the loan file to outside attorneys to institute
foreclosure proceedings. Thus, while a borrower in this bank would be
recorded as having received a default notice, a borrower from another bank
might be overdue twice as long (120 days) before receiving any default
warning notices. Nonetheless, each of these five definitions of status
outcomes is useful in providing a somewhat different perspective on the
issue of risk exposure to the lender through delinquency and default.
FORMULATION OF ANALYSES OF LOAN TYPE DECISIONS AND RISK OUTCOMES
Once the major outcomes had been defined, two models were formulated
-- one for loan type decisions and the other for loan status outcomes.
These basic models consisted of a number of financial measures related to
the household and property purchased. These measures were developed
through extensive examination of the factors for which data were available
and their statistical strength relative to the defined outcomes (see
Appendix C). Of these factors, those for which adequate information was
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available were selected and incorporated in the basic models summarized in
Exhibit 4-2. Controlling for each of these financial factors, the effect
of each individual factor on loan type and status outcomes was examined. 3
In addition to the financial variables which comprised the basic
models, a number of other factors were also examined to determine whether
they too were influential in loan type decision-making or in predicting a
loan's status. The purpose of this phase of the analysis was to find out
whether non-financial, and in some cases discriminatory, factors were
related to the loan outcomes.
Given the large number of additional explanatory variables under
consideration, three major variable classifications were developed. One
set pertains to specific characteristics associated with an individual
loan. These included attributes of the borrower(s), property, and the
bank. Another is a set of general neighborhood characteristics describing
the geographic area where the property was located. Also included were two
general location variables indicating whether or not the property or the
lending institution were in urban or suburban areas. A hierarchy was then
established among these variables to determine the order in which the
contribution of a particular variable should be considered. This hierarchy
was as follows:
Loan-Specific Variables
(1) Number of units (single-family versus two-to-four
unit dwelling)
(2) More than one wage earner on loan application
(Yes or No)
(3) Primary wage earner self-employed (Yes or No)
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EXHIBIT 4-2
FINANCIAL FACTORS IN THE
BASIC LOAN TYPE AND DELINQUINCY
RISK MODELS
LOAN TYPEa
REGULAR EARNINGS PER CAPITA
INSTALLMENT DEBT TO INCOME RATIO
BANK APRAISED VALUE
AS A PERCENTAGE OF PURCHASE PRICE
BANK APPRAISED VALUE
DELINQUENCY RISKb
aA time-related variable, defined as months originated prior to 1979, was
included in this basic model to control for any changes in underwriting
policies and to minimize the effects of inflation on the variables defined
in terms of dollars.
bA time-related variable defined as age of loan (that is, the number of
monthly payments made after the loan origination) was included to control
for the seasoning effect.
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REGULAR EARNINGS PER CAPITA
INSTALLMENT DEBT TO INCOME RATIO
MORTGAGE DEBT TO INCOME RATIO
LOAN TO VALUE RATIO
REFINANCED LOAN
(4) Occupational prestige of primary wage earner's
occupation4
(5) Age of primary wage earner (in years)
(6) Marital status of primary wage earners (married/
single/widowed or divorced)
(7) Sex of primary wage earner
(8) Size of lending institution (in millions of
dollars in deposits)
Neighborhood Variables
(9) Mean 1970 household income in census tract or
zip code where property was located
(10) Percent of two-to-four unit structures built
prior to 1939 in census tract or zip code where
property was located
(11) Percent minority population in 1970 in census
tract or zip code where property was located.
General Location Variables
(12) Property location (urban/suburban)
(13) Location of bank's main office (urban/suburban)
To assess the importance of these factors, variables were added to
the basic model one at a time in the order specified. Only those factors
which were significant in addition to the variables previously entered in
the model have been identified as determinants of delinquency risk or loan
type decision.5
TESTS FOR MODEL DIFFERENCES
One of the assumptions implicit in any statistical analysis is that
the underlying model applies equally well to each of the members of the
population for which it is to be estimated. This means that any variable
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in a linear model should have approximately the same effect for each popu-
lation member, regardless of the specific attributes of that person. If,
for example, refinanced loans are hypothesized to increase the probability
of default, then the risk associated with refinanced loans should be the
same for borrowers in suburban areas as for those in urban areas, the same
for persons financing single-family homes as those buying multiple-unit
dwellings, and so on. To the extent that certain explanatory variables
have differential effects for different types of borrowers or loans, an
attempt to estimate a single model for the entire population will produce
biased estimates of the influence of these variables and result in
misleading conclusions regarding their importance, unless these differences
are incorporated into the statistical model. When confronted with the pos-
sibility of behavioral differences among different subpopulations of the
same sample, there are two basic alternatives: stratify the sample into
different subsamples relating to each group or specific behavioral dif-
ferences within one overall model through a dummy constant term or a slope
dummy variable. A series of tests was conducted to investigate the possi-
bility that the basic conceptual models that had been developed would need
to be estimated separately for specific types of borrowers or loans.
On the basis of these tests, two major revisions were made prior to
conducting the final analyses. First of all, the influence of certain fac-
tors in determining whether a borrower was originally granted a conven-
tional or federally insured loan tended to change over time. These
differences appear to be related to changes in the Federal Housing
Administration's mortgage lending mandate. With the passage of the Housing
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Act of 1968, the FHA began to actively encourage lending to minority home-
buyers and in minority neighborhoods. As a result, the loan type model has
been estimated separately for mortgages made prior to 1969 (the year the
impact of the Housing Act would presumably first take effect) and loans
issued in the decade from 1969-1978.
In addition, an examination of bank appraised property values
revealed that conventional loans were rarely granted for properties valued
at less than $10,000 while federally insured loans were almost never made
for homes appraised at $40,000 or more. Therefore, the loan type analysis
has been restricted to properties valued at between $10,000 and $40,000,
the range within which lenders must decide which type of loan a homebuyer
should be granted.
Second, in loan status models of the probabilities that a loan would
become delinquent or default, the impact of certain risk factors differed
depending on the type of loan a borrower had received. Therefore, models
predicting loan status have been estimated separately for conventional and
federally insured loans. Because this distinction between the two types of
loans was anticipated at the inception of this study, the sampling methodol-
ogy was designed to obtain a sufficiently large number of loans of each
type to permit such a stratification.
A number of other potential qualitative model differences were also
tested, but no indication of any serious model misspecification problems
were found for any of these factors. These included:
Single versus multiple (2-4 family) unit dwellings;
Suburban versus urban properties (urban properties were
defined as those in the cities in the metropolitan
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area with population densities of more than 10,000
persons per square mile);
. Suburban versus urban-based banks (urban-based banks
were defined as those with main offices in the most
densely populated urban communities);
. Properties located in areas with minority populations
of 10 percent or less versus dwellings in areas where
minorities constitute more than 10 percent of the
population;
. Large versus smaller banks (large institutions were
defined as those with $299 million or more in
deposits).
In addition, the loan type model was also tested to determine whether
the probability of receiving a federally insured loan differed depending on
whether the loan was insured by the Federal Housing Administration or the
Veterans Administration. No significant distinctions were detected,
however, and FHA and VA loans have been merged for the purposes of this
analysis.
Thus, tests for model differences resulted in two major modifications
in the analysis: (1) the probability of being granted a conventional as
opposed to a federally insured loan has been examined for two different
time periods, for a restricted range of appraised values, and (2) the
effects of risk factors on the delinquency status of a loan have been esti-
mated separately for federally insured and conventional loans.
LOAN TYPE: PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING A CONVENTIONAL OR FEDERALLY
INSURED MORTGAGE
Overview
A risk evaluation of mortgage application by a banker may lead to one
of several alternatives:
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. approved
...as a conventional loan
...as a conventional loan with private mortgage
insurance
...as a federally insured FHA or guaranteed VA loan;
. approval of any one of the above loan types but with
modifications in the terms originally requested by the
borrower;
. rejected by the banker; or,
. withdrawn by the applicant.
Of these, the data most readily available from mortgage lenders are those
on the first alternative, approved loans. As discussed at the outset of
this chapter, risk-related reasons for approval of a federally insured
rather than a conventional loan are threefold: a household's ability to
make the downpayment required for a conventional loan; the lender's ability
to sell mortgages in the secondary market; and, the use of FHA 100 percent
loan insurance as a "high risk" property or neighborhood program. Conven-
tional loans with private mortgage insurance were developed as alternative
means of financing loans which qualified for insurance coverage for one of
the first two reasons when FHA was applied to "high neighborhood risk" eval-
uations after 196S. Private mortgage insurance has not been commonly used
in metropolitan Boston until very recently. As a result, analyses of the
loan approval process will focus on the decision to grant conventional ver-
sus federally insured loans both prior to and since 1969.
Regarding the second alternative, approval with modifications, little
data has been consistently available on the loan terms which the
borrower(s) originally applied for. Until federal regulations were adopted
in 1977 which required federally chartered and insured institutions to keep
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written records of original inquiries, in most states, including
Massachusetts, there were no recordkeeping requirements on these
applications. For purposes of these risk analyses, one variable has been
specifically created to proxy lender-borrower differences: the ratio of
the appraised value of the bank to the purchase price paid by the
borrower.6
Formulation of the Basic Loan Type Model
The probability that an applicant would be granted a conventional
rather than a federally insured loan, as an outcome of the bank's risk eval-
uation of the application, was assessed on the basis of a model comprised
of a number of household financial characteristics and factors related to
purchase price and bank appraisal of the property to serve as collateral
security for the mortgage. Each of the factors used in the model was devel-
oped from information known to the bank prior to the final decision on
loan amount or terms to be offered to the applicant. Two aspects of a
household's finances have been included: monthly earnings per capita
(based on the total number of household members) and the percentage of that
income required to meet payments on outstanding installment debt unrelated
to housing costs. Two additional factors considered by the bank prior to
loan approval are an appraisal of the value of the property and the ratio
of the appraised value to the purchase price of the home.
One other variable -- the number of months prior to 1979 the loan was
originated -- has also been incorporated in the model. This variable was
not anticipated to have an important influence in and of itself but is
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required primarily to adjust for any differences in loan origination dates
and to correct dollar values for the effects of inflation over time.
Thus, the basic loan type model was specified as follows:
p(CONV) = b1 TIME + b2 REGCAP = b3 INSTREG + b4 APPUR +
b5 APVAL + a
where
p(CONV) = the probability that an applicant was
granted a conventional as opposed to a
federally insured loan,
CONV = a dummy variable representing loan type,
coded 1 if the applicant received a con-
ventional loan and 0 if an FHA or VA loan
was granted,
TIME = the number of months prior to January 1,
1979 the loan originated,
REGCAP = monthly regular earnings per capita
(i.e., per household member),
INSTREG = monthly installment debt as a percentage
of regular monthly earnings,
APPUR = bank appraised value as a percentage of
purchase price,
APVAL = bank appraised value of the property
(in dollars),
bI-b 5 = a vector of regression coefficients, and
a = a constant.
Analysis of Basic Loan Type Model
The effects of the variables in the model on the probability of
receiving a conventional loan were first assessed for the period from
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1969-1978, following the change in FHA mortgage insurance policies. Over
70 percent of the loans in the study were made during this period.
Of the four factors of primary interest, during the period from
1969-1978, the appraised value of the property was the most strongly corre-
lated with the probability of receiving a conventional loan (r=.40). That
is, the higher the bank appraised value the better the chance that the loan
was conventional. This was followed by installment debt ratio (r=-.15),
the appraised value to purchase price ratio (r=.12), and regular earnings
per capita (r=.09). Similar correlations were found for the period prior
to 1969.7
The basic model results were as follows:
1969 to 1978
p(CONV) = .00064 (TIME) + .00005 (REGCAP)
- .01057 (INSTREG) + .00290 APPUR
+ .00003 APVAL - .60506
When each of these variables were controlled for simultaneously, the
results suggested that the strongest impact on loan type was attributable
to appraised value -- the higher the bank's assessment of the property
value, the more likely the applicant was to receive a conventional loan
(See Exhibit 4-3). Significant effects were also found for the appraised
value as a percentage of purchase price (higher ratios increasing the pro-
bability of a conventional loan) and installment debt levels (which
decreased this probability). Regular earnings per capita had almost no
unique effect on loan type probabilities, but this was due in part to the
fact that borrowers with high monthly earnings were also those seeking to
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EXHIBIT 4-3
LOAN TYPE DECISION SUMMARY
Loans Originated Loans Originated
Basic Model Variablesa From 1951-1968 1969-1978
Months originated prior to 1979 ns ns
Regular earnings/household size ns ns
Installment debt/regular earnings
Appraised value to purchase price ns +
Appraised value + +
Other Variables With Significant Effectsb
Deposit Size
Single-family home + ns
Widowed/divorced + ns
Self-Employed ns +
a Basic model variables were included on the basis of theoretical
specification. None were dropped on the basis of insignificant results.
Significance test used for these variables was the F Ratio result in the
equation: "+" indicates statistically significant with a positive
coefficient; "-" indicates statistically significant with a negative coef-
ficient; and, "ns" indicates that the F Ratio was below a .05 level of
significance.
bOther variables were included on the basis of any significant contribution
(. o3 or more) to increase goodness of fit of the equation. A "+" indi-
cates statistically significant with a positive coefficient; a "-" indica-
tes a statistically significant with a negative coefficient; and, "ns"
indicates that the variable was not statistically significant (i.e. contri-
bution to r of less than .oz).
Other variables with insignificant effects: Borrower Attributes: Age;
Sex; Multiple Wage Earners; Occupational Prestige; Self-Employed.
Property and Neighborhood Characteristics: Single/Multi-Family Dwelling;
Property Location; Older 2 to 4 Unit Structures; Mean Household Income,
1970; Percent Minority Population, 1970.
Lender Characteristics: Bank Location.
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finance homes with higher appraised values. For loans made prior to 1969,
the results were similar with one exception -- no appraised value to
purchase price ratio effect was detected during this period. While neither
regular earnings per capita nor the control variable for time period of
origination were statistically significant, they were retained in the basic
model as correctly specified as factors which should be key determinants of
loan risk evaluation at origination (See Appendix D, Exhibits D-7 and D-8).
Finally, the strength of any statistical results from this model were
affected by the stratified sampling methodology. Analyses were based on
comparable numbers of each type of loan, despite the fact that conventional
loans are the more prevalent type of mortgage. As a result, the overall
goodness of fit for these equations was (adjusted r 2 =. 18) for the period
1969 to 1978 and slightly stronger (adjusted r2 = .22) for the earlier
period. These results are indicative of the roughly equal numbers of each
type of loan. The probability of a conventional mortgage in this equation
will be closer to .5 then to 0 or 1. An alternative method of multivariate
analysis particularly well designed to test discrete outcomes such as loan
type did not modify the results of the model originally tested under ordi-
nary least squares regression analysis, (See Note 3 and Appendix D,
Exhibits D-7 and D-8). Thus, the stratified data base necessary to obtain
an adequate sample of loans of each type limited the results of subsequent
analyses designed to predict which type of loan would be offered to an
applicant.
Effects of Other Factors
In addition to the financial and economic variables comprising the
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basic loan type model, a number of other more subjective and, therefore,
potentially discriminatory variables were also examined to determine
whether or not they were also influential in the decision to grant an
applicant a particular type of loan. The analyses of these variables are
based on a somewhat smaller number of cases than the basic model due to
missing data. For example, one variable that could not be included for
this reason, but which had appeared in preliminary analyses to be of impor-
tance in the loan type decision, was whether or not a borrower was
financing a home for the first time. 8
After accounting for the financial variables related to the household
and property purchased which were set in basic model, only one other factor
-- the size of the lending institution -- proved to be a significant predic-
tor of the loan type decision before and particularly after 1969. The
larger the institution in terms of dollars on deposit, the less likely a
borrower was to receive a conventional loan. In other words, if the same
borrower were to apply for a mortgage at two different banks, he or she
would be more likely to be granted a conventional loan at the smaller bank.
For loans originated in the 1950's and 1960's, both the number of
units in a dwelling and whether or not the primary wage earner was widowed
or divorced also appeared to have some influence on the type of loan
received. During this period, lenders were somewhat less likely to grant
conventional mortgages on multiple-unit dwellings, and more inclined to
provide widowed or divorced borrowers with conventional loans than single
persons who had not been married previously. By the 1970's, there was no
longer any statistical evidence that lenders continued to differentiate on
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the basis of these two variables. Only self-employment of the primary wage
earner appeared to have any marginally significant effect on the probabil-
ity of receiving a conventional loan in this later period.
The introduction of these other significant factors did not substan-
tially affect the coefficients of the variables in the basic model for
either period, thus indicating that the basic models were relatively stable
equations (See Appendix D, Exhibits D-7 and D-8). In the later period,
deposit size had a pronounced effect on the predictive strength of the
equation (adjusted r2 with deposit size = .43).
LOAN STATUS: PROBABILITY OF DELINQUENCY OR DEFAULT
Overview
Mortgage risk can best be assessed through an analysis of actual loan
experience. What factors known to the mortgage officer at the time of loan
origination are significant determinants of loan risk? Can one reliably
predict the probabilities of delinquency of default based on information
collected in the mortgage application? A series of analyses devoted to the
identification of factors associated with mortgage risk were prepared to
address these questions. Given the results of earlier tests indicating
differences in the determinants of risk of conventional compared with
federally insured loans, each of these loan status analyses was performed
separately for these two loan types.
One phase of this analysis focuses on loan status at the time of data
collection for this study and evaluates one's ability to predict:
the probability of any delinquency, i.e., major and
minor delinquencies and defaults versus "current"
loans;
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. the probability of serious delinquency or default,
i.e., major delinquencies and defaults versus current
loans and minor delinquencies; and,
. the probability of defaults, i.e., defaults versus
minor and major delinquencies and current loans.
Each of these probabilities has been expressed as a function of borrower,
property, loan, and possible neighborhood characteristics.
The second phase is based on the status history of the loans based on
any previous delinquencies, minor and major, which the bank may have even
considered serious enough to warrant warning notices regarding foreclosure.
If the loan data had been collected in a different month or year, loans
which are classified as current might have been delinquent and vice-versa.
Thus, these analyses were developed on the basis of loan servicing infor-
mation through which each loan is classified according to its previous
payment record as well as its present status. Based on contact records,
each loan was screened for any evidence of:
serious delinquency of more than 90 days; or,
default notice.
These analyses have been structured in a manner similar to the earlier
equations on loan type. First, a basic equation was constructed using
financial factors which relate to the economics of the loan. These analy-
ses were formulated on the basis of household financial characteristics and
loan characteristics which reflect the terms on which the bank initially
extended the loan. Thus, in contrast to the loan type analysis in which
the factors considered were those existing prior to a bank's decision on
loan amount or terms, these loan status analyses were predicated on factors
such as mortgage debt to income ratios and loan to value ratios which were
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established only after the bank formulated an offer to the applicant.
Subsequently, additional analyses were carried out for each of these
sets of outcomes. Controlling for the financial factors in the basic
equation, evaluations were made as to any additional characteristics which
further contribute to one's ability to predict loan risk. These factors
included various attributes of the property, wage earner characteristics,
and any differential in lender characteristics. Again these analyses are
based on data which lenders have screened through their own evaluation of
the likelihood of repayment in making the original loan commitment.
(Exhibit 4-1). In this initial evaluation, three or more sets of
underwriting risks may have been taken into consideration. Default has
been a primary, if not the major, underwriting concern of mortgage lenders
traditionally as recouping the outstanding mortgage amount requires insti-
tuting foreclosure proceedings or collection infull on mortgage insurance.
Delinquency has been of concern, even where it does not result in default,
as either prolonged or chronic delinquency may impose significant servicing
costs in contacting and counseling the borrower. Finally, while these anal-
yses are directed exclusively at evaluating individual loan risks in any
period, general economic trends may also have a pronounced effect on the
likelihood of delinquency or default and may have factored in a lender's
decision at the time of origination of any of these loans.
Formulation of Basic Loan Status Model
The principal objective of this analysis is to determine which fac-
tors known to a mortgage officer at the time a loan is made can be used to
predict the probability that a loan will become delinquent or default at
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some point in time. To fully explore this question, the status of a loan
has been defined in several ways. First, the most serious and conclusive
evidence of risk is default. Thus, the first definition of status was to
simply classify loans as defaults or nondefaults. A second approach is to
assess a loan's status at a given point in time, in this case, in 1978 when
the sample of loans used in this analysis was drawn. At this time, for
sampling purposes, a loan was categorized as either current, a minor
delinquency (30-90 days in arrears), a major delinquency (more than 90 days
in arrears), or a default. Third, some historical perspective is offered
by classifying loans according to their prior delinquency records. Over
time, status may be defined as (1) whether a particular loan had ever been
seriously delinquent (more than 90 days overdue), and (2) whether a
borrower had ever been officially notified that foreclosure proceedings
would be undertaken unless loan payments were made.
Thus, the status of a loan may be assessed on the basis of data
available for metropolitan Boston in terms of five different probabilities
of interest to lenders:
. the probability that a loan will default
. the probability that a loan will ever become
seriously delinquent
. the probability that a loan will receive a
foreclosure warning
the probability that a loan will be delinquent
for 30 days or more at a given point in time
the probability that a loan will be delinquent
for 90 days or more at a given point in time.
As in the loan type analyses, a basic model was constructed to
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explain each of these five loan status outcomes. Comprised of a similar
set of household financial and loan characteristics, this model has been
formulated on the basis of common mortgage lending practices and previous
empirical research. Six factors constitute the basic loan status model.
Two of these, monthly regular earnings per capita and monthly installment
debt as a percentage of income, are indicators of a borrower's financial
status at the time a loan was made. Two other factors in the model reflect
the terms of the loan. These are the monthly housing costs (including loan
principal, interest, and property taxes) as a percentage of regular ear-
nings and the ratio of the amount of the loan to the appraised value of the
home. Since previous studies have suggested that refinanced loans increase
default risk, a variable indicating whether or not a particular mortgage
was refinanced has also been added. Completing the model is the age of the
loan. This variable was included to adjust for the fact that the loans in
our sample were originated at different points in the time as well as to
correct dollar values for inflation. Also, as discussed previously, a
loan's "seasoning" plays an important role in the determining risk, with
loans being especially susceptible to default and delinquency during the
first few years after origination.
The basic loan status model is thus specified as:
p(status outcome ) =
b LOANAGE + b2 REGCAP + b3 INSTREG + b4 PITREG +
b5 LOANVAL + b6 REFIN + a
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where:
p(status outcome ) = the probability that a loan will
be of status , where refers to one of the five
status outcomes above.
LOANAGE = the age of the loan (in months),
REGCAP = monthly regular earnings per capita
(i.e., per household member),
INSTREG = monthly installment debt as a percentage
of monthly regular earnings,
PITREG = monthly mortgage-related payments (in-
cluding principal, interest and taxes)
as a percentage of monthly regular
earnings;
LOANVAL = the loan amount as a percentage of the
appraised value of the property,
REFIN = a dummy variable, coded 1 if the loan was
refinanced and 0 if it was not,
b 1-b5 = a vector of regression coefficients, and
a = a constant.
Once it was ascertained that the effects of the variables in this
model differed by loan type, the model was estimated separately for conven-
tional and federally insured loans for each status outcome.
Analysis of Basic Loan Status Model Results
Conventional Loans
When the basic status model was applied to the five status probabili-
ties outlined above for conventional loans, a number of consistent patterns
emerged. The correlations between the explanatory variables in the model
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and the dummy variable outcomes were generally low, between zero and .25,
and the overall explained variation in the five dependent variables was
also small, ranging from .089 to .135 (Appendix D, Exhibits D-13 and D-9,
respectively). Explained variation was highest for the default/nondefault
dichotomy and lowest for the probability of a delinquency of more than 30
days at a given point in time. Delinquencies, particularly minor
delinquencies, tend to be a transient status that is especially difficult
to predict. 9
Certain variables in the model exhibited strong and statistically
significant effects on the probability of each of the default or
delinquency status outcomes (Exhibit 4-4). Chief among these were the
household's monthly earnings per capita, and loan-to-value ratios. The
higher the household income relative to household size, the less likely the
loan was to become delinquent at any point in time. It should be noted
that this does not refer to total household income, but to total income
divided by the number of persons supported by that income. Mortgages with
lower loan-to-value ratios, and therefore higher equity investment on the
part of the borrower, were less risky than those with lower equity and com-
mensurately higher loan-to-value ratios. Loan age had a pronounced effect
on the probabilities of default, a serious delinquency at the time of data
collection, or receipt of a default warning notice. The older the loan,
the less likely each of these three outcomes were.
The remaining variables tended to have important effects only for
specific outcomes. Borrowers with installment debt in addition to housing
debt were a somewhat greater risk, but only for delinquency at a given
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EXHIBIT 4-4
LOAN STATUS SUMMARY
CONVENTIONAL LOANS
Probability of:
Receiving Ever 90 days or 30 days or
default seriously more deliquent more deliquent
Basic Model Variablesa Default notices deliquent at sampling at sampling
Age of Loan - - ns - ns
Regular earnings per capita - - -
Installment debt/regular earnings ns ns ns + +
Mortgage debt/regular earnings ns ns ns ns ns
Refinanced loan ns + + + +
Loan amount/appraised value + + + + +
Other variables b
with significant effects
Occupational prestige ns - ns ns ns
a Basic model variables were included on the basis of theoretical specification. None were dropped on the
basis of insignificant results. Significance test used for these variables was the F Ratio result in the
equation: "+" indicates statistically significant with a positive coefficient; "-" indicates statisti-
cally significant with a negative coefficient; and, "ns" indicates that the F Ratio was below a .05 level
of significance.
bOther variables were included on the basis of any significant contribution (r = .02 or more) to increase
the goodness of fit of the equation. A "+" indicates a statistically significant positive coefficient;
a "-" indicates a statistically significant negative coefficient; and, "ns" indicates that the variable
was not statistically significant (i.e. contribution to r2 of less than .02).
Other variables with insignificant effects:
Borrower Attributes: Age; Sex; Multiple Wage Earners; Self-Employed; Marital Status.
Property and Neighborhood Characteristics: Single/Multi-Unit Dwelling; Property Location; Older 2 - 4
Unit Structures; Mean Household Income, 1970; Percent Minority Population, 1970.
Lender Characteristics: Bank Location; Deposit Size.
point in time rather than over time. Refinanced loans were more likely to
result in both minor and major delinquencies, but refinancing had no detect-
able influence on default risk. Somewhat surprisingly, mortgage debt was
not an important predictor of any of the five status probabilities. This
may simply reflect systematic application by banks in metropolitan Boston
of the .25 mortgage debt to income underwriting standard. As discussed in
the preliminary analyses, the proportion of family income devoted to
housing costs tends to be quite similar, ranging between 20 percent and 30
percent, for most of the conventional loan sample.
Federally Insured Loans
Compared to conventional loans, the factors in the basic model were
poorer predictors of the probability that an FHA or VA loan would become
delinquent or be foreclosed. Simple correlations between risk factors and
status outcomes were very low and little of the variation in risk outcomes
could be explained by the model. In fact, for one outcome, the probability
that at a specific point in time a loan would be 30 days or more delin-
quent, none of the variables in the model had statistically significant
effects. 10
Loan-to-value ratios, which had strong effects on each measure of
status for conventional loans, were unimportant in predicting the status of
federally insured loans. The likely reason for this is that federally
insured loans require smaller downpayments, so that loan-to-value ratios
are higher and more uniform for loans insured under FHA or VA. These
ratios averaged over 93 percent for borrowers receiving federally insured
loans, as opposed to 74 percent for the conventional loan group.
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Installment debt was a significant predictor of the probability that
a loan had ever been a serious delinquency, but was unrelated to default
risk. Once again, mortgage debt ratios tended to vary little from borrower
to borrower and were unimportant in explaining risk when other factors were
simultaneously taken into account. Refinancing also was not associated
with any of the risk probabilities, although less than 2 percent of all
federally insured loans in this sample involved refinancing.
Of the variables in the basic model, only two proved to have any sta-
tistically significant effects (Exhibit 4-5). Regular earnings per capita
was significant vis-a-vis default risk, but generally unrelated to
delinquency outcomes. Loan age proved to be a significant predictor of all
status outcomes except for the probability of a delinquency of 30 days or
more at the time of data collection. For each of the other outcomes., the
more seasoned the loan, the lower the risk of delinquency or default.
Effects of Other Factors
As in the loan type model, the same set of additional borrower,
property, lender and neighborhood characteristics was tested in order to
identify other factors that might be important determinants of delinquency
and default risk. The variables considered and the testing procedure have
been described in the introduction to this chapter.
Conventional
Testing for the effects of other, non-financial factors on risk for
conventional loans indicated that none of the borrower attributes and
neighborhood characteristics for which data were available were important
determinants of loan risk. Of the borrower attributes, age, multiple wage
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EXHIBIT 4-5
LOAN STATUS SUMMARY
FEDERALLY-INSURED LOANS
Probability of:
Receiving Ever 90 days or 30 days or
a default seriously more deliquent more deliquent
Basic Model Variables Default notices deliquent at sampling at sampling
Age of Loan - - - - ns
Regular earnings per capita - - ns - ns
Installment debt/regular earnings ns ns + ns ns
Mortgage debt/regular earnings ns ns ns ns ns
Refinanced loan ns ns ns ns ns
Loan amount/appraised value ns ns ns ns ns
Other variables b
with significant effects
Single-Family Home - - ns - ns
Deposit Size - - ns ns ns
Percent Minority Population + + + ns +
Age (of borrower) ns ns ns ns
a Basic model variables were included on the basis of theoretical specification. None were dropped on the
basis of insignificant results. Significance test used for these variables was the F Ratio result in th
equation: "+" indicates statistically significant with a positive coefficient; "-" indicates statisti-
cally significant with a negative coefficient; and, "ns", indicates that the F ratio was below a .05
level of significance.
bOther variables were included on the basis of any significant contribution (r = .02 or more) to
increase the goodness of fit of the equation. A "+" indicates a statistically significant positive
coefficient; a "-" indicates a statistically significant negative coefficient; and, a "ns" indicates that
the variable was not statistically significant (i.e. contribution to r2 of less than .02).
Other variables with insignificant effects:
Borrower Attributes: Sex; Multiple Wage Earners; Self-Employed; Occupational Prestige; Marital Status.
Property and Neighborhood Characteristics: Property Location; Older 2 to 4 Unit Structures; Mean
Household Income, 1970.
Lender Characteristics: Bank Location.
earners, self-employed persons, sex and marital status, none were signifi-
cantly associated with the probability of delinquency or default. Only
ratings of occupational prestige as a proximate measure of employment sta-
bility showed any marginal effects on the runs testing the probability of
receiving a default notice. 11
The neighborhood characteristics for which there were data and, based
on preliminary analyses, indicated strong correlations with the default
status categories included average household income, proportion of minority
residents, and proportion of older 2 to 4 family units. However, none of
these neighborhood factors were strongly related to any of the status out-
comes after controlling for household financial status and loan terms.
Property characteristics, including property location (urban or suburban)
and number of units were also insignificant.
Federally Insured Loans
Borrower attributes, property and neighborhood characteristics, and
lender characteristics tested in the conventional loan status model were
also tested in the status model for federally insured loans. However,
given that the financial and economic factors in the basic status model
fail to explain much of the variation in risk outcomes for federally
insured loans, it is not surprising that other factors appear to be related
to risk for this type of loan.
Of the borrower attributes, occupational prestige, self-employment,
sex, and widowed or divorced are not significant for any of the loan status
outcomes. Age of borrower is significant only for delinquencies of 30 days
or more, indicating that older borrowers may have less propensity to minor
- 178 -
arrears than younger borrowers.
Among the property, neighborhood and lending institution character-
istics, there were three factors that appear to be linked to risk experi-
ence for federally insured loans. First of all, greater default risk was
found for 2 to 4 family dwellings than single family homes. However, as
stated by one senior mortgage loan officer at a Boston-based savings
institution:
It is not the property that makes mortgage payments on
schedule, becomes delinquent, pays up or goes into
default. One needs to identify the financial root
causes which are either directly related to the
property, such as rental income stream or abnormally
high vacancy rates or only indirectly related to the
property. (October, 1978)
Data were generally not available for factors such as rental income or
vacancy rate history for these properties. The absence of adequate rental
income information distorted other variables such as mortgage debt and
installment debt, since rental income could not be taken into account in
any income measures. Given the substantial amount of missing information
with respect to this variable, it would appear that at least some institu-
tions in metropolitan Boston have not regarded rental income as an integral
component of their income calculations. Any accurate assessment of risk
differentials would require more complete information on these loans.
Delinquency and default risk also appear to increase the greater the
proportion of minorities in a neighborhood where the property was located.
Given that this relationship was not found for conventional loans, these
combined results may indicate that minority neighborhoods are not inherently
riskier. As for any risks associated with federally insured loans in these
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areas, there are several possible explanations which could not be ade-
quately tested with the available data. There is some empirical research
from other metropolitan areas on differential servicing patterns for
federally insured loans, that is, a tendency on the part of the bank offi-
cials to take action more quickly on delinquent federally insured loans in
these areas, as the lender has little or no risk exposure through foreclo-
sure on these loans which are fully insured or guaranteed by the federal
government.12 Moreover, this variable may also be serving as a proxy for
other financially based factors related to the economics of the loan for
which information was not obtained. It should be noted that this factor
reflects the racial composition of the neighborhood and not the race of the
borrower.
Finally, of the lender characteristics, deposit size was a signifi-
cant predictor of risk while main office location was not. In this case,
unlike decisions regarding loan type where larger banks were more likely to
grant a federally insured loan than a conventional loan to an applicant,
federally insured loans granted by smaller banks were more likely to
default. This may be a result of the loan type decision itself. Where
large banks tend to grant federally insured loans to a broad range of risk
borrowers, small banks may grant them more systematically to higher risk
borrowers. It may also be the case that during the period of relatively
high federally insured loan activity, 1969 to 1973, large savings banks
were actively engaged in the Boston Banks Urban Renewal Group Program
(BBURG) during those years. If smaller banks met the demand for increased
federally insured loans through their regular portfolio while larger banks
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allocated a significant portion of these loans to their BBURG files, the
effects of the institutional deposit size variable could be distorted.
CONCLUSIONS
The multivariate analyses reported in this chapter indicate that (1)
of the many factors for which data were obtained, most outcomes are best
predicted by only six or seven variables, (2) both loan type and status
outcomes are relatively difficult to predict. The loan type equations pre-
dict only about 20 percent of the probability that a loan will be conven-
tional rather than federally insured. In other words, eighty percent of
the variation is unexplained. The loan status equations are considerably
weaker. For conventional loans, the variation explained by loan status
equations ranges from a low of 9 percent to a high of 12 percent; for
federally insured loans, from 1 percent to 9 percent. These latter results
indicate that, based on data known to the lender at the time of
origination, delinquencies and defaults are to a large extent relatively
random and, therefore, unpredictable events. Those variables which do
offer some explanatory value for these risk outcomes are summarized in the
final subsections below.
Loan Type
The decision to grant a mortgage applicant a conventional rather than
a federally insured loan was found to be influenced primarily by the
appraised value of the property, the level of installment debt carried by
the borrower and, for loans issued after 1968, the ratio of the appraised
value to the purchase price. Appraised values were found to be par-
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ticularly important -- the probability of receiving a conventional loan
increased steadily as appraised values rose. The only non-financial factor
studied that affected the loan type decision was the deposit size of the
institution making the loan. Larger banks were more likely to grant
federally insured loans than smaller lending institutions. There was some
evidence that divorced or widowed borrowers or those purchasing single-
family homes were favored for conventional mortgages, but these effects
appeared only for loans made before 1969 (Exhibit 4-3).
Loan Status
Based on the status of individual loans, a number of different
measures of delinquency and default risk, both over time and at a given
point in time, were analyzed. For conventional loans, regular earnings per
capita and loan-to-appraised value ratios were the two financial factors
that were consistently associated with the probability of delinquency or
default. Both installment debt and refinancing tended to increase
delinquency risk, but were unrelated to the threat of default. Mortgage
debt as a percentage of regular earnings was not an important determinant
of risk. The probability of default was closely tied to the age of the
loan, with risk decreasing steadily as loans became more seasoned. Only
one non-financial factor -- ratings of occupational prestige -- exhibited
any association with status outcomes, and this occurred only in terms of
the likelihood of receiving a notice of default (Exhibit 4-4).
Predicting mortgage risk for federally insured loans proved to be
difficult to accomplish with any degree of accuracy. Regular earnings per
capita was the only financial measure associated with more than one of the
- 182 -
risk outcomes studied. Three nonfinancial factors were found to be
risk-related. Multiple unit dwellings and properties in areas with higher
percentages of minority group residents appeared to be more prone to
delinquency and default but these results may be questionable based on
institutional factors and the extent to which key financial information
such as rental income and vacancy rate history was not available. In
addition, larger banks (based on deposit sizes) were less likely to
experience defaults for the federally insured loans in their portfolios
than smaller banks (Exhibit 4-5). This may stem from the fact that larger
institutions have tended to grant federally insured loans to a broader
spectrum of borrowers while smaller institutions used this loan type more
exclusively for higher risk borrowers. 13
Comparison of Loan Type Decision and Risk Analyses
In theory, a lender's decision to grant a mortgage applicant either a
conventional or a federally insured loan should be based only on those fac-
tors related to the likelihood of serious delinquency and default. In
practice, there are institutional factors associated with overall portfolio
risk, e.g., secondary mortgage market sales to achieve greater liquidity
and institutional perceptions of risk associated with factors such as
appraised value.
A comparison of the two major analyses conducted in this study indi-
cates that among conventional loans two factors -- regular earnings per
capita and ability to make a substantial downpayment (measured as the loan-
to-appraised value ratio) -- appear to be the major determinants of risk.
These factors should clearly be taken into consideration in the decision to
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grant a conventional loan. Mortgage debt, installment debt and refinancing
should also be considered.
In analyzing actual loan type decisions, however, it was found that
lenders tend to emphasize installment debt, appraised values, and the ratio
of appraised value to purchase price in making these decisions. Regular
earnings per capita seem to be generally overshadowed by the lender's con-
sideration of the appraised value of the property. In sum, appraised
values seem to have been historically overemphasized to the exclusion of
more basic household financial factors.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 4
1Two studies (Schafer, 1978; Schafer and Ladd, 1980) have been able
to analyze this phase of risk evaluation with data obtained through state
regulatory agencies in New York and California where these agencies have
required recordkeeping on rejected written mortgage applications for some
years. Rejected loan information in Massachusetts, as most other states,
was limited to requirements under relatively new FDIC Equal Credit
Opportunity Act regulations.
2After several bouts with "disintermediation" (i.e., depositors'
withdrawal from financial intermediaries to invest their savings directly
in market securities for better rates of return) savings institutions in
metropolitan Boston became more concerned about saleability of their long
term mortgages nationally in the secondary market. However, by the early
1970's, several of the federally sponsored mortgage credit agencies (FNMA,
FHLMC, and GNMA) had stimulated sufficient investor interest and credibi-
lity that sale of conventional loans made under FNMA or FHLMC's appraisal
and underwriting (and, in some cases, with private mortgage insurance) cri-
teria became increasingly straightforward. Thus, these nascent concerns of
Boston area banks with secondary market resale did not necessitate emphasis
on federally insured loan activity, as opposed to conventional loans.
The initial statistical procedure used in this analysis was the
ordinary least squares (OLS) technique. Because of the dichotomous nature
of each of the outcomes in this study, however, one of the important
assumptions underlying OLS is violated, which might produce biased esti-
mates of the effects of some risk factors. To check on this possibility, a
non-linear estimation technique, logit analysis, was also applied to each
equation. Results of the logit analyses closely paralleled those of the
OLS technique, yielding similar interpretations of the effects of all
variables in the basic models. The fact that two different estimation
methods produced nearly equivalent results serves to increase confidence in
the accuracy of our findings. Correlation matrices, coefficient estimates
and their associated standard errors, and other summary statistics for
these multivariate analyses may be found in Appendix D.
4Prestige ratings have been assigned based on a scale developed at
the National Opinion Research Center. See Paul S. Siegel, Peter H. Rossi
and Robert W. Hodge, Social Standings of Occupations (N.Y.: Seminar
Press), 1976.
- Significant was defined as increases in explained variation of .02
or more.
6If bank appraisal is lower than the purchase price, the conventional
loan amount that can be granted is proportionately less. For example, if a
homebuyer has signed a purchase and sale agreement on a home for $50,000
and the bank appraised value is $50,000 or more, the homebuyer can obtain a
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conventional loan of at least 80 percent of $50,000, or $40,000. However,
if the bank appraised value is only $45,000, the maximum conventional loan
amount for which the homebuyer is eligible is $36,000. Unless the home-
buyer has an additional $4,000 (the difference between a loan amount of
$40,000 and $36,000) to put down, the options are (1) obtain an insured
mortgage as, of the $10,000 paid out on $50,000, the bank will only credit
the amount below $45,000 or $5,000, which from the bank's perspective is an
11 percent downpayment, (2) renegotiate the purchase price of the house
with the seller down to the bank appraisal value, or (3) withdraw from the
transaction.
7See Appendix D, Exhibits D-1, D-2, D-5 and D-6 for detailed infor-
mation on these statistical results.
8See Appendix C.
9See Appendix D, Exhibits D-3 and 4, D-6, D-9, D-10, D-ll, D-12, and
D-13.
10See Appendix D, Exhibits D-5 and 6, D-14, D-15, D-16, D-17, and
D-18.
A far better measure of this variable would be an individual's
employment and occupational history per se. While the data collection
forms provided for compilation of this information on a case by case basis,
apparently most of the banks sampled have generally not maintained records
on this. Secondary mortgage market agencies now request applicant infor-
mation not only on occupation, but also (1) number of "years employed in
this line of work or profession" and (2 employment history over the two
years prior to making the application. Since many Boston area banks are
now using these application forms developed by FNMA and FHLMC, a clearer
assessment of employment prospects as a factor in loan risk could be made
by these institutions, individually or collectively, in several years.
12See Chapter 3.
13Data by deposit size of lender were checked so as to assure that
this effect was not observed as a result of smaller institutions not
holding federally insured loans. Institutions of all sizes in the sample
held federally insured loans.
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CHAPTER 5
TOWARDS ALTERNATIVE LENDING POLICIES:
REFORM AMIDST UPHEAVAL IN RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE MARKETS
INTRODUCTION
Risk analyses of mortgage loan data in Chapter 4 have significant
implications for the thrift institutions, as the traditional mortgage
lenders, and for newer institutional investors. From an investor's
perspective, there are two different risk considerations. One concerns the
mortgage instrument, the terms of repayment measured against the borrower's
ability to meet these terms and any collateral security in the event of the
borrower's default. The other set of risks is associated with portfolio
considerations of each institutional investor. Since the mid-1960's, much
of the formulation of regulatory reform has been in response to institu-
tional needs of the thrift industry for shorter term or variable rate
assets to better match the short term deposits held by these institutions.
These changes, many of which are directed at modifications in the mortgage
instrument, have potentially significant risk implications and have
received minimal attention.
From a consumer perspective, there has been considerable concern that
the changes in types of mortgages promoted by the thrift industry will
negate efforts over the past two decades to broaden and equalize access to
credit, particularly classes of borrowers including minorities, women, and
urban borrowers. While these consumer concerns have been given con-
siderable weight in Congress, pressures for new mortgage instruments have
continued to increase as the financial viability of the thrifts has been
threatened. To some extent, within years of enactment of consumer-oriented
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legislation and regulatory initiatives to expand access to credit, changes
in mortgage credit instruments promoted by the industry in response to
financial market pressures may undermine many of these reforms. Moreover,
as other less regulated institutions enter the market either as originators
or purchasers in the secondary market, their underwriting criteria may
reinstate the anti-urban and de facto discriminatory biases which have been
the subject of consumer criticism and reform directed at their more
publicly regulated predecessors.
This chapter will assess changes in mortgage instruments and institu-
tional sources of capital and the implication of these changes for reforms
in traditional perceptions of loan risk. Most of the chapter is devoted to
the thrift industry, which has been the major source of one-to-four family
residential mortgage funds since the 1930's. Regulatory reforms, both
those instituted and proposed, are discussed in terms of their implications
for mortgage capital in the housing market. Structural changes in these
institutional sources of mortgage funds and in the mortgage instrument
itself are critically examined. Finally, the future of consumer-oriented
reforms is evaluated in view of these developments.
THRIFT INSTITUTIONS AND THE RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE INDUSTRY
Historical Perspective
Thrift institutions in the United States have historically been spe-
cialized financial institutions. Since the early nineteenth century, when
the first mutual savings bank was chartered in.Philadelphia by the state of
Pennsylvania, thrift institutions have been created to serve the small
saver. Building and loan societies, forerunners of the savings and loan
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industry, were associations in which groups of families would pool their
savings to serve as a revolving fund from which a home was built for each
family. In both cases, the capital resources, or liabilities, of these
institutions were the deposits of wage-earning households. Savings and
loan associations were also chartered to specialize in investments or
assets, by devoting these resources to one-to-four family home mortgages.
Thus, "specialized" meant serving a segment of investors and investments
that were not, at least at the time these institutions were created, part
of the economic mainstream. These institutions were not chartered to serve
"commerce", but a set of "social needs".
As discussed in Chapter 3, much of the federal and state regulatory
apparatus for thrift institutions was set up in the 1930's. Most of this
was directed at protecting small depositors from any financial losses
through (1) prudent investments on the part of each regulated institution,
and (2) various forms of government support, including deposit insurance
systems and loans from a central bank (the Federal Home Loan Bank) to
member institutions, as needed. Thus, historically, banking regulation of
assets held by thrift institutions has been done in the name of ensuring
that the institutions will be able to honor their liabilities to small
savers. 2 Home mortgage investments specifically have been strongly
encouraged indirectly by banking regulations which limited the investment
alternatives of thrift institutions essentially to other types of real
estate or government securities.
Up through the mid-1950's, most thrift institutions were mutually
held, i.e., owned by depositors or shareholders as opposed to stockholders.
As such, thrifts were considered nonprofit and exempt from income taxes.
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However, as these institutions thrived in a post-World War II booming
housing market, political pressure increased, particularly from the commer-
cial banks, to have thrift institutions taxed so as to remove some of their
competitive advantage in attracting deposits. Ultimately, thrift institu-
tions were subject to federal income taxes, but granted special tax
shelters through provisions labeled "bad debt reserve" requirements. These
provisions granted thrift institutions with 60 percent or more of their
assets invested in one-tofour family mortgages special tax breaks. Thus,
the thrift industry's specialization in the residential segment of finan-
cial markets was sanctioned by federal regulatory and tax policies.
This portfolio composition based on long-term assets (home mortgages
with contract maturities of as long as 30 years) supported by short-term
liabilities (regular savings accounts from which withdrawals could be made
without advance notice) was supportable during a decade of relatively
stable interest rates. However, when interest rates rose rapidly in 1966
and, again, in 1969, thrift institutions found themselves with overall
rates of return on their portfolios far below market rates. Higher inter-
est rates levied on new mortgages were insufficient to raise the portfolio
earnings to pay market rates of interest on deposits.
Prior to this period, deposit rates paid by commercial banks had been
federally regulated, but the thrift institutions had not been. In 1966,
ostensibly as a temporary measure to address short term problems of the
thrifts, Congress enacted legislative provisions. This legislation was
implemented under Regulation Q of the Federal Reserve Board. To preclude
commercial banks from luring depositors away from the thrifts, thrifts were
permitted to pay a slightly higher rate than commercial banks. These
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interest rate provisions, extended by Congress several times since their
initial statutory expiration date, was still in effect until the Depository
Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980 instituted phase out provisions.
In retrospect, these stop-gap measures appear to have perpetuated what
was an increasingly untenable portfolio situation. The mismatch in the
thrift industry between long-term assets and shorter term liabilities is
pronounced, as indicated in Exhibit 5-1. The poorly "hedged" asset liabil-
ity structure of savings and loan associations and mutual savings banks is
best illustrated in this exhibit by comparing them to two other major types
of financial institutions. Commercial banks generally hold short term
assets well-matched to their short term liabilities. Life insurance com-
panies make longer term investments based on their longer term liabilities
through term and whole life insurance policies. After 1966, while there
was much analytical discussion and debate directed at modifications of
thrift institutions' portfolios, little change actually occurred.
Political Pressure for Financial Institution Reform
Much attention has been focused on Regulation Q, as both a cause and a
symptom, of changes in capital markets. The issues associated with the
solvency of the thrift industry and social consequences of making these
institutions more competitive through reducing their portfolio emphasis on
home mortgages, have been deliberated in a series of Presidential,
Congressional, and privately commissioned studies. There have also been
perennial public hearings, debates, and in 1980, major legislation on
financial institution reform (Exhibit 5-2).
In the 1930's, many major federal initiatives were directed at
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Exhibit 5-1
ESTIMATED MATURITY OF ASSET AND LIABILITY HOLDINGS OF REPRESENTATIVE
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (IN PERCENTAGES)
Maturity Structure Based on Initial
Holding Period
Total Assets/
Liabilities
(in billions
of dollars)
12/31/72
Financial
Institution
Less than
Five Years
(percentage)
Greater than
Five Years
(percentage)
Commercial banks
Life Insurance
companies
Savings and Loan
associations
Mutual savings
banks
Sources: Federal
$835.4 Assets
Liabilities
$252.4 Assets
Liabilities
$272.4 Assets
Liabilities
92
88
5
10
8
92
$106.7 Assets 5
Liabilities 91
Reserve Bulletin Tables 3-3, 4-3, 4-7, 5-1.
8
12
95
90
92
8
95
9
aThis table obtained from Dougall, 1975 (p.23).
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Date
1958
Author (and
Sponsor, if different)
Comission on Money and
Credit (Comittee for
Economic Development)
1966 Friend, Irwin A. ed.
(Federal Home Loan Bank
Board directed by Congress
to undertake study in
conjunction with enactment)
1969 U.S. President's Commission
on Financial Structure and
Regulation (Hunt Commission)
Exhibit 5-2
Studies and Legislative Events
Directed at Financial Institution Reform
Title of Document
Money and Credit: Their
Influence on Jobs, Prices
and Growth (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1961)
A Study of the Savings and
oan Industry (Washington-
D.C.: FHLBB, 1969)
Re rt
as ngton, D.C.,
1972
Major Recomendations
1. Standardize regulations versus differen-
tiation between financial institutions.
2. Greater portfolio flexibilityfor thirft
institutions.
3. Use direct subsidies to sustain level of
residential finance as more efficient
means of allocating resources than reg-
ulation of portfolio powers of financial
institutions.
1. Again, liberalization of asset and liab-
111ty restrictions on thrifts.
2. Modification of FHLBB advance (loan)
system:
a. loans available to thrifts on
request
b. long-term advances available to
finance mortgages in capital-short
areas, regardless of housing indus-
try conditions nationwide.
3. Elimination of points by raising state
usury ceilings and regulated rates of
federally insured mortages.
1. Reiterated most of recommendations made
by Commission and Money and Credit in-
cluding
a. broadening investment powers of
thrift institutions
b. extension of demand deposit
authority
2. Removal of interest rate ceilings on
deposit
__j
Exhibit 5-2 (continued)
Author (and
Date Sponsor, if different)
1969 Federal Reserve Staff
Study (Federal Reserve
Board
1973 U.S. Treasury
Title of Document
Ways to Moderate
Fluctuations in
Housing 1972
Report on the Financial
Institutions Act of 1973:
A Section by Section Analysis.
October 11, 1973
also
11t Congress Senate Subcommittee
on Financial Institutions of the
Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs.
Hearings on the Financial Insti-
tutions Act of 1973
November, 1973
Major Recommendations
3. Direct subsidies for housing; addressed
criticisms of Comission's recommenda-
tion by outlining a temporary tax credit
for lenders who invested in home mortages
during the transitional period.
1. Focused primarily on sustained availa-
bility of housing credit (versus
viability of thrifts)
2. Recommended lengthening liabilities, but
only minor changes in asset structure:
variable rate mortgages were not endorr.ed
on the grounds that these instruments
transferred interest rate risk to house-
hold borrowers that the thrifts as finan-
cial intermediaries should assume.
3. Supported gradual removal of rate
ceilings on mortagages and deposits, but
only as thrift industry became more
viable through long-term mortgages as
assets.
4. Also, concluded that mortgage credit
could be stablized by smoothing the flow
of business investment: "variable
business-investment tax credit to sta-
bilize expenditures for residential
constructon as well as for plant and
equipment." (Henderschott and Villani,
1977:9)
1. Essentially recommendations of Hunt
Commission in legislative form
2. Homogenization of thrift and comercial
bank investment power
a. Thrifts unlimited in consumer credit
investment and limited options to
invest in corporate debt
b. Demand deposits
I
Exhibit 5-2 (continued)
Author (and
Date Sponsor, if different)
1973-1976 U.S. Congesss, House of
Representatives (Committee
on Banking, Currency, and
Housing) Subcommittee on
Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation,
and Insurance.
__,
Title of Document
Hearings on Financal Institu-
tions and the Nation's Economy
"Discussion Principles" 93rd
Congress, Ist Session, November,
1973
Hearings on the Financial
Reform Act of 1976, 94th
Congress, 2nd Session,
March, 1976
earings on the Variable
ate Mort a e Pro sal
an egulation th
Congress, Ist session,
April, 1975
Major Recommendations
3. Interest rate ceilings
a. on deposits, removed overtime
b. on FHA and VA, eliminated
c. mortage lending encouraged through
a tax credit up to 3 1/2 percent of
income received by lender' on
residential mortgages.
1. Premise that "housing goals could be more
effectively achieved outside the finan-
cial system, and that housing, like all
other sectors of the econouy, would bene-
fit form a more efficient and equitable
financial structure" rejected by the
House conmitte members (Henderschott and
Villani, 1977 11)
2. Counterproposals to reconnendations made
by above study commissions and legisla-
tion filed by the Administration and
approved by the Senate:
3. Financial Reform Act (FRA)
of the House developed in
response to the Financial
Institutions Act (FIA) filed
by Treasury and favorably
received in Senate.
Specifically, provisions of
FRA:
a. Retention of deposit
rate ceilings and
differentials between
commercial banks and
thrifts to protect
housing.
b. FHLBB empowered to make
30-year advances so as to
provide below-market
interest-rate loans (vs.
original liquidity back-
up function)
Exhibit 5-2 (continued)
Author (and
Date Sponsor, if different)
1975 Federal Home Loan
Bank Board
1980 U.S. Congress
Title of Document
A Financial Institution
for the Future
Washington D.C., 1975
Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary
Control Act (Enacted March 31,
T980)
MaJor Recommendations
1. Legislative proposals based
on FHLBB's 1969 study
2. Promoted concept of thrifts as family
Financial Services Center (FSC), in part
to mitigate oppositon based on fears of
less mortagage money. Also, in part to
address the issue of thrifts' established
strength in the household sector and
relative weakness in other investment or
savings sectors.
1. Title 1: Monetary Control Act Establishes
a universal reserve requirement appli-
cable to non-members as well as members
of the Federal Reserve system.
2. Title 11: Depository Institutions
Deregt Ion Act._
Elimination of restrictions on the amount
thrifts and commercial banks can pay for
savings deposits "as rapidly as economic
conditions warrant" within the next six
years. Deregulation Committee comprised
of federal bank regulars, created to
oversee this phasing out of Regulation Q.
3. title III: Consumer Checking Account
Equit Act. Authorizes nationwide NOW
(interest-bearing checking) accounts.
4. Title IV: Powers of Thrift Institutions
... Expands the investment powers of
thrift institutions including ability to
issue credit cards.
5. Title V: State Usury Laws. Pre-empts,
pending further state action, existing
state mortgage usury ceilings.
__j
ko
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assisting the housing industry through creation of specialized financial
institutions (federally chartered savings and loan associations) and regu-
latory agency (the Federal Home Loan Bank Board), as well as a series of
residential mortgage instruments such as the federally insured mortgage
programs administered by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) and a
secondary market mortgage-purchase program under the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA). These measures were novel in that federal
regulation of financial institutions had previously been devoted almost
exclusively to commercial banking. Up to that time, only the states had
chartered specialized institutions such as mutual savings banks and
cooperative banks.
In 1957, the Committee for Economic Development, a privately funded
industry organization, convened the Commission on Money and Credit. The 27
Commission members were primarily of Chairmen of the Boards or Presidents
of major corporations. The Commission was chaired by Frazier Wilde,
Chairman of the Board of Connecticut General Life Insurance Company. The
membership included David Rockefeller as President of the Chase Manhattan
Bank, the Chairman of the Board of Bank of America, and so on. There were
a few labor representatives and one or two academics on the Commission.
Further academic input was structured through a thirteen member Advisory
Board comprised exclusively of university faculty. (Commission on Money and
Credit, 1961). The focus of the Commission and their final report was
standardization in the regulation of financial institutions, both assets
and liabilities. With regard to assets, the Commission recommended greater
portfolio flexibility for thrift institutions. To compensate for any
reduction in home mortgages, the Commission suggested that direct federal
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subsidies should be used to sustain the level of residential finance as a
more efficient means of allocating resources than the regulation of port-
folio powers of financial institutions.
Little attention was generally given to the Commission's report or
recommendations. Some analysts have attributed this to the fact that it
was not done during a "crisis period". Subsequently, interest rates led to
substantial withdrawal of deposits from financial intermediaries. The most
significant periods of disintermediation occurred in 1966, 1969, 1973-1974
and 1979-1980. A series of federally sponsored commissions convened inter-
mittently from the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's arrived at many of the same
conclusions as the Commission.
In 1966, with the onset of soaring interest rates, thrift institutions
were threatened with market rates for funds considerably higher than the
average rate of return on their portfolios. These portfolios were
comprised of long term mortgage investments. There was no possibility of
the thrifts making any substantial short term changes in earnings. As a
result, Congress mandated deposit interest rate ceilings on accounts held
by thrift institutions which were to be set somewhat higher than those per-
mitted commercial banks so as to give the thrift institutions and, hence,
home mortgage borrowers, a competitive edge.
In conjunction with the enactment of this legislation, Congress
directed the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to undertake a study to address
longer term solutions to the problem, as the imposition of deposit rate
ceilings on the thrifts was considered only a temporary, emergency measure.
The Board commissioned this study in 1966. Completed in 1969, the conclu-
sions of the contributing authors were similar to those of the Commission's
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on liberalization of the asset and liability restrictions on thrift insti-
tutions (Friend, 1969). However, this report was significantly different
in that measures were recommended to ensure that savings and loan asso-
ciations would be able to continue to make mortgages capital available to
the homebuilding industry. One contributor concluded that long-term loans
should be made by the FHLBB to member institutions on request. This
proposal differed considerably from the operating policy of short term
advances to address liquidity problems. Moreover, these advances were
granted not automatically but at the discretion of the Board. Another con-
tributor recommended the retention of state imposed and federally insured
mortgage interest rate ceilings, if these ceilings were raised sufficiently
so as to eliminate "points". Points charged by lenders at origination make
the effective rate of the mortgage the same as the unregulated market rate.
Thus, while the stated rate complies with the regulated rate, the borrower
pays more by paying additional interest in points charged in advance.
In 1969, another period of disintermediation set in. The deposit rate
ceilings imposed by Regulation Q appeared to exacerbate rather than alle-
viate the financial situation of the thrifts. At this time, a Presidential
Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation, commonly known as the
Hunt Commission, was appointed. Once again, the report of this Commission
issued in 1972 reiterated many of the recommendations made by the 1961
report. These included broader investment powers and extension of demand
deposit authority to the thrift institutions. The Hunt Commission also
recommended removal of interest rate ceilings on deposits imposed under
Regulation Q. In the long term, the Hunt Commission recommended direct
subsidies for housing. In the short term, the Commission proposed a tax
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credit for lenders who invested in home mortgages during a transitional
period.
The practical outcome of the Hunt Commission was the Financial
Institutions Act filed in the Senate by the U.S. Treasury in 1973.
Exhibit 5-2 summarizes the bill's provisions. These legislative recommen-
dations were reasonably well-received in the Senate. However, the House
Banking Committee began to formulate counterproposals in an effort to
better protect the home mortgage borrower and the homebuilding industry.
In 1973, hearings were held on the House study on Financial Institutions in
the Nation's Economy (FINE). Three years later, a formal legislative coun-
terproposal was filed entitled the Financial Reform Act (FRA). This
legislation rejected the premise of earlier works that "housing goals could
be more effectively achieved outside the financial system and that housing,
like all other sectors of the economy, would benefit from a more efficient
and equitable financial structure" (Henderschott and Villani, 1977:11).
For example, the FRA proposed to retain deposit interest rate ceilings and
the rate differential favoring thrifts over commercial banks. The proposal
of the FHLBB 1969 study to enable the Board to make 30-year loans to its
member institutions to provide for below market rate mortgages was also
incorporated. Thus, the House Committee took the position that housing was
a sufficient matter of public concern such that a laissez-faire policy
toward availability of mortgage funds was politically unacceptable.
The Senate and House versions of financial reform legislation were
essentially irreconcilable. Congressional action remained at a stalemate
for several years. In the meantime, financial reform was undertaken by the
federal regulatory agencies, usually with the informal sanction of one or
more Congressional committee chairpersons.
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Recent Changes in Liability Structure
Since 1966, an array of deposit-related regulations have been prom-
ulgated in response to the thrift industry need both to hold longer term
deposits better matched to their mortgage loans and to offer higher rates
to maintain and attract more deposit funds. A series of time deposit
instruments were developed which, unlike regular savings accounts, required
minimum deposit amounts of as much as one thousand dollars and which, on a
graduated rate scale, paid higher rates on longer term deposits.
Throughout these developments, the perceived threats to the thrifts
deposit base were the commercial banks, notes issued by the U.S. Treasury,
and securities issued by other federal agencies. What these three invest-
ments had in common was either a federal government guarantee or federal
deposit insurance which made them relatively risk free and hence more
attractive to small savers than other types of investments. To address the
threat of commercial banks, the thrift industry lobbied for interest rate
differentials on accounts of less than $100,000. Over that amount,
however, the commercial banks could issue certificates of deposit paying
market rates to wealthier individual and institutional investors who could
afford to buy them. To address the threat of Treasury notes, the thrifts
successfully argued that minimum denominations should be $10,000 or more,
thus keeping these market rate instruments out of the reach of small
savers. Federally sponsored credit agencies such as the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA) did the same (Exhibit 5-3).
In the late 1960's, the U.S. Treasury ventured to issue notes in denom-
inations as low as $1,000. The net result was substantial deposit
withdrawals from financial institutions, particularly the thrifts. The
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Exhibit 5-3
Differential Rates of
Return by Type of Investment
and Minimum Denominationa
Type of Investment Minimum Denomination Interest Rate
Thrift Institutions
NOW
Regular Savings
Time
Money Market Certificate
$500/$1000
$10,000
Commercial Banks
Demand
Regular Savings
Time
Certificates of Deposit
$500/$1000
$100,000
5.0%
5.25%
5-7.75%
MARKET RATE
Treasury
Savings Bonds
Notes/Bonds
$25
$5000/$10 ,000
BELOW MARKET
MARKET RATE
Secondary Mortgage Market
FNMA Securities
GNMA-Guaranteed pass
through Certificates
$10,000
$25,000
MARKET RATE
MARKET RATE
Corporate Issues
MARKET
MARKET
(less
Stock
Notes/Bonds
Investment Funds - Stocks
and Bonds
State and Local Government
Issues
RATE
RATE
Fund Fee)
$5,000 or more
$5,000 or more
TAX EXEMPT MARKET RATE
TAX EXEMPT MARKET RATE
aAs of 1977
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5.0%
5.50%
5-7.75%
RATE
Notes
Bonds
Treasury subsequently retreated to issuing notes with higher denominations.
In a prominent article entitled "Short Changing the Small Saver," the
author, Edward Kane (1973), presented substantial data on the inequities
and regressive effects of the federal government fostering policies which
protected the thrift institutions at the expense of lower income
households. He argued that a large proportion of thrift institution funds
come from households with incomes of less than $15,000. The primary bene-
ficiaries of the thrifts access to below market interest rate funds were
middle and upper income households with incomes of $15,000 or more.
By the mid-1970's, it was clear that neither term deposits with grad-
uated rates nor sustained efforts to keep the minimum denominations of
alternative investments beyond the reach of the small saver were workable
solutions to the thrifts' financial problems. None of these had been
intended as long term solutions. Moreover, as the thrift industry con-
tinued to offer below market interest rates on deposits, money market funds
were formed which offered small savers close to market rates of return.
These funds gave savers with smaller sums of money to invest a means to
pool their funds and simply purchased some of the very securities which the
thrifts had tried to keep out of the reach of the small saver, i.e., com-
mercial bank certificates of deposit and U.S. Treasury notes.
Prior to 1973-1974, money market funds were negligible in terms of
national capital markets. However, in the years that followed, these funds
became an important institutional force in the competition for funds from
small savers. The growth and portfolio composition of these funds is sum-
marized in Exhibit 5-4. Overall, these funds appear to have grown rapidly
during periods of rising interest rates (1974-1975 and 1978-1979) and pla-
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Exhibit 5-4
Money Market Funds:
Growth Trends and Composition
of Assets
(Millions of Dollars)
1973
Total Assets
Demand Deposits
and Currency
Time Deposits
Credit Market
Instruments
U.S. Gov't
Securities
Open-Market
Paper
Miscellaneous
Share Outstandings
1974
2.4
1975
3.7
1976
3.7
1977
3.9
1978
10.8
.1
1.6
.8
.1
.7
2.4
2.1
1.5
.9
.5
.1
3.7
1.5
2.1
1.1
.9
.1
3.7
1.8
1.9
5.3
5.1
.9 1.5
1.0 3.7
.1 .3
3.9 10.8
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts, 1949-1978:
Annual Total Flows and Year-End Assets and Liabilities,
Washington D.C.
12/79: 128.
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teaued as interest rates subsided (1976-1977). Moreover, their growth
coincides with reduced flow of funds to thrift institutions (Exhibit 5-5).
As the thrifts entered a second major period of disintermediation in
1978, they were granted authority to issue 6 month certificates. Pegged to
the Treasury bill rate, these certificates were designed to be competitive
market rate instruments. Again, the minimum denomination for purchase of
these money market certificates (MMC's) was initially set at $10,000. When
MMC's were first introduced, it appeared that they would generally sustain
the thrifts' deposit base. However, over time several problems arose. For
some institutions, it appeared that they were cannibalizing their below
market rate deposit funds as transfers were made from these to MMC's. For
thrifts generally, sustaining the high and variable rate interest payments
due certificate holders with relatively low average rates of return from
their portfolios was becoming more burdensome. Finally, with minimum entry
levels of $10,000 and term requirements of six months, these certificates
were not as available or attractive as many of the money market funds where
entry level deposits were as low as $1,000 and without term requirements.
The net result of these efforts to extend the term and rates of return
paid on deposits by savings institutions may be summarized as follows:
During the 1950's and early 1960's, when the variability
of interest rates was relatively mild and long term rates
consistently exceeded short-term rates, the maturity
imbalance of major mortgage lenders was of little impor-
tance. However, with the acceleration of inflation in
the mid-1960's, the average level and variability of
short term interest rates rose much more than long-term
rates. This increased the risk of borrowing short to
lend long, and thrift institutions sought to reduce this
risk by lengthening the maturities of their deposits.
For example, in the period from 1969 to 1978 savings and
loan associations (S&L's) reduced the share of their
total deposits accounted for by passbook accounts, which
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Exhibit 5-5
Net Increases/Decreased in
Liabilities of Thrift Institutions
(Mutual Savings Banks and Savings and
Loan Associations) Compared with
Net Share Issues of Money Market Funds
(Billions of Dollars)
MSB's S&L's MMF's
1970 4.5 13.3 -
1971 9.8 29.0 -
1972 10.4 35.5 -
1973 5.3 26.9 -
1974 3.4 22.3 2.4
1975 11.1 41.4 1.3
1976 13.1 51.5 *
1977 11.5 64.2 .2
1978 10.0 60.6 6.9
1979 5.5 52.0 34.4
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are effectively payable on demand, from 69 percent to 32
percent. Mutual savings banks reduced their passbook
share from 99 percent to 51 percent. Nevertheless, the
average maturity of thrift institutions' assets still
far exceeds that of their liabilities. (Melton and
Heidt, 1979:23-24)
Changes in Asset Structure: Alternative Mortgage Instruments (AMI's)
Alternative mortgage instrument proposals vary considerably.
However, as a common denominator, each proposes modifications in one or
more of four basic characteristics of the fixed rate mortgage (FRM). These
four characteristics are:
. fixed interest rate from loan origination to maturity
. periodic (usually monthly) level payments comprised
of principal and interest
. repayment term established at origination
. amount of principal established by initial loan commitment.
Under a fixed rate mortgage, the first three factors remain unchanged over
the life of the mortgage and the last steadily declines with amortization
of the loan.3
The arguments presented to the general public and prospective
borrowers in favor of the variable term alternative mortgage instruments
(VRM's, RM's and PLAM's) may be summarized as follows:
Better to have some mortgage money under less
advantageous terms than none at all. Fixed rate
long-term mortgages financed with variable rate
and short-term deposits are an instrument which
works only in a stable economic environment with
minimal changes in interest rates and virtually
no inflation. Fixed rate long-term instruments
in an era of volatile interest rates and rampant
inflation have threatened many thrift institutions
with insolvency. No other private investors will
consider these instruments viable in such times
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and the thrift institutions cannot afford to, par-
ticularly in their present financial situation.
. Stabilize the flow of mortgage funds available.
Counter the cyclical nature of the housing market
by minimizing disintermediation from the fin4ncial
institutions supporting the mortgage market.
. AMI's will be more equitable to small savers.
As the thrift institutions bring their return on
assets closer to market rate, they will be able
to pay depositors a market rate of return.
Variable interest rate instruments (VRM's and
RM's) will mean lower interest charges. The
lender will not need to set mortgage rates higher
than present market to offset any anticipated
future increases. Also, mortgage lenders will
not have to charge new borrowers disproportion-
ately higher interest rates to offset any unan-
ticipated increases which are not reflected in
their outstanding loans at below market rates of
return. (For example, fixed rate mortgages
offered by some institutions in the California
experiment had effectively higher rates of inter-
est, as a result of points charged, than variable
rate options assuming the maximum increases over
the life of the loan. As a result, variable rate
mortgages may be preferable to borrowers, par-
ticularly those who only intend to hold their prop-
erties on a short term basis (Colton, et.al. in
FHLBB, 1977).
Alternative mortgage instrument proposals can be classified in two
categories. One set addresses the portfolio risk considerations of an
institutional mortgage lender. These are generally less advantageous to
the borrower. In many respects, they may present the institutional lender
with reduced risk in terms of asset-liability match but increased portfolio
risk by increasing probabilities of delinquencies or defaults of any indi-
vidual loan. The other set of proposals addresses borrower concerns, par-
ticularly those of first time homebuyers and those of older homeowners.
These instruments generally increase the lender's risk exposure. The
"variable rate" mortgage (VRM) and the short term "roll-over" or
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"renegotiable" mortgage (RM) are the most commonly discussed forms of
alternative mortgage instruments. Both of these fall primarily in the
first set of "good for the lender and household saver" proposals. A third,
"price level adjusted" mortgage (PLAM) has received more discussion among
academic economists than in the industry. In the "greater borrower access"
category, there are two instruments, the graduate payment mortgage (GPM)
for the young upwardly mobile homebuyers and the reverse annuity mortgage
(RAM) for elderly homeowners. The shared equity (SE) mortgage has also
been proposed by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.
Investor - Oriented AMI's: VRM's, RM's and PLAM's
The variable rate mortgage is generally characterized by a flexible
interest rate charged to the borrower on the outstanding balance of the
loan. Variable rate mortgage designs can differ considerably in several
ways:
selection of an index rate which determines the
rate adjustments permitted on the mortgage in a
given time period;
frequency of rate adjustments allowed and
advanced notice to borrower required before any
upward adjustment;
magnitude of rate change permitted during any
specified time period or over the life of the
mortgage; and
methods of computing the borrower's monthly pay-
ment, including a constant payment with a vari-
able maturity. (FHLBB, 1977:XII-11, 12)
On most counts, the "lending institution is the primary beneficiary of the
variable rate mortgage (VRM) because this mortgage partially resolves the
problem of unmatched rates in its borrowed and loaned funds" (FHLBB,
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1977:XII-ll). Specific consumer concerns have focused on the index deter-
mining the rate change and limitations on any rate variation, so as to make
VRM's as comparable to FRM's as possible.
Consumer concerns about the rate index have been twofold. One is the
extent to which the rate may not be a market rate, but a rate controlled by
individual institutions, a regional group of institutions, or the thrift
industry nationally through their own average cost of funds. Consumer
representatives have argued that indices such as that used in the 1970's
California variable rate mortgage experiment are illustrative. This index
was based on the average cost of funds rate for the savings and loan
industry as measured by the regional FHLBB. As such, the index was so
influenced by the institutions' financial performance as to subject
borrowers to bear the risks of institutional management. The
institutions' cost of funds rate was not, in their opinion, a rate suf-
ficiently representative of capital markets. The other major consumer con-
cern has been development of an index which better represented a weighted
average of short-term and long-term rates. Given that mortgages were
intermediate to long term mortgage instruments, borrowers should not be
subject to indices based exclusively on short term rates which were con-
siderably more volatile and in recent years had often exceeded long term
rates.
The other major consumer concern has been provisions in the mortgage
on variation in terms. These have generally focused on minimizing the fre-
quency of adjustments, maximizing the notice required prior to any
adjustment, ensuring the borrower's ability to refinance the loan with
another lender without prepayment penalty on receipt of such a notice,
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limiting the amount of rate increase which occurs over the life of the
loan, and allowing the borrower to extend the maturity of the loan so as to
keep monthly payments constant whenever there were substantial rate
increases. Some of the research on the California experiment with variable
rate mortgages concluded that borrower acceptance of VRM's appears to have
been largely contingent on their ability to extend loan maturities from 30
to as long as 40 years, thus maintaining constant monthly payments.
Apparently, in August of 1978 following "the first rate increase imple-
mented by a significant number of large lenders" in California, 67 percent
of the variable rate mortgages who were subject to rate increases exercised
their ability to extend their maturities and maintain constant mortgage
payments (Melton and Heidt, 1979:27).
Apart from consumer concerns, the mortgage lending industry has had
some reservations as to the net benefits of VRM's. One issue has been
governmental control over the index by which rates on variable mortgages
would be set. Given the history of the regulated rates on federally
insured mortgages (FHA's and VA's) consistently set at below market rates,
these concerns may not be unwarranted. Industry spokespersons have also
stated concerns that their cash flows with variable rate mortgages, if they
truly decreased in accordance with market rates, might be the same or less
and administrative expenses in bookkeeping for variable term loans is
likely to be considerably more. A related industry concern seems to be
that, in periods when funds are readily available and interest rates rela-
tively low, competing lenders are likely to offer fixed rate mortgages to
attract borrowers; in times of tight money when rates were high, lenders
would offer variable term loans. Thus, the argument goes, "lenders would
- 211 -
be in the worst of all possible worlds, originating VRM's in high-rate
periods when rates may be expected to fall and fixed rate mortgages in
periods when future money rates are apt to be rising" (Schaaf, 1976:78).
The renegotiable mortgage would appear to address many of the industry's
concerns in this regard, but does not address most of the consumer
concerns.
Roll-over or renegotiable mortgages simply present the borrower with
an intermediate term loan to finance a long term capital investment. The
loan period is typically for five years with a payment schedule comparable
to that on a longer term mortgage, except that at the end of the fifth
year, the outstanding principal is due in full as a "balloon" payment. The
mortgage may be renewed, subject to new terms required by the lender. The
thrift industry has advocated this type of mortgage, particularly as the
shift to time deposits has meant that the term of their liabilities are
roughly comparable to these intermediate-term mortgage investments.
Consumer concerns have been essentially the same as those for variable rate
mortgages.
A third type of variable term mortgage in the lender-oriented category
is the price level adjusted mortgage (PLAM).
... account for inflation by providing for periodic
increases or decreases in the principal amount of the
mortgage based upon a predetermined price level index.
A constant real rate of interest is charged to a loan
which is constant in real dollars, the constancy being
achieved by varying the amount by a reference percent-
age such as the consumer price index. The PLAM is
desirable for the lender because it resolves the prob-
lem of a downward tilted payment stream and eliminates
the capricious effects of inflation on the payment
level. (FHLBB, 1977:XII-21)
Under this instrument, the lender keeps pace with inflation. With each
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price level adjusted mortgage, the institution now holds an indirect
investment in a real asset which appreciates rather than a financial asset
with a fixed, or even variable, rate of interest and a declining rate of
return as the borrower repays in actual rather than constant dollars.
Among those who maintain that the borrower also benefits from the
pricelevel adjusted mortgage, the central argument seems to be that the
index used to increase (or decrease) mortgage payments is not simply tied
to short term money markets or longer term capital markets, but is a more
comprehensive index. Thus, the index is equitable, as it would be based on
a more general cost of living index such as the CPI. However, this argu-
ment is premised on two assumptions about the borrower. First, that the
household income, and hence ability to repay the loan in "real dollars", is
closely indexed to the CPI, or whatever index is used. Second, that the
household should be indifferent to sharing its inflation hedge, the capital
appreciation of the real property serving as collateral security for the
loan, with the lending institution. Given these drawbacks, it is not clear
why a borrower should prefer a price level adjusted mortgage to a fixed
rate mortgage. However, it may be more advantageous to the borrower than
variable interest rate mortgages which are indexed exclusively to costs of
borrowing rather than more general costs of living.
Borrower-Oriented AMI's: GPM's, RAM's and SE's. A fundamentally dif-
ferent series of alternative mortgage instrument proposals has been devel-
oped to address borrower issues of affordability of homeownership. These
proposals generally address either first time homebuyer issues of access to
homeownership or elderly homeowner issues of maintaining their residence
but leveraging some of their capital investment so as to be able to afford
- 213 -
rising costs.
Graduated payment mortgages (GPM's) are the most common form of alter-
native mortgages directed at first time homeowners. The key difference
between this type of mortgage and the fixed rate instrument is "the reduc-
tion in the level of initial payments in exchange for higher payments later
in the life of the mortgage" (Follain and Struyk, 1977:7). This instrument
also differs from the lender-oriented instruments outlined above in that
while the level of mortgage payments does increase over time, it is in
accordance with a schedule that the borrower and lender agree to in
advance. There are clear limitations to this instrument, as it is "most
appropriate for younger, upwardly mobile homebuyers who expect future
increases in income levels" (FHLBB, 1977:XII-16). Thus, the incidence of
borrowers who have access to these loans is likely to be comparable to the
socio-economic class of homebuyers assisted by FHA and VA loan programs in
the 1950's and early 1960's. This instrument clearly does not address the
issue of those households who will be priced out on the basis of their
expected earnings, the rate at which their income can be expected to
increase. It may, however, be the 1980's version of the lower downpayment
programs which served younger and upwardly mobile households in earlier
decades. 6
The shared equity mortgage (SE) involves joint ownership of the pro-
perty by the occupant and the lender. Under a traditional mortgage, the
legal relationship between the borrower and lender is such that lender
exercises ownership interest only when payments are delinquent or there is
evidence of serious abuse of the property serving as collateral security
for the loan by the borrower. In contrast, under the shared equity
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mortgage, the lender has a proprietary interest in the dwelling.
Mechanically,
...the lender (either a financial or governmental institu-
tion) holds title to a share of the dwelling which it
obtains by contributing the same share of the purchase
price of the dwelling. In exchange for participation,
the lender is entitled to the same share of the net
proceeds at the time of the sale. The lender's share
presumably would be kept minor, say a maximum of 30
percent, so that the majority of the reward for proper
maintenance and improvement would accrue to the occupant.
If the lender believed that the rate of appreciation
were going to be less than the opportunity cost of
funds, he could charge the borrower interest on the
borrower's share equivalent to the difference. The
occupant's equity is then the value of the dwelling
less the accumulated interest and the institution's
share. (Follain and Struyk, 1977:10)
Thus, the possible advantage to the borrower is that the shared equity
mortgage is tantamount to a fixed rate mortgage on a lower priced home.
Through such an arrangement with a public or private investor, the borrower
puts down only say 70 percent of the equity required and, at least
initially, carries a mortgage payment of only 70 percent of what it would
ordinarily take to purchase such a home. As a quid pro quo wih the inves-
tors, the homeowner shares any capital gain at the time of sale with the
lender. In the specific SE proposal outlined in the above quotation, one
major disadvantage to borrowers is the extent to which they bear the risk
of their property not appreciating as rapidly as other real estate or other
types of investments foregone by the lender in making the loan. Hence,
they may unexpectedly have to pay the lender the interest differential.
Finally, the reversed annuity mortgage (RAM) has been advocated as a
means for those homeowners who have fully amortized the loan used to
purchase their home, to capitalize on their investment. Under the reversed
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annuity mortgage,
the borrower receives a monthly payment (from the
lender) based upon the value of the home. The amount
of the 'loan' (i.e., funds disbursed plus accumulated
interest) would be repaid at the time of the demise of
the borrower or at the maturity of the mortgage.
(FHLBB, 1977: XII-25)
From the borrower's perspective, the attractions of such a mortgage instru-
ment would appear to be predicated on whether they expected to die prior to
the loan maturity, and simply have the property sold and the reverse
annuity repaid as a part of their estate.
In sum, while all of these alternative instruments are generally pre-
sented in the literature as advantageous to the household saver, the
lender, and the consumer, the consumer benefits are unclear. Under the
terms of most of these instruments, except possibly RAM, borrowers would
appear to be assuming greater risks with no clear indication that their
ability to support greater debt will be matched to the rate of increases in
mortgage payments.
Implementation of AMI's on an Experimental Basis. Beginning in 1976,
several of the alternative mortgage instruments were put into effect on an
experimental basis under the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). HUD's initiatives were pursuant to a
Congressional mandate in the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974
to establish a mortgage insurance program for graduated payment loans on an
experimental basis. In September of 1976, HUD issued final regulations for
a one-year trial period in which GPM's would be originated with FHA on the
following terms:
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Five specific plans are authorized. Three plans will
permit five years of increasing payments at 2-1/2, 5
and 7-1/2 percent annually at the outset and two plans
will permit ten years of increasing payments at 2 and
3 percent annually. Payment amounts will be level
each year and adjusted annually for the first 5 or 10
years as the plan may call for.
Starting in the 6th year for the 5-year plans and in
-the llth year for the 10-year plans the payments will
be level in the amount for the remaining term of the
mortgage.
The minimum downpayment required under this program
will be somewhat greater than required under the
standard level payment mortgage. This is required
because the outstanding principal due on a mortgage
under this program will increase during the initial
years. The additional downpayment will ensure that
the outstanding mortgage balance at no time exceeds
the maximum mortgage limit for the section 203(b) or
234(c) Program, as the case may be.
The underwriting will be the same as those specified
for the Section 203(b) and 234(c) Programs, except
each borrower must certify that he or she fully under-
stands the obligation undertaken. Mortgage credit
review for the purpose of determining eligibility will
consider first year income and expense data for evalu-
ation purposes. (Federal Register, vol. 41, no. 190,
September 26, 1976:42948)
Under these parameters, a GPM might extend homeownership possibilities to
households who had sufficient savings to make higher downpayments than
those ordinarily required under HUD-FHA mortgage insurance programs, but
whose current monthly income and future earnings expectations were such
that they might opt for lower monthly mortgage payments in the initial five
to ten years and somewhat higher payments over the remaining life of the
mortgage. It is interesting to note that ostensibly the traditional under-
writing requirements regarding debt to income ratios were not changed, as
the data base for the originating lender and FHA was to be the debt to
income ratio at the time of the mortgage application with no attempt to
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predict the future income stream of the applicant.
On December 20, 1978, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board issued final
regulations for three types of alternative mortgage instruments: GPM's,
RAM's, and VRM's. Of the two "borrower-oriented" instruments, the GPM
provisions were similar to those of HUD-FHA with a limited graduation
period of ten years and implicitly, borrower equity requirements such that
the loan-to-value ratio never exceeded those allowed under fixed payment
instruments (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 12, Section 545.6-2:498).
The RAM's provided for a mortgage instrument in which
"periodic payments to homeowners based on accumulated
equity; the payments are made directly by the lender
or through purchase of an annuity from an insurance
company. The loan becomes due on a specific date or when
a specific event occurs, such as sale of the property or
death of the borrower." (CFR, Title 12, Sec. 545.6-2:500)
Rather than specify permissible terms for these instruments, the Board pro-
vided that any institution interested in making reverse annuity mortgages
should submit a mortgage plan to the Board for review. If the Board did
not respond with objections within 60 days, "the association may proceed to
offer mortgages pursuant to such a plan."
After the successive defeats of VRM proposals in Congress, federal
regulatory policy on VRM's evolved in response to state policy. State
chartered thrift institutions in several states such as California, Ohio,
Wisconsin, and most New England states including Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Maine, and New Hampshire were permitted to issue variable rate
and, in some cases, five-year renegotiable mortgages (Melton and Heidt,
1979:28). Up through 1978, the bulk of the VRM activity was concentrated
in California. In December of that year, the FHLBB authorized VRM lending
by federally chartered savings and loans in areas where these institutions
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faced a "complete disadvantage" in the market, namely California. In doing
so, the chairmen of the FHLBB emphasized the extent to which this measure,
and others permitting GPM's and RAM's nationally, would increase the
consumer's "freedom to choose" among alternative types of mortgage instru-
ments (FHLBB, 1979:3). To assure that fixed payment mortgages would con-
tinue to be available in reasonable terms, VRM acquisitions of each
institution were restricted to 50 percent of their total mortgage origina-
tions and purchases in any given year (12 CFR 545.6-2(b)(ii)). However, in
VRM regulations revised in a credit crunch a little over one year later,
federally chartered savings and loans nationally were permitted to issue
VRM's exclusively. Thus, while Congress had refused to statutorily endorse
variable rate mortgages in the mid-1970's, by 1979, the FHLBB had insti-
tuted VRM's under its general administrative authority with only "clear
indications of approval from two important congressional committees on
authorizing AMI's (FHLBB, 1979:3). In 1980, the Senate Chairman of the
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee addressed the new Chairman of
the FHLBB on his proposed renegotiable mortgage as follows:
In testifying before our Committee in August of 1978
on the Board's then proposed regulations on variable
rate mortgages and roll-over mortgages, Chairman
McKinney emphasized that documented choice was the
'centerpiece' of the Board's entire proposal. In
summarizing the argument in favor of the Board's
authorizing these new instruments, Chairman McKinney
stated that 'the question basically boils down to
one of choice, a choice that will enable borrowers
to fit their financing needs to their mortgage.'
In the home financing field, I believe a choice of
different products is long overdue. What has been
needed is to design a regulatory framework which
ensures that borrowers can select the instrument of
preference. As presently structured, the Board's
new proposal regulations would fail this test of
ensuring consumer choice. (Letter from U.S. Sen-
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ator William Proxmire to FHLBB Chairman Jay Janis
dated January 31, 1980)
Thus, while much of the literature on introducing variable rate and roll-
over mortgages in the United States has been presented in terms of consumer
sovereignity and expanding the choice among the mortgage instruments
offered, it appears that household saver sovereignty is evidenced in insti-
tutional portfolio reforms. Household borrower concerns are subordinate.
Risk Issues Associated with AMI's
Most of the research on mortgage alternatives has addressed one set of
portfolio risk issues, the asset-liability match of the lender. Few have
addressed the risks associated with the proposed modifications and the
extent to which more variable terms may increase the probabilities of de-
linquency of default on any particular loan.
Of the four fundamental mortgage variables -- principal, interest
rate, maturity, and downpayment -- the only one which has been subject to
much variation in the past several decades is the downpayment, or equity to
value ratio. Lower downpayment requirements for federally insured and,
subsequently, privately insured mortgages have been the major alternatives
to conventional fixed rate mortgages. Much of the risk literature during
this period found that lower downpayment loans were higher risk, with
higher probabilities of delinquency and default (Chapter 3). In practice,
these findings simply reinforced the statutory requirements that the lender
require the borrower to carry some form of mortgage insurance for mortgages
with downpayments less than 20 percent of the appraised value of the
property.
Some analysts have argued that many of the few forms of variable term
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mortgages are not new at all. They maintain that some of the proposed
alternatives such as the roll-over, or renegotiable mortgage, parallel
instruments used prior to the depression such as the balloon mortgage.
Analysts critical of AMI's generally argue that the risk issues presented
by these "new" instruments are twofold. One, related to portfolio risk, is
the argument that "variable-rate residential mortgages transfer the risk of
interest rate changes from the mortgagee to the household mortgagor, who
may be expected to be poorly prepared to accept it" (Kaufman, 1973:50).
These analysts maintain that the perceived need for variable term loans has
arisen as a result of incorrect interest rate forecasts on the part of the
financial intermediaries, particularly the thrifts:
In the absence of incorrect rate forecasts, variable-
rate mortgages cannot improve the actual performance of
thrift institutions. They can improve only the apparent
performance. To the extent the longer term nature of their
assets increases the probability of thrift institutions'
misestimating distant short-term interest rates relative to
shorter-term maturity intermediators, the introduction of
variable-rate mortgages can contribute to improved performance
by shortening the prediction horizon and reducing the likelihood
of forecast error. However, this would eliminate both the
gains and the losses of erroneous forecasts and any profits from
selling interest rate insurance to mortgagors. Moreover, if
activated through changes in the size of monthly payments,
variable rate mortgages may intensify the countercyclical
savings patterns and thereby also the countercyclical pattern
in both deposit inflows and mortgage extensions. (Kaufman,
1973:50).
The other risk issue addressed by critical analysts is the extent to which
this portfolio risk shift from lender to borrower will mean either
inherently riskier individual loans (as incorrect forecasts have mattered
to the industry only as rates increased, and hence, variable rate mortgages
are most likely to be offered when it is expected that rates will increase)
or: --
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Increased expectations by lenders of default among
certain borrower groups could possibly result in
revised rules-of-thumb for lending -- specifically
higher downpayments, lower payment burdens, more
attention to income expectations and/or stricter
credit standards -- which would ration many of these
households, now barely capable of sustaining home-
ownership, out of the mortgage and homeownership
markets. In addition, risk of future interest rate
increases could be shifted to the borrower in the
form of greater uncertainty in future payment levels
and rates of equity accumulation making budget plan-
ning more difficult, and resulting in lowered demand
for housing mortgage credit, and homeownership.
(Vandell, 1978a:129-130).
Of those few who have tried to assess the probable incidence of the risk
effects introduced by variable term mortgage (assuming underwriting stan-
dards remained essentially the same) not surprisingly the consensus is that
those forms which may vary a little but have a cap on the amount of
variation upwards in any given time period and over the life of the loan
are likely to have little impact on risk. However, any considerable
variation is estimated to have substantial effects on the incidence of
delinquencies and defaults (Swan in FHLBB, vol. 2, 1977:IX; Vandell,
1978b:1279-1296).
There are additional risk issues which generally have not been
addressed in the alternative mortgage instrument literature, but which are
implicit in risk research on fixed payment mortgages discussed in Chapter
3. One is the implication of effectively very short term mortgages vis-a-
vis the stability offered by a seasoned mortgage portfolio. As discussed
in Chapter 3 and 4, after an initial honeymoon of approximately two years,
the highest probability of default is before the fifth year with probabili-
ties declining substantially thereafter. If rates and, in turn, monthly
mortgage payments increase considerably, this seasoning effect may diminish
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somewhat as, on a cumulative basis, the loan is essentially reissued.
Second, some analyses (FHA, 1963; VA, 1963; Herzog and Early, 1970; MBA,
1971) identified secular trends related to macroeconomic conditions that
affect the incidence of mortgage risk. It appears that these are not
simply linked to trends such as unemployment, but effects of business cycle
on real estate prices. For example, the high rate of delinquencies in 1963
was attributed to the fact that many of these borrowers had purchased their
homes in 1957-1958 at a price and interest rate peak and subsequently, when
the general market declined, they were locked into the finance structure of
the time of purchase. They had not experienced much appreciation in the
rate of return on their equity and, when faced with household finance
problems such as unemployment, their ability to sell and recoup their down-
payment was limited. In this regard, variable rate mortgages should reduce
risk if the monthly carrying costs were reduced accordingly. Price level
adjusted mortgages, which would reduce the principal basis as well might
theoretically extend the household's ability to sustain the debt even
further. However, graduated payment mortgages, predicated on increased
household income and rapidly appreciating real estate values would put an
even greater burden on the household. A shared equity mortgage in which
the lender shared the downturns as well as the upturns would probably
essentially be the same as the fixed rate instrument; however, the proposal
to date has been for the borrower to bear the full burden of the downturns,
thus making the shared equity instrument considerably riskier.
Finally, there are some questions in terms of overall portfolio
management, about managing assets and liabilities which are not, strictly
speaking, short term. Not only does portfolio management necessarily
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become costlier with frequent rate changes, but anticipation of time and
magnitude of changes so as to minimize any lags in the rate changes on
assets becomes critical.
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF COST IMPACT ON BORROWER UNDER AMI'S
BASED ON METROPOLITAN BOSTON DATA 1963-1979
Hindsight on mortgage interest rates is 20-20. The future of these
rates is unknown. Thus, one way to gauge carrying costs to the homeowner
under a variable rate mortgage in the future is to review what would have
occurred to a homebuyer in the immediate past.
Mortgage interest rate data were obtained for metropolitan Boston from
1963 through 1979. Calculations were made on the basis of a $25,000
mortgage made in January of 1963 for 25 years under three different rate
instruments: a fixed rate mortgage, a variable rate mortgage, under which
payment levels could change as often as every six months, and a renego-
tiable mortgage under which monthly payment levels could change every five
years (Exhibit 5-6).
Under this example, the interest rate went from 5.44 percent in
January of 1963 to 8.5 percent in January of 1978. This was not a period
of particularly rapid interest rate increases, yet a household with a rene-
gotiable mortgage would have experienced a 21 percent increase in monthly
mortgage payments ($152.03 to $184.20). Another with a variable rate
mortgage, subject to rate changes unlimited in number or amount, would have
mortgage payments 26 percent higher at the end of this fifteen year period.
Corresponding increases in household income from $608 required for the ini-
tial period was to have amounted to $737 for the renegotiable loan and $767
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EXHIBIT 5-6
COMPARATIVE SUMMARY OF MORTGAGE PAYMENTS
UNDER FIXED RATE, VARIABLE RATE,
AND RENEGOTIABLE MORTAGE
Interet
Date Rate
1/1/63
1/1/68
1/1/73
1/1/78
5.44
6.48
7.30
8.50
aBased on Mortgage
Bank Board.
Monthly
FPM
Mortgage
VRM
Paymentb
RM
Household Income Required
FPM VRM RM
152.03 152.03 152.03 608.12 608.12 608.12
152.03 166.28 165.88 608.12 665.12 663.52
152.03 178.00 174.81 608.12 712.00 699.24
152.03 191.73 184.20 608.12 766.92 736.80
Interest Rate Survey compiled by the Federal Home Loan
bCalculated on $25,000 mortgage with a 25 year maturity.
cCalculated using the debt to income ratio of .25, or an income four times
the monthly payment. These calculations cover principal and interest (not
property taxes and insurance) only.
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for the variable rate.
Apart from the increased monthly income stream which may be required
to meet mortgage obligations under these instruments, as finance charges
increased, the amortization schedule decelerates. Thus, the increase in
finance charges is attributable not only to the rise in interest rates but
also to the fact that one pays more for longer outstanding loan dollars.
In sum, as recently observed by the president of the largest private
mortgage insurance company in the United States:
The consumer is going to have to be a miniforecaster
when it comes to selecting what type of mortgage he wants.
It will be like picking stocks and bonds. (WSJ 8/18/80:32)
Under these alternative instruments, the lender will no longer bear the
burden of unanticipated increases in mortgage interest rates. Thus, the
reduced portfolio risk of the institution transfers risk to the individual
mortgage holder. In the final analysis, however, any increased risks asso-
ciated with these individual loans will cumulatively increase the portfolio
risks of the lending institution.
Further Public Policy Considerations Re: AMI's
Apart from consumer concerns with the particulars of these
instruments, a more basic argument presented by representative organiza-
tions addresses the fundamental issue of the roles appropriate to borrowers
and lenders in the mortgage market. Mortgage lenders, specifically the
thrift institutions, were chartered to provide five types of financial
intermediation services:
(1) basic intermediation (joining of surplus and
deficit household units);
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(2) denomination intermediation (joining mostly
small deposits with large mortgages);
(3) default risk intermediation (joining less
risky deposits with more risky mortgages);
(4) maturity intermediation (joining short-term
deposits with fixed rate mortgages);
(5) interest rate intermediation (joining vari-
able rate deposits with fixed rate mortgages);
(Findley and Capozza, 1977:356)
Variable term instruments permit the thrifts to abdicate two of these five
services (Kaufman, 1973:50). A lender is
...the professional in judging future monetary condi-
tions and they should bear the risk of interest rate
changes rather than the borrowers. Bearing of this
risk is one of the major functions of the mortgage
lenders, and in determining the rate that they will
charge in a fixed rate mortgage, they are attempting
to forecast what future mortgage rates are likely to
be. This is their job and they should not shift the
risk-bearing function to unsophisticated borrowers.
(Schaaf, 1976:79)
One central issue, even among the series of instruments (GPM's, SE's,
and RAM's), which are generally perceived as more borrower-oriented, is the
extent to which all of these are tied to the lender's predictions of
increases in household income and indirectly, or directly in the case of
shared equity and reverse annuity mortgages, predictions of property value
trends. Under a fixed payment mortgage, the lender assesses the mortgage
related debt to current income and, assuming that the borrower will be able
to sustain at least this level of earnings, approves the loan on the basis
of current income. Predicting the rate at which current income will
increase requires analytical assumptions and interpretations which, by
definition, are not as objective as actual data. The underwriting criteria
are likely to create classes of borrowers. Those who have traditionally
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had difficulty in obtaining credit may have even more difficulty in doing
so. Moreover, unlike credit institutions such as life insurance and
casualty companies which have formalized a statistical basis for their
underwriting standards, the residential mortgage lending industry has
generally not developed a data base and analysis which can be systemati-
cally evaluated in terms of its discriminatory effects. For example, in
one federally funded research effort entitled Women in the Mortgage Market,
data was developed by HUD researchers on mortgage lenders' predictions in
1965 of the future income stream of female applicants and compared with
their actual income four years later in 1969. On average, the lenders
underpredicted the earnings of these women by 50 percent. Such predic-
tion biases will become extremely important with any mortgage instrument
which is predicated on the borrower's income increasing commensurately with
any anticipated increases in monthly carrying costs.
In one of the few articles of the many on new forms of mortgages in
the past decade which addresses the "Distributional Consequences of
Alternative Mortgage Instruments", the author concluded:
"The results derived in this study tend to support the
theoretical arguments of opponents of the VRM, and
indicate that the introduction of a standard variable
rate instrument with adjustable payments made annually,
especially one tied to a short-term interest rate index,
may impact negatively on all households, and especially
upon lower-middle income, young, elderly, and black
households." (Vandell, 1978:147)
These findings substantiated the consumer concerns articulated at
Congressional hearings (Rohde in Subcommittee on Financial Institutions,
1975:368-386) which ultimately led to the defeat of any legislative mandate
for federal regulators to implement these instruments.
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Contrary to much of the neoclassical literature on the subject,
Vandell tested and upheld two hypotheses:
...first, that mortgage-related characteristics can
have a significant impact on the demand for homeown-
ership, housing, and mortgage-credit; and, secondly,
that different instruments can have very different
consequences for different classes of households,
depending on the way in which these mortgage charac-
teristics interact with individual household incomes
and income expectations and conditions in the economy
in general. (Vandell, 1978:130)
In other words, the mortgage market is largely shaped by institutional
suppliers and the types of instruments and terms on which they are offered.
Any changes in the types of loan instruments offered by these institutions
may fundamentally alter the distribution of households which may have
access to mortgage credit.
Implicit in many of these AMI proposals (PLAN's, SE, and RAM's),
generally billed as borrower-oriented, is the argument that a mortgage
instrument which is transformed from a financial asset to a real asset will
be more attractive to financial institutions as an investment. During par-
ticularly inflationary periods, real assets tend to appreciate far more
rapidly than financial assets and thus are more attractive forms of capital
investment. Apart from the apparent problems of joint ownership or shared
capital gain with the investor, these instruments would inevitably rein-
force the lender's emphasis on property and location and prediction of
rates of appreciation would become an essential factor in mortgage lending
decisions. Under the fixed rate, term, and principal instrument, the
lender presumably needed only to be assured that the value of the property
serving as collateral security, in the event of default, would be suffi-
cient to recoup the outstanding balance of the mortgage and any foreclosure
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costs. Under these several alternative instruments, however, the lender
has a vested interest in the rate of appreciation, as it affects the
institution's future rate of return. Thus, the geographic distribution of
mortgage capital is even more likely to be channeled to (1) rapidly devel-
oping regions where values have skyrocketed as a result of changes in land
uses from agricultural non-metropolitan areas to more densely developed
residential in conjunction with commercial and industrial uses, (2) rapidly
changing urban neighborhoods where dramatic increases in property values
have occurred as a result of institutional expansion or desire to expand
their physical facilities (e.g., city-based service industries such as
universities, hospitals, insurance companies, etc.), (3) in-migration of
upper and middle income residents willing to pay suburban prices for urban
houses, or (4) radically different re-use of existing structures (e.g.,
apartment buildings converted to condominiums).
MORTGAGE-RELATED SECURITIES: LONGER TERM FIXED RATE LIABILITIES
TO MATCH MORTGAGE ASSETS
Background
In some respects, the issuance of intermediate or longer term market
securities to finance mortgages is new wine in old bottles. An article on
mortgage banking published in 1894 reports on investment houses that issued
bonds against portfolios of farm mortgages in the 1880's (Frederiksen,
1894). A century later, federally sponsored credit agencies including
FNMA, FHLMC, and GNMA have issued market securities, such as mortgage-
backed bonds and/or passthrough certificates to finance mortgage loans.
State housing finance agencies, which have mushroomed over the past decade,
finance housing construction loans and mortgages by issuing tax-exempt
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notes and bonds. Thus, obtaining longer term funds to finance mortgages or
serving as an intermediary passthrough selling mortgages as longer term
securities to investors, are not novel means of mortgage financing, but a
novel means for thrift institutions to obtain funds.
The impetus for thrift institutions to consider mortgage-related
securities grew out of the growing inadequacy of their household deposit
base to finance residential mortgage demand. 7  Beginning in the late
1960's, a financial management strategy which relied exclusively on short
term savings from individual households could not assure coverage of
outstanding mortgage investments, particularly in periods of soaring
interest rates. Moreover, new mortgage commitments from savings institu-
tions went to a virtual standstill under these conditions. As summarized
in one analysis:
The growth in the (mortgage) securities market has
sharply accelerated the trend towards an 'unbundling'
of services offered by the traditional mortgage lender.
The traditional method of profit generation in the
thrift industry had been characterized by spread man-
agement -- that is, the institution would take in
deposits at an average cost of 6.50% and originate and
hold mortgage loans at 9.50%, with profit being earned
on the loan rate -- deposit cost spread. However,
spread management is no longer a sufficient technique
for profit generation. The mortgage market has become
increasingly integrated with the overall capital mar-
ket with a substantial portion of liability cost tied
directly to weekly fluctuations in short-term interest
rates. This means that 'spread profitability' has
become an increasingly risky and difficult proposition.
As a result, it is likely that traditional mortgage
lenders will have to rely increasingly on origination
and servicing income as sources of profitability. It
has been aptly stated that the industry has moved from
a 'make them and hold them' to a 'make them and move
them' environment. (Jaffee and Rosen, 1979:1-2)
Thus, the prospects for the savings industry in mortgage finance appear to
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be roles previously played by mortgage bankers, mortgage brokers, and
mortgage companies. That is, without a substantial and growing capital
base of their own, their role as long-term investors in residential mortga-
ges may subside. Expertise in residential mortgages may be applied pri-
marily to origination, servicing, and warehousing functions. 8
There are two basic types of mortgage-related securities which have
been introduced and experienced phenomenal growth over the past five to ten
years. One is the mortgage-backed bond (MBB), which is a debt obligation
of the issuing institution with scheduled principal payments that are
secured by mortgage collateral. The other is the mortgage-backed
passthrough certificate (PTC), which provides ownership interest in the
monthly payments from a pool of mortgages. Both MBB's and PTC's grew
significantly in the 1970's. In 1978 alone, "the $40 billion of mortgage-
backed securities issued in the national market financed nearly one-quarter
of all home loan originations" (Sivesind, 1979:1). The proportionate share
of mortgage-backed securities of each issuer in 1978 is indicated in
Exhibit 5-7. The annual volume of mortgage-backed bonds since 1975 when
FHLBB regulations were adopted to permit savings institutions to issue such
bonds is summarized in Exhibit 5-8. A market summary of passthrough
securities by issuer since 1972 is given in Exhibit 5-9. The most notable
trends in the late 1970's are the extent to which (1) conventional, as
opposed to federally backed, loans now serve as the collateral security for
MBB's and (2) non-governmental issuers entered the passthrough market.
While FNMA paved the way for the first federally-insured and then conven-
tional mortgage-backed bonds, GNMA for federally guaranteed passthrough
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EXHIBIT 5-7
Mortgage Backed Securities issued in 1978
Billions of dollars
20
18
16
14 -
12 -
10-
8-
6 -
4 -
2 -
0-
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
()(6)
(7)
ILL~L
A~1
GNMA pass-through securities
FNMA Notes and debentures
FHLMC participation certificates
Tax-exempt mortgage-backed bonds
Publicly issued pass-throughs
FHLMC-guaranteed mortgage certificates
Publicly issued mortgage-backed bonds
Source: FRBNY Quarterly Review/Autumn 1979
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EXHIBIT 5-8
MARKET SUMMARY OF MORTGAGE-BACKED BONDS ISSUED BY THRIFT INSTITUTIONS
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Total
(In Millions of Dollars)
PUBLIC MARKET
Type of Collateral
GNMA Securities
FHA-Insured or VA-Guaranteed Mortgage Loans
Conventional Mortgage Loans
Subtotal
50 75
40
450
625
40
425
- 80
- 575
1,110 2,160
50 75 1,115 465 1,110 2,815
PRIVATE MARKET
Type of Collateral
GMNA Securities
FHA-Insured or VA-Guaranteed Mortage Loans
Conventional Mortgage Loans
Subtotal
Total
15
-
15
65 75 1,1
- - 10 10
6 14 20 55
73 135 192 400
79 149 222 465
94 614 1,332 3,280
SOURCE: Blyth Eastman Paine Webber Incorporated
Corporate Finance Department
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EXHIBIT 5- 9
MARKET SUMMARY OF MORTGAGE-BACKED PASS-THROUGH SECURITIES
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 .1977 1978 1979
(In Millions of Dollars)
Government National
Mortgage Association
Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation - P.C.
Non-Governmental Issuers
"3
I3
2,662 2,953 4,553 7,447 13,764 17,440 15,358 24,900
494 317 52 526 1,456 4,834 5,630 3,878
- 226 728 445
SOURCE: Blyth Eastman Paine Webber Incorporated
Corporate Finance Department
securities, and FHLMC for conventional mortgage passthrough securities,
non-governmental issuers were now major participants in the market.
In the following subsections, the development of both mortgage-backed
bonds and passthroughs are examined. Materials from rating agencies and
other analyses are used to assess the investment terms and magnitude of
these securities in mortgage finance throughout the United States.
Mortgage-Backed Bonds (MBB's): Experience Under FHLBB-FSLIC
MBB Regulations Issued in 1975
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board in conjunction with the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation permitted member institutions to
issue mortgage-backed bonds beginning in 1975. This permission was quite
limited, as an institution could not issue bonds on more than "2.5 percent
of its specified assets" (CFR Title 12, Section 563.8-2).8 These limita-
tions may have been instituted either because FHLBB and FSLIC officials (1)
perceived MBB's primarily as a timely means by which savings institutions
could sell their below current mortgage rate loans at somewhat lower cor-
porate bond rates (Kaplan, 1975) or, (2) wanted to monitor MBB issues on an
experimental basis to assess their longer term viability as a liability
management technique for savings institutions (Tucker in Buckley et. al.,
1977).
These regulations sought to establish minimum threshold criteria in
terms of the financial soundness of the issuing institution. 9 Moreover,
before issuing a MBB, an institution was required to file a note of intent
to issue mortgage-backed bonds with a brief description of the amount and
terms of the offering. The FSLIC reserved the right to prevent an institu-
tion from issuing a mortgage-backed bond if, in the opinion of the
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Corporation, there were problems either with "the policies, condition, or
operation of the insured institution" or with the terms of the proposed
bond indenture, particularly where they appeared to be unnecessarily
onerous to the issuing institution. These regulatory provisions appear to
be designed to protect (1) individual institutions entering the mortgage-
backed bond market from succumbing to terms imposed by underwriters and
their bondbuyers, (2) savings institutions collectively, as a default on a
mortgage-backed bond issue by one institution would subsequently limit the
ability of others to issue and increase the rates on future bond issues,
and (3) the FSLIC, as this agency would be encumbered with bailing out any
institution which became insolvent over the life of an outstanding bond
issue.
Finally, in keeping with regulations on market rate liability instru-
ments under Regulation Q, the minimum denominations and marketing of these
obligations were designed to preclude the ability of the institution's
ongoing depositors from transferring their funds into the purchase of these
bonds. As with market rate certificates of deposit designed to attract
institutional investors, the minimum denominations in which these bonds
could originally be purchased was $100,000. This denomination could be
lowered to $10,000 as long as the bonds were "sold only through brokers and
dealers registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission", without
any solicitations or sales made by the issuer or any of its affiliates (CFR
Title 12, 563-8.2(d)(2)(ii) and (iii)).
The first MBB issue made was by the First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Rochester, New York. The bond issue was for $15 million and
privately placed through an investment house rather than publicly marketed.
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As stated by First Federal's President:
This...was the Bank Board's desire as it would effec-
tively preclude individual investor's participation...
By our choice of the private placement method, the offer
was limited to institutional investors. Also, we
avoided sales to other savings institutions. (Scheu,
1975:27)
Prior to placement, the investment house had to work "closely with Standard
and Poor's rating agency in developing rationale for rating such bonds."
(Scheu, 1975:25) Historically, Standard and Poor had had a policy of not
rating any issue of a savings association. Given the extent to which this
rating agency influenced interest rates offered on corporate bond issues
generally, this institutional breakthrough was considered essential.
Ultimately, the issue received a very high rating ("AAA") and commen-
surately low interest cost by (1) pledging only 100 percent federally
insured FHA and VA mortgages as collateral and (2) maintaining the colla-
teral balance at a minimum of 150 percent of the outstanding principal
borrowed.
Subsequently, over the next five years, the MBB issues by thrift
institutions followed similar patterns. As of May, 1980, a total of 77
issues had been made by 57 institutions for a total dollar amount of
$3,380,000,000. Thirty-five of these issues were public offerings of $30
million to $200 million. These offerings totaled $2,865,000, or 85 percent
of the MBB's sold. Of these, only 8 offerings were secured with GNMA
securities or FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed mortgage loans; the remaining
27 offerings were secured by conventional mortgages (Exhibit 5-10). The
other 32 of these issues were private placements with institutional
investors between $6 million and $62 million (Exhibit 5-11).
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EXNIBIT 5-10
MARKET DATA FOR PUBLIC OFFERINGS Of MORTGAGE BACKED BON S
LISTED By TYPE OF COLLATERAL AND REMAINING LIFE TO MATURITY
AS OF MAY 15, 1980
Current Market Date 05/13/80
Issuer
Collateral Consists of GNMA Securities
Amount of Date of Date of
Offering ($91) Offering Maturity
Initial
Coupon Rate Price
Remaining
Life
Offering to Maturity
Yield (Yrs/Mo.)
Date of
Premium Over Initial
05/13/80 Yield to Comparable U.S. Redemption
Price Maturity Treasury Yield (3) at Par
NR MR AAA Talman Federal S&L Assoc. of Chicago
MR NR AAA Broadview SAL Company
40 4/13/78 4/15/83 8.375 100.00 8.38 2/11 93.88 10.871
40 11/03/77 11/01/84 8.000 99.84 8.03 4/6 89.25 11.12
1.21% 10/15/82 11.33%
1.27 11/01/83 11.87
Collateral Consists of FHA-Insured or
VA-Guaranteed Mortgage loans
American SAL Assoc. (California)
Coast Federal SAL Assoc. (California)
Home SAL Assoc. (California)
California Federal S&L Assoc.
California Federal S&L Assoc.
Home SAL Assoc. (California)
Collateral Consists of Conventional
Mortgage loans
Home S&L Assoc. (California)
California Federal SAL Assoc.
San Die:. ederal SAL Assoc.
World SAL Assoc. (California)
First Federal S&L Assoc. of Wisconsin
Valley Federal SAL Assoc.
Guarantee SAL Assoc. (California)
American SAL Assoc. (California)
Houston First Savings Association
Gibraltar Savings Assoc.
Northern California SAL Assoc.
American SAL Assoc. (Utah)
American SAL Assoc. (California)
First Federal SAL Assoc. of Chicago
Eureka Federal SAL Assoc.-San Fransisco
Midland Federal SAL Assoc. (Colorado)
Imperial SAL'Assoc. (California)
First Federal S&L Assoc. of Miami
Monterey SAL Assoc.
Great Western S&L Assoc. (California)
Citizens SAL Assoc. (4)
Glendale Federal S&L Assoc.
Washington Mutual Savings Bank
Gibraltar SAL Assoc. (6)
Conunity Federal SAL Assoc.
Great Western SAL Assoc. (California)
Connercial Federal SAL (Nebraska)
200
50
100
75
50
100
200
100
35
50
35
40
50
200
50
125
50
50
200
40
45
30
100
50
30
200
75
100
50
100
65
100
40
5/26/77
10/05/77
11/22/177
10/15/76
9/25/75
11/22/77
6/23/177
9/21/77
10/26/77
12/13/177
5/23/78
10/21/177
3/07/178
4/13/78
8/02/178
8/21/79
2/01/80
4/27/78
6/21/79
5/11/78
8/02/79
12/18/79
6/16/77
1/25/79
8/16/79
6/28/19
7/03/79
7/03/79
8/16/79
8/02/179
9/06/79
10/18/77
12/07/179
6/01/82
10/01/82
11/15/83
6/15/84
1/15/85
11/15/85
6/15/82
10/01/82
10/15/82
12/15/82
8/15/83
11/01/83
3/01/84
4/15/84
8/01/84
8/15/84
2/01/85
4/15/85
6/30/85
5/01/86
8/01/86
12/15/86
6/15/87
7/15/87
6/30/89
7/01/891/01/89
7/01/89
1/31/89
8/01/89
9/01/89
10/01/89
12/15/89
7.250 100.00 7.25
7.500 99.88 7.53
7.750 99.70 7.81
7.625 99.45 7.72
9..125 100.00 9.13
1.875 99.63 7.94
(2)
(5)
(7)
(8)
7.250
7.375
8.000
7.950
8.750
8.125
8.450
8.500
8.875
9.750
12.500
8.625
9.500
8.700
9.850
11.500
7.100
9.750
9.650
9.500
9.500
9.350
9.700
9.500
10.000
7.800
11.200
99.90
99.50
99.60
100.00
100.00
99.74
100.00
99.77
99.88
100.00
100.00
99.60
100.00
100.00
100.00
99.85
100.00
99.72
100.00
99.75
99.15
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
7.27
7.50
8.10
7.95
8.75
8.18
8.45
8.55
8.90
9.75
12.50
8.70
9.50
8.70
9.85
11.53
7.70
9.80
9.65
9.54
9.54
9.35
9.70
9.50
10.00
7.80
11.20
(1) Prior to June 1979 Moody's Investors Services had not rated any publicly offered mortgage-backed bond. The American Savings 9 Loan Association(California) 9 1/2's due 1985 was the first public issue to be rated Aaa by this service.
(2) Each holder may put all or part of its holdings to Monterey at par on June 30, 1986. 1987 or June 30, 1988. The yield to the first put date (June 30,
1986) is 11.411 (6 years. 2 months remaining life to the first put date).
(3) Represents the premium by which the yield to maturity on each mortgage-backed bond exceeds the yield to maturity on U.S. Treasury issues with the same
remaining life to maturity.
4) Collateral consists initially of Conventional. FHA-Insured and VA-Guaranteed Mortgages.
5 Each holder may put all or part of its holding to Glendale at par on July 1. 1986. 1987 or July 1, 1988. The yield on the first put date (July 1.
1986) is 11.30% (6 years. 2 months remaining life to the first put date).
(6) The initial collateral includes $20,000.000 ofGNMA securities.( Each holder may put all or part of its holdings to Gibraltar at par on August 1. 1986. 1987, or August 1, 1988. The yield to the first put date(August 1, 1986) is 11.29% (6 years. 3 months remaining life to the first put date).
(8) Each holder may put all or part of its holdings to Great Western at par on October 1. 1984 or any October 1 thereafter through October 1, 1988. The
yield to the first put date (October 1. 1984) is 11.26% (4 years, 5 months remaining life to the first put job).
Source: Blyth Eastman Paine Webber Incorporated
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(A)
Yield tobate of
Initial
Redemption
at Par
AAA
AAA
AAA
NR
NR
AAA
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
NR
NR
AAA
AAA
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
MR
AAA
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
Aaa
Aaa
NR
Aaa
NR
Aaa
NR
NR
NR
NR
Aaa
Aaa
Aaa
Aaa
Aaa
Aaa
NR
Aaa
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AM
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
2/1
2/5
3/6
4/1
5/2
5/6
2/1
2/5
2/5
2/7
3/3
3/6
3/10
3/11
4/3
4/3
4/9
4/11
5/2
6/0
6/3
6/7
7/1
7/2
9/2 (2)
9/2
9/2
9/2 (5)
9/3
9/3 (7)
9/4
9/5 (8)
9/7
93.25
92.75
90.15
88.63
91.75
86.38
93.00
92.38
93.25
92.75
93.25
91.25
91.38
91.50
91.88
95.00
103.88
89.75
93.50
88.88
93.25
100.00
81.88
90.88
92.38
89.88
89.38
91.50
89.13
92.13
92.13
88.25
98.88
11.01
11.03
11.00
11.16
11.27
11.26
11.09
11.09
11.25
11.25
11.21
11.24
11.29
11.23
11.34
11.25
11.40
11.40
11.19
11.31
11.39
11.49
11.50
11.66
10.99 (2)
11.30
11.40
10.84 (5)
11.65
10.87 (7)
11.39
9.74 (8)
11.39
1.41
1.43
1.40
1.31
1.21
1.26
1.49
1.49
1.65
1.65
1.67
1.64
1.44
1.38
1.49
1.40
1.55
1.55
1.19
1.31
1.39
1.49
1.35
1.51
0.84
1.15
1.25
0.69
1.50
0.12
1.24
(0.41)
1.24
6/01/82
10/01/82
11/15/82
12/15/82
1/15/82
11/15/83
12/15/81
4/01/82
4/15/82
6/15/82
2/15/83
11/01/82
3/01/83
4/15/83
8/01/83
8/15/83
8/01/84
4/15/84
6/30/84
5/01/86
8/01/85
12/15/84
6/15/847/15/85
6/30/89 (2)
7/01/86
7/01/89
7/01/89 (5)
7/31/86
8/01/89 (1)
9/01/86
10/01/89 (8)
12/15/86
11.01
11.03
12.14
12.92
13.62
12.82
12.21
12.00
12.03
11.96
11.67
12.34
12.16
12.03
11.98
11.62
11.31
11.97
11.51
11.31
11.60
11.49
13.62
12.17
10.99 (2)
11.86
11.40
10.84 (5)
12.24
10.81 (7)
11.80
9.74 (8)
11.44
EXHIBIT 5-10
MARKET DATA FOR PUBLIC OFFERINGS OFMRTGAGE BACKED BONDS
LISTED BY TYPE OF COLLATERAL AND REMAINING LIFE TO RATURITY
en S s Issuer
Collateral Consists of GNMA Securities
NR NR AAA Talan Federal SAL Assoc. of Chicago
NR NR AAA Boradview SAL Company
AS OF MAY 15, 1980
Amount of Date of Date of
Offering ($M) Offering Maturity
40 4/13/78 4/15/83
40 11/03/77 11/01/84
Current Market Date 05113180
Remaining
LIfe
Initial Offering to Maturity 05/13/80 Yield to
coupon Rate Price Yield
Yield to
Date of Date of
Premium Over Initial Initial
Comparable U.S. Redeption Redemption
8.375 100.00 8.38 2/11 . 93.88 10.875 1.27% 10/15/82 11.33%
8.000 99.84 8.03 4/6 89.25 11.12 1.27 11/01/83 Lj.87
Collateral Consists of FRA-Insured or
VA-Guaranteed Mortgage Loans
American S&L Assoc. (California)
Coast Federal SAL Assoc. (California)
Hone SAL Assoc. (California)
California Federal SAL Assoc.
California Federal SAL Assoc.
Home SAL Asso
AAA
AAA
AAA
NR
NR
AAA
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
NR
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
AAA
200
so
100
15
50
5/26/11
10/05/77
11/22177
10/15/76
9/25/75
6/01/82
10/01/82
11/15/83
6/15/84
7/15/85
7.250
7.500
7.750
1.625
9.125
100.00
99.88
99.70
99.45
100.00
(OA
7.25
1.53
1.81
1.72
9.13
2/I
2/5
3/6
4/I
5/2
93.25
92.75
90.15
88.63
91.15
11.01
11.03
11.00
11.16
11.27
1.41
1.43
1.40
1.311.27
6/01/82
10/01/32
11/15/82
12/15/82
1/15/82
11.01
11.03
12.14
12.92
13.62
EXHIBIT 5-11
PRIVATE PLACEMENTS OF MORTGAGE-BACKED BONDS EXCEEDING
$5 MILLION BY THRIFT INSTITUTIONS
Date
of Loan
Agreement
Amount
of Coupon
Oein RateIssuer
04/15/75 First Federal S&L Assoc
of Rochester
08/15/77 State S&L Assoc.
10/01/77 Washington Mutual Savings
Bank
10/31/77 State Mutual SAL Assoc.
10/31/77 State Mutual S&L Assoc.
04/20/78 First S&L Assoc. (Fresno)
04/20/78 Texas Federal SAL Assoc.
06/30/78 United Savings Assoc. of Texas
07/01/78 Far West Federal SAL Assoc.
07/01/78 Fidelity Federal SAL Assoc.
(Series A)
10/24/78 Provident Federal SAL Assoc.
10/30/78 Santa Fe Federal SAL Assoc.
11/22/78 Fidelity Federal SAL Assoc.
(Series B)
11/22/78 First Federal S&L Assoc.
of San Diego
12/21/78 Pacific Federal SAL Assoc.
12/28/78 Western Federal SAL Asoc.
05/16/79 Santa Barbara SAL Assoc.
(Series A)
06/21/79 American Federal SAL Assoc.
(Wash.. D.C.)
$15
6
50
14
9
14
15
14
20
16
10
12
Date of
Initial
Date of Redemption
Maturity At Par
9.00% 03/31/90
7.375 08/15/81
7.75
8.125
8.375
8.60
8.625
8.80
9.15
09/15/82
10/31/82
10/31/87
04/20/84
04/20/85
06/30/83
11/01/86
9.10 06/30/84
9.20 11/01/83
9.125 10/31/83
03/31/85
08/15/81
09/15/82
10/31/82
10/31/87
04/20/84
04/20/85
06/30/83
11/01/86
06/30/84
05/01/83
10/31/83
Mandatory Sinking Fund
Percent
Annual Amount Retired
Initial (As a Percent of Prior to Average
Date Amoun of Offering) Maturity Life
03/31/85 S 1,667 (11.1%) 88.9% 11.0 yrs.
-------------------- None------------------------------
-------------------- None------------------------------
-------------------- None------------------------------
10/31/84 2,200 (24.4) 73.3 8.6 yrs.
04/20/82 4,000 (28.6) 64.3 5.1 yrs.
04/20/83 5,000 (33.3) 66.6 6.0 yrs.
--------------------None------------------------------
11/01/82 4,000 (20.0) 80.0 7.0 yrs.
Collateral as a
Type of Percent of Principal
Mortgage Loans Amount Outstanding
as Collateral Initial Maintenance
FHA-VA
FHA-VA
Conventional
Conventional
Conventional
Conventional
Conventional
FHA-VA
Conventional
06/30/83 8,000 (50.0) 50.0 5.5 yrs. Conventional
--------------------None------------------------------ Conventional
--------------------None------------------------------ Conventional
19 9.35 10/31/86 10/31/86 10/31/85 9.500 (50.0)
10
9
10
9.20 12/01/83
9.55 01/31/87
9.625 12/28/88
06/01/83
07/31/86
12/28/86
254%
175
175
175
175
185
200
150
180
175
175
175
150%
135
150
150
150
160
150
125
150
150
150
50.0 7.5 yrs. Conventional 187.5 150
-------------------- None------------------------------
01/31/86 5,000 (55.6) 55.6 7.6 yrs.
-------------------- None------------------------------
62 10.00 05/15/89 05/15/89 --------------------None------------------------------
11 10.125 06/20/89 06/20/89 -------------------- None------------------------------
Conventional
Conventional
Conventional
175
180
200
150
150
175
Conventional 200 175
Conventional 200 150
0
08/14/79
08/23/79
09/79
10/01/79
10/01/79
10/11/79
10/15/79
10/79
11/79
11/02/79
11/16/79
12/21/79
12/21/79
Union Federal SiL of
Los Angeles
First Federal S&L Assoc.
of Santa Monica (9)
Charlestown Savings Bank
(Boston)
Buckeye Federal S&L
Dade Sit Assoc. of Miami (i)
First Federal S&L Assoc.
of Cleveland
First Federal Sit Assoc.
of Philadelphia
Provident Federal SiL Assoc.
of Casper, WT.
First Federal of Detroit
Republic Federal S&L Assoc.
of Wisconsin (J)
Santa Barbara S&L Assoc.
(Series 8)
Houston First American Svgs.
Assoc. (Series 8) (k)
Houston First American Svgs.
Assoc. (Series C) (k)
12
15
10
27
20
10
14
10
11
10
20
10
10
10.00
10.00
9.90
N/A
10.00
10.00
10.25
10.50
10.375
10.25
10.00
12.875
12.125
06/30/86
07/31/89
09/86
09/01/89
09/30/86
10/01/89
10/15/91
06/30/86
11/01/84
11/30/89
11/01/99
05/01/82
01/01/84
06/30/84
07/31/89
09/86
09/01/87
09/30/86
10/01/88
10/14/89
06/30/92
05/01/84
11/30/89
11/01/99
05/01/82
01/01/84
-------------------- None------------------------------
07/31/84 6.000 (40.0)(h) 73.3 7.0 yrs.
----------------------------------------------- 5.0 yrs.
--------------------None------------------------------
09/30/85 10.000 (50.0) 50.0 6.5 yrs.
-------------------- None------------------------------
-------------------- None-------------------------------
-------------------- None------------------------------
-------------------- None------------------------------
11/30/84 N/A N/A N/A 7.5 yrs.
11/01/85 1.300 ( 6.5) 91.0 13.2 yrs.
--------------------None------------------------------
--------------------None------------------------------
1/80 Dade S&L Assoc. of Miami (1) 20 12.10 03/30/90 03/30/90 N/A N/A N/A N/A 7.5 yrs. Conventional 185 170
Conventional
Conventional
GNMA-Collat.
Bonds
Conventional
FHA-VA
Conventional
Conventional
Conventional
Conventional
Conventional
Conventional
Conventional
Conventional
181
182
150
200
152.5
220
210
220
175
190
215
162.5
170
156
150
125
150
135
150
130
150
150
150
150
150
150
Mortgage Passthrough Securities: Experience With Governmental
and Non-Governmental Issuers
In 1970, GNMA introduced a passthrough program under which
private mortgage lenders could sell, or "pass through", their
federally insured loans to private investors. This program is
structured such that
...any qualified FHA mortgagee who is judged to have
adequate experience and facilities to issue mortgage-
backed securities and who is approved for a guarantee
by GNMA can issue a passthrough security. The indi-
vidual mortgages in the pool collateralizing the
security are collected by the issuer and are deposited
with a custodian, usually a bank; GNMA grants to the
pool its guarantee. The issuer of the pool may then
sell fractional participations in the pool to investors
or may, alternatively, sell the entire pool to a
securities' broker or mortgage broker who, in turn,
sells the issue to the final investor. The issuer is
responsible for servicing the pool of mortgages....
All collections of interest and principal are passed
on to the investors on the basis of their pro rata
shares [as are] any prepayments [of an outstanding
loan].... (Marcis, 1975:173)
In the event of delinquencies, the issuer may have to advance his own funds
in order to meet scheduled payments. GNMA, as guarantor with the pledge of
the full faith and credit of the U.S. Government, is required to assume
responsibility for the monthly payments if the issuer defaults on these
obligations.
By 1973, the demand for GNMA passthrough securities exceeded the
availability of newly originated federally insured mortgages available for
inclusion in such securities. This was paritally attributable to the devel-
opment of a futures market with GNMA passthrough securities being sold (in
August-October of 1973 when rates were high) on a forward commitment basis
for delivery in January of 1974 or later (when rates were expected to be
low). This sort of interest rate speculation on GNMA-guaranteed
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EXHIBIT 5-12
Comparative Summary of Issuer and Investor Considerations in
Mortgage-Backed Bonds and Passthrough Certificates
ISSUER
MORTGAGE-BACKED BONDS
. Debt obligation of the issuer, providing
means to borrow additional funds using
existing assets as collateral.
. AAA ratings to date given (1) institu-
tional obligation and (2) overcollat-
eralization of 150 percent; relatively
low rates.
. Useful to put low yield assets acquired
in prior low interest rate periods to
work without having to sell in secondary
market or as passthroughs, either of which
would require taking a loss.
. Institution's ability to isue MBB's limited
by regulation to 50 percent of total assets
with a maximum of 25 percent of its assets
pledged as security for outside borrowing
(FHLBB Reg's. Federal Register 5/30/80).
. Cash obtained from prepayments and fore-
closures must be reinvested rather than
"passed-through" in order to keep up the
coupon payment to bond holders. Thus,
issuers of bond-type securities must be
large enough to withstand the risks of
changes in market rates of interest.
. Potentially more attractive than at
least GNMA's passthrough program which
requires uniform maturities and loan
types in any package.
INVESTOR
. Fixed and certain cash flow characteristics
of a corporate bond as opposed to the variability
and uncertain cash flow characteristics of a
pass-through type of security.
. Interest paid semiannually; principal paid at
maturity.
PASSTHROUGH CERTIFICATES
. Sale of assets, thus permitting off-the-balance
sheet financing.
. AA ratings to date, since these are not institu-
tional obligations and considered higher risk ergo
higher rate charges to issuer (lower spread between
mortgage rate and yield at sale).
. Earnings based on origination and servicing fees
versus interest rate spread between assets and
liabilities of traditional savings institutions.
Investment of uncertian maturity, as depends when
and if payment(s) of outstanding loans made in
which case principal repayment passed directly on
a pro rata basis to investors.
Payments of principal and interest, fixed or
variable depending on type of mortgage.
I
passthrough securities became a modus operandi in the years that followed.
The volume of mortgages financed through passthrough certificates increased
significantly between 1970 and 1979. Thus, passthroughs as a mortagage
instrument were fostered through federally sponsored credit agencies, first
on federally insured loans through GNMA and then on conventional mortgages
through FHLMC.
In 1977, the Bank of America made a public offering of $150.5 million
in passthrough certificates underwritten by a New York investment house and
issued without a GNMA guarantee. In lieu of a government guarantee, a pri-
vate mortgage insurance policy was carried to cover 5 percent of the total
amount of the issue. In the event of defaults, this insurance policy would
pay investors up to $7.5 million (5 percent of $150.5 million). If
delinquencies occurred, Bank of America as the originator had put forward
cash advances to assure investors prompt payment, even on overdue loans.
The market data for mortgage-backed passthrough certificates issued by
non-governmental issuers beginning with Bank of America's first successful
issue through mid-May of 1980 is summarized in Exhibit 5-13. Of the 24
public offerings to date, ten of these have been issues by the Bank of
America. Of the total $1.4 billion, $839.4 million or 60 percent of the
dollar volume has been issued by BoA. Only one issue of $27 million by
Private Mortgage Insurance Corporation offers a precedent for a consortium
of smaller lenders to successfully market a consolidated series of
passthrough certificates. Thus, the public market for passthroughs issued
by smaller institutions may be more limited. Private placements with large
institutional investors may provide a viable means for these smaller insti-
tutions to issue mortgage-backed passthroughs. However, this market is
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EXHIBIT 5-13
Corporate Finance Department
S&P's
Rating Originator & Service
- Bank of America
NTSA (Series A)
- First Ferderal S&L
Assoc. of Chicago
(Series A)
AA Home S&L Assoc.
(California)
(5)(4) (First Series)
AA Bank of America NTSA
(Series B)
AA Glendale Federal S&L
Assoc. (Series A)
AA Washington Mutual
Savings Bank
(Series A)
AA Bank of America
NTSA (Series 1978-1)
AA Home S&L Assoc.
(California)(3)(5)
(Second Series)
AA Bank of America
NTASA (Series 1978 -2)
AA Bank of America
NTSA (Series 1978 -3)
AA Bank of America
NTSA (Series 1978 -4)
AA Bank of America
NTISA (Series 1978 -5)
AA Bank of America
NTSA (Series 1979 -1)
AA Bank of America
NTSA (Series 1979 -2)
MARKET DATA FOR MORTGAGE-BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES
AS OF MAY 13,1980
Initial Date Pass-
of
Offering
09/21/77
10/20/77
Through
Rate
8.375%
8.750
Mortgage Bond Yield
Price Yield (1) Equivalent(2)
100.00 8.38% 8.44%
100.00 8.75 8.83
99.25 9.02
99.25
98.19
95.50
9.02
9.30
9.57
9.19
9.19
9.48
9.76
96.00 9.50 9.69
97.50 9.53 9.72
95.38
93.38
93.00
96.00
94.50
9.59
9.90
9.96
10.00
10.23
9.78
10.11
10.17
10.21
10.45
Offering
Amount
(mu-~0
$150.55
75.1
100.00 03/29/78 9.637
201.2
100.0
50.4
25.3
103.1
25.3
28.7
65.5
28.6
26.3
04/19/78
05/03/78
06/23/78
10/02/78
10/04/78
10/20/78
11/17/78
11/28/78
12/14/78
01/12/79
9.000
9.125
9.000
9.000
9.540
9.000
9.000
9.000
9.500
9.500
Current Market Data 5/13/80
5/13/80 Mortgage Bond Yield
Price Yield (1) Equivalent(2)
80.00 11.51%
82.50 11.47
86.00 11.80
84.00
84.00
85.00
11.47
11.60
11.29
84.00 11.47
86.00 11.65
84.00
84.00
84.00
86.00
86.00
11.47
11.47
11.47
11.65
11.65
11.79%
11.75
12.09
11.75
11.88
11.56
11.75
11.94
11.75
11.75
11.75
11.94
11.94
28.0 01/31/79 9.500 95.75 10.04 10.25
I
86.00 11.65 11.94
EXHIBIT 5-13 (continued)
Corporate Finance Department
MARKET DATA FOR MORTGAGE-BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES
AS OF MAY 13,1980
S&P's
Initial
Of
Rating Originator & Service A
(00
AA Bank of America
NTSA (Series 1979 -3)
AA Bank of America
NTSA (Series 1979 -4)
AA Bank of America
NTSA (Series 1979 -5)
AA Bank of America
NTSA (Series 1979 -6)
AA Bank of America
NTASA (Series 1979 -7)
AA Bank of America
NTSA (Series 1979 -8)
AA Bank of America
NT&SA (Series 1979-9)
AA PMI Mortgage Corporatio n
(Series 1979 -A)
AA Home S&L Asoc.
(California) (Fourth Series)
AA Bank of America
(Series 1979 -10)
fering
mount
0~000)
26.2
60.5
36.1
27.9
25.5
31.5
25.5
27.0
104.1
26.8
Date Pass-
of Through
Offering Rate
03/21/79 9.500
04/04/79 9.500
04/18/79 9.500
05/02/79 9.500
05/16/79 9.500
06/20/79 9.500
07/11/79 9.500
08/02/79 10.250
08/16/79 10.000
08/29/79 10.500
- Government National Mortgage
- Government National Mortgage
- Government National Mortgage
- Government National Mortgage
- Government National Mortgage
- Government National Mortgage
Government National Mortgage
Mortgage Bond Yield
Price Yield (1) Equivalent(2)
94.75 10.20 10.42
94.50 10.23 10.45
95.00 10.31 10.53
93.00 10.47 10.70
92.50 10.55 10.78
94.25 10.27 10.49
94.75 10.20 10.42
98.75 10.34 10.57
96.50 10.43 10.66
98.50 10.62 10.86
8.500
9.000
9.500
10.000
11.000
12.500
13.500
Current Market Data 5/13/80
13/ mortgage Bond Yield
Price Yield (1) Equivalent(2)
86.00
86.00
86.00
86.00
86.00
86.00
86.00
90.00
89.00
91.00
87.00
88.00
90.00
92.00
97.00
11.65
11.65
11.65
11.65
11.65
11.65
11.65
11.75
11.66
11.84
10.43
10.80
11.00
11.19
11.40
105.75 11.52
11.94
11.94
11.94
11.94
11.94
11.94
11.94
12.04
11.95
12.14
10.66
11.05
11.26
11.45
11.67
11.80
111.00 11.63E 11.92E
I
EXHIBIT 5-13 (continued)
Corporate Finance Department
MARKET DATA FOR MORTGAGE-BACKED PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES
AS OF MAY 13,1980
S&P's
Rating Originator & Service
Initial
Offering
Amount
- Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corp. P.C.
- Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corp. P.C.
- Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corp. P.C.
- Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corp. P.C.
- Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corp. P.C.
- Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corp. P.C.
Date Pass-
of Through
Offering Rate
- 10.750
Mortgage Bond Yield
Price Yield (1) Equivalent(2)
11.250
11.750
- 12.000
- 12.500
- 13.500
Current Market Data 5/13/80
5/13/80 mortgage Bond Yield
Price Yield (1) Equivalent(2)
95.75 11.21 11.48
97.00 11.51 11.79
98.00 11.84 12.14.
99.63 11.83 12.13
101.00 12.09 12.40
104.50 12.50 12.83
(1) For purposes of trading this yield is calculated as if the pool of underlying mortgages were a single 30 year mortgage prepaying in
full after 12 years with an adjustment in yield for the lag in the first payment of interest.
(2) Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates pay interest monthly. Over the course of six monthly payments the effective rate from this
monthly compounding will make the yield on the security paying interest monthly higher than a security with the same nominal yield
paying interest on a semi-annual basis. When comparing these securities to bonds paying interest on a semi-annual basis the mortgage
yield has to be revised to reflect this difference in interest payout. The Bond Yield Equivalent takes the frequency of interest
payment into consideration and is the standard by which corporate bond yields should be compared with pass-through yields.
(3) The Mortgage Pool consists of variable rate conventional mortgage loans. Any change in the nominal interest rate on these mortgage
loans will be passed through to certificateholders.
(4) The pass-through rate for Home Savings and Loan Association (First Series) was 9.00%. In August 1978 and May 1979, the Federal Home
Loan Bank of San Francisco variable rate index increased, permitting a rise in the nominal rate charged on selected mortgage notes in
this pool. As a result the current pass-through rate is 9.637%.
(5) The pass-through rate for Home Savings and Loan Association (Second Series) was 9.25%. In May 1979 the Federal Home Loan Bank of San
Francisco variable rate index increased, permitting a rise in the nominal rate charged on selected mortgage notes in the pool. As a
resul2 the current pass-through rate is 9.54%
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difficult to evaluate from publicly available information as passthroughs
are indistinguishable on these balance sheets from other types of financing
such as participation loans (Rilander, 1980).
Since the mid-1970's, the FHLBB has steadily liberalized its regula-
tions to permit greater use of mortgage-backed securities, both MBB's and
passthroughs. On May 3, 1980, the Bank Board adopted rules which allow
savings institutions to self-insure mortgage pools for mortgage-backed
securities. By retaining a subordinate interest of up to 10 percent of the
original amount of the mortgage pool, the institution may offer its subor-
dinated position as an alternative to private mortgage insurance coverage
which has been a requirement on the publicly offered passthroughs to
date. 10
Prognosis for Mortgage-Backed Securities Based on Experience to Date
These securities appear to be a potentially significant means of
obtaining home mortgage funds. For savings institutions, these securities
provide a viable means through which to raise funds from investors outside
their traditional deposit bases. Passthrough securities have also provided
savings institutions with mortgage investments which qualify as income tax
shelters under the "bad debt" provisions of the IRS Code. The savings
industry may develop not only as originators and servicers of passthroughs
but also major investors. Originally, both MBB's and passthroughs were
...designed to appeal to investors who previously have not
channeled their investment funds into the mortgage market...for
example, the tremendous pool of capital held by private pension
funds and state and local retirement funds. To the extent that
[mortgage securities] provide a means for associations to tap
this pool of capital, we will not, for a change, be robbing Peter
to pay Paul (i.e., transfer individual household funds from lower
to higher interest bearing accounts)... Thus, [mortgage
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securities] will be attractive to and will trade in the very broad
financial markets which are currently the sole domain of corporate
bonds. (Kaplan, 1975:14)
As of 1978, while there is not considerable evidence that the institutional
holdings have changed, 10 percent of the outstanding home mortgage dollars
were held through pools of passthrough securities.
Mortgage-backed securities have been heralded as a means of making a
better asset-liability match, i.e., substitution of longer term liabilities
for short term savings to match longer maturity mortgage needs. However,
while the nascent development of MBB's and passthrough certificates (PTC)
for conventional as well as federally insured mortgages may have acce-
lerated the integration of the mortgage markets and the bond markets, it
may be at a point when "there has emerged a widespread consensus that
something must replace the long-term fixed rate debt market (Seligman,
1980:59). An article published in Fortune in March of 1980 entitled "The
Revolt of the Lenders" began
fhe convulsions in the bond markets during the past
several months looked more and more like a watershed in the
U.S. financial history. There is an emerging sense that the
shattering price declines and soaring interest rates that
began last fall signify the end of an era for bonds and,
indeed, for long-term fixed-rate financing in general.
After being clobbered for years in the debt markets, the big
bond holders have, in effect, revolted. For a variety of
reasons, it now seems unlikely that they will again be willing
to buy those traditional long-term bonds, even with still higher
yields. (Seligman, 1980:57)
Among the lenders identified as withdrawing their funds from the bond
market are (1) household sector, in part because "it has more options in
the short-term markets" such as money market funds and MMC's offered by the
thrifts and (2) pension funds, as "fixed-rate assets like bonds cannot be
used to finance variable rate pension benefits" wherein payments to pen-
- 248 -
sioners are tied to a cost of living index.
The solution posed to this problem to "which most bond-market veterans
seem to be partial is a not-so-long-term variable rate instrument --
something approximating what already exists in Canada and Europe"
(Seligman, 1980:59). Thus, it would appear that neither MBB's or PTC's
present an alternative to the shorter term mortgage instruments and that to
issue MBB's or PTC's, a mortgage lender may be able to offer an attractive
package only with such variable rate instruments.
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE MORTGAGE MARKET: IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE FUTURE
Over the past several decades, household savings institutions have
been the major single source of mortgage funds. Prior to the National
Housing Act of 1968, federal mortgage assistance was primarily in the form
of FHA or VA mortgage insurance which (1) established residential appraisal
and underwriting standards and (2) government guarantees which facilitated
mortgage purchases by secondary investors such as life insurance companies
as these loans were essentially risk-free investments. Since 1968, a
secondary market for conventional loan securities backed by these loans
without FHA or VA mortgage insurance has been fostered first by two
federally sponsored credit agencies which purchase mortgages by issuing
mortgage-related FNMA and FHLMC securities, and subsequently through public
offerings and private placements by non-governmental financial industries.
GNMA has also fostered a market for mortgage-backed passthroughs. While
GNMA's securities are tantamount to U.S. Treasury securities, the issues by
private financial institutions to private investors are not federally
sponsored. Major issues presented by these structural changes include both
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the institutional implications for the thrift industry and implications for
the consumer in the home mortgage market and consequently federal and state
consumer protection laws and regulations.
The key issues here depend to some extent on one's perception of the
marketplace. Again, the three paradigms of economic behavior discussed in
Chapter 2 may be helpful.
From a neoclassical perspective, mortgage-backed securities may
contribute to a more perfectly competitive market for financial capital.
Traditionally, savings institutions have culled their funds from individual
households which had few alternative vehicles for investment of their
savings. Reinforced by government regulation designed to assure homebuyers
mortgage capital through special tax treatment of savings institutions and
interest rate regulation favoring the thrifts over the commercial banks,
such an artificially segmented market leads to inefficiencies and misallo-
cation of capital resources in society.
From a liberal perspective, many inequities developed as a result of
the thrifts holding the small savers virtually captive until challenged by
other financial intermediaries such as commercial banks and money market
funds. Moreover, present developments such as MBB's and PTC's issued by
the thrifts competing in the market with corporate bonds issued by Fortune
500 multinationals may produce results which are no more equitable in terms
of increasing access to market rates of return. First, in terms of invest-
ment possibilities for the small saver, while MBB's and PTC's may offer
competitive rates, it is unclear that the small saver would be able to
purchase them. Minimum denominations in the market have traditionally been
$5,000 to $10,000. Thus, the issue of small savers' direct access to
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market rates of return still remain. However, access might be provided
through financial intermediaries which purchased these securities. Second,
savings institutions were originally created to (1) serve small savers and
(2) in the case of savings and loan associations, specifically chartered to
make home mortgages. These institutions were created in the absence of
private firms to adequately meet these social needs. Government interven-
tion may be necessary to ensure that these two social objectives are
addressed as the liabilities and assets of thrift institutions are subject
to fundamental change.
Finally, from a structural perspective, there are institutional dynam-
ics that make it improbable that mortgage-related securities will be more
than a marginal source of funds for thrift institutions, particularly the
medium-sized and smaller institutions. For example, as a general rule,
given the costs associated with a public bond offering, $50 million is con-
sidered the minimum worth issuing. Institutions of less than half a bil-
lion dollars are not likely to issue MBB's individually, although they may
be able to do so collectively. Only the very largest institutions are
likely to have national investor recognition such that they can issue
mortgage-related securities through a public offering, particularly on con-
ventional loans without federal or private mortgage insurance. Smaller
institutions are likely to only have the option of private placement with
large institutional investors such as life insurance companies, pension
funds, and major commercial banks. Under private placements, rates are
negotiable for the issuer by an underwriting firm. These rates are never
really tested in the financial markets. Only under public offerings, where
the bonds may be subsequently traded between buyers and sellers in a secon-
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dary market, i.e., sales other than those to original buyers who purchase
at a rate stipulated by the issuer's underwriters, are the rates ever
challenged in the marketplace. Thus, from the structuralist perspective,
the securities market is segmented with limited access for smaller
institutions.
The Future of Thrift Institutions in the Home Mortgage Market:
Retailers, Wholesalers or Investors
Through 1979, thrift institutions continued to supply approximately 50
percent or more of the funds invested in home mortgages in any given year
(see Exhibit 5-14). These funds overshadowed mortgage funds supplied by
other sectors. There is no clear secular trend for other investors in the
near future to assume a dominant role. The questions confronting thrift
institutions at this point are
(1) To what extent will deposit growth continue? What
types of accounts will attract depositors (i.e., no
term, short term, intermediate or long term)? What
rates will be required to attract depositors? Should
their clientele continue to be limited (by regulation)
to households as opposed to institutional or corporate
investors?
(2) To what extent will it be necessary to obtain non-
deposit sources of funds to sustain their role as
institutional investors? Apart from the mortgage-
related securities that they now issue, what are the
alternative debt instruments they should consider? In
addition, are there means other than household deposits
by which they can expand their liability base (debt
instruments, unless there are provisions for equity
kickers, at best sustain a portfolio at status quo)?
(3) What should be their market strategies?
(a) Should they focus on the household sector
and extend their assets to a broader range of consumer
loans (e.g., personal loans, automobile loans, etc.) in
an effort to become "full household credit service
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EXHIBIT 14
CAPITAL AND CREDIT MARKETS
HOME MORTGAGES - FUNDS SUPPLIED
(Dollar Amounts in Billions)
Insurance Companies and Pension Funds
Life Insurance Companies
Private Noninsured Pension Funds
State and Local Retirement Funds
Total
Thrift Institutions
Savings and Loan Associations
Mutual Savings Banks
Credit Unions
Total
Other Financial Intermediaries
Mortgage Brokers
Real Estate Investment Trusts
Total
Commercial Banks
Government
U.S. Government
Nonbudget Agencies
State and Local General Funds
Total
Individuals and Others
Total
Components may not add due to rounding
Source: Bankers Trust Company
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
$ (1.8) (4.0%) $ (1.4) (4.2%)
.7 1.6 .7 2.1
$ (1.4) (3.4%)
1.5 3.6
$ (1.5)
1.8
(2.3%) $ (1.4)
2.8
TYflT T~1y T71 TW TF T2 W TS
2.7
.2
-- .6 -
21.4 47.7 15.0 45.0 25.6 61.8 39.5 60.3 51.9
3.0 6.7 1.1 3.3 1.9 4.6 5.5 8.3 7.2
.5 1.1 .5 1.5 .1 .2 .9 1.3 2.0
25.0 55.7 1-6.6 49.8 27-.6- 66.7T -45.8- 69.9 -61.1T
1.5 3.3
.7 1.6
11.2 24.9
(.7) (2.1)
(.2) (.6)
.9 2.7-
6.9 20.7
(.8) (1.8) 2.6 7.8
3.5 7.8 5.5 16.5
.6 1.3
3.- 7.5
.7 2.1
8.8 26.4
(1.4%) $ (.3)
2.7 2.1
1979(est.)
(1.3%) $ .8 .8%
2.0 1.3 1.2
.2 .5 .5 .3 .3
1.6 2.3 2.2 24 2.3-~
52.2
7.2
2.0
61.4-
2.0 4.8 3.5 5.4 3.9 3.9
(.5) (1.2) (.2) -(.3) (.2) (.2)
1.5- 3.6- 3.3 5.1" 3.7- 3.7-
2.3 5.6
49.1
6.3
1.7
57.1
46.6
6.0
1.6
54.2-
2.7 2.6
(.1) (. 1)
2.6' 2.5-
43.3 40.8
4.3 4.1
1.4 1.3
49.0 46.2
1.5 1.4
(. 1) (.1)
1. 4 1.3
9.7 14.8 20.6 20.7 23.3 22.1 21.5 20.3
4.3 10.4 (1.8) (2.8) .9 .9
2.5 6.0 .5 .8 .5 .5
.8 1.9 .8 1.2 .6 .6
7.7 18. (. (.8) 20 2
1.0 .9 1.8 1.7
9.0 8.6 8.7 8.2
2.0 1.9
120 11.4
2.8 2.6
13.3 1275~
4.3 7.3 2.6 7.8 2.3 5.6 6.9 10.6 10.5 10.6 7.9 7.5 18.4 17.4
$ 44.9 100.0 $ 33.3 100.0 $ 41.4 100.0 $ 65.4 100.0 $ 99.5 100.0 $105.3 100.0 $106.0 100.0
r")
UJ1
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stations" (as recommended in several of the national
studies summarized at the beginning of this chapter)?
(b) Or, should they capitalize on their home
mortgage expertise and continue to invest most of their
capital resources in this market? If so, should they
serve as retailers, i.e., originate loans to individual
homebuyers, package and sell them to institutional
investors, and retain servicing fees over the life of
each loan, thus providing a mortgage market function
comparable to that served by a mortgage broker or a
mortgage company? Or, should they function as inter-
mediate wholesalers by creating subsidiary service cor-
porations to provide the retail mortgage services,
acquiring loans originated by the mortgage retailers
and packaging these loans as either loan sales in the
secondary market, passthroughs, or to the extent
possible with overcollateralization requirements retain
the loans and finance the purchases from retailers with
MBB's? A related question is the extent to which "full
homebuyer service stations" (i.e., real estate broker,
home mortgage, homeowner insurance such as those in
development under the auspices of Merrill Lynch and
Coldwell Banker may become major competitors of the
thrifts or their service corporations in providing
mortgage retail services?
Thus, the strategic alternatives for the savings institutions appear to be
either (1) to try to maintain a dominant role in one of two market segments
(general household credit services or continued specialization in home
mortgages) or (2) to accept recommendations such as those of the Hunt
Commission and become general financial institutions, undifferentiated from
commercial banks in terms of liability or asset requirements.
Consumer Protection, Public Policy and Regulatory Perspectives
on Mortgage Market Developments
Structural changes in the institutional mortgage market may have pro-
nounced effects on the consumer, both the home mortgage borrower and the
household depositor. Given that changes introduced to date have been
somewhat limited, their impact has not been widespread and thus cannot be
readily evaluated empirically. The potential issues discussed in the
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literature to date include:
(1) To what extent do consumers need specialized insti-
tutions to serve their credit needs, particularly
home mortgage loans? If financial institutions are
homogenized such that they can all serve the corporate
business as well as the household sector, will house-
holds face perennial problems in obtaining credit as
they can readily be outbid by competing corporate
customers? As a matter of public policy, should there
be some forms of governmental intervention to assure
some "equitable" distribution of credit between con-
sumer and corporate borrowers? Or, is this sort of
market interference inefficient and ultimately penalizes
both consumer and corporate sectors through a costly
misallocation of resources?
(2) To what extent will the household sector lose its
leverage, vis-a-vis the thrift institutions if
increasing proportions of their funds are obtained
not from household depositors but from institutional
investors which may impose their own priorities or
underwriting criteria in terms of the use of their
funds?
The first series of issues are those generally raised by the thrift insti-
tutions advocating that public policy regulation maintain market segmen-
tation in the banking industry as "either the consumers' bid for mortgage
and other types of credit nor the thrift institutions themselves will sur-
vive in an open market. The second set of issues has seldom been
addressed, possibly because it is only recently that depositors themselves,
specifically urban depositors in conjunction with anti-redlining and com-
munity reinvestment campaigns, have tried to exercise any influence over
investment policies, particularly mortgage investment policies of local
savings institutions.11
Urban neighborhood organizations and national coalitions of these
organizations have pursued a number of strategies premised on the savings
institutions obtaining their investment funds from households in geographic
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proximity to their main and branch offices and maintaining in many cases a
charter obligation to make home mortgage loans. These strategies have
included
Organized deposit withdrawals from savings
institutions which refused to make mortgage loans in
the areas they represented, or did so only on less
favorable terms than other areas (e.g., Milwaukee,
Boston-Jamaica Plain).
Lobbied successfully for disclosure by savings institu-
tions and commercial banks as to the geographic
distribution (by census tract or zip code) of their
home mortgage loan commitments. At the federal level,
the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act discussed in some
detail in Chapter 3 was enacted in 1975. Some states
adopted more stringent disclosure provisions,
including disclosure of deposits by geographic area in
which the depositors resided.
Enactment of the Community Reinvestment Act which
stipulated that depository institutions are chartered
to serve public convenience and needs not only through
deposit services but also through credit services, par-
ticularly in low and moderate income areas, in the com-
munities in which they were chartered. Under this Act,
as a condition for expanding their services area
through new branch offices, acquisitions or mergers
with other financial institutions, federal regulatory
agencies are mandated to scrutinize how well an appli-
cant institution has served in its present area. These
agencies are also required to take these considerations
into account in their annual examination or audit of each
institution.
The structural changes discussed in this chapter undermine each of these
consumer-oriented and, in some cases, household saver reforms to the extent
that publicly regulated financial institutions are not the household
savings depositories nor the major institutional mortgage investors of the
future. With particular regard to home mortgage loans, new investors have
purchased mortgage-related securities on conventional loans which conform
with a set of federally sanctioned appraisal and underwriting standards
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such as those of FNMA and FHLMC or nationally recognized standards such as
those of major private mortgage insurance companies such as MGIC or PMI.
These, along with those of FHA and VA, have been directly subject to criti-
cism and challenge by local household organizations where they were volun-
tarily applied by the savings institutions. If, however, the local savings
institution must follow loan standards which preclude serving portions of
its chartered community in order to obtain funds to make mortgages at all,
the investment leverage of local depositors is considerably diminished.
Requirements, for example, of Standard and Poor in their high quality
securities ratings for the issue to be comprised exclusively of loans on
single-family as opposed to two-to-four family mean for many urban banks
that their suburban loans are marketable, while loans made in their imme-
diate service area are not. Local savings institutions may evolve into
mortgage brokers wherein the financial incentives are (1) to make as many
new loans to obtain front end fees and maximum number of points as
possible, (2) to terminate outstanding loans as early as possible, possibly
through fast foreclosure, to maximize return on investment, and (3) to
avoid smaller mortgages and, as a result, financing in many urban neigh-
borhoods where home purchase prices may be below those of suburban areas,
so as to maximize fees which are calculated on the basis of percentages of
the original amount.
Thus, many reforms instituted over the past decade have assisted
various consumer organizations in obtaining the information necessary to
challenge risk perceptions and investment decisions, particularly in
mortgage lending. One inadvertent outcome of pending structural changes
in the mortgage market may be diminished accountability to household
depositors and to households seeking mortgage credit.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER 5
1As local institutions limited to household, rather than corporate
customers, they have been more accountable to the borrower, particularly in
the wake of consumer protection reforms discussed in Chapter 3.
2In Massachusetts, the state-chartered thrift institutions (savings
banks, cooperative banks, and credit unions) each formed their own deposit
insurance funds just prior to the creation of federal deposit insurance
funds. As a result, these institutions have historically not been members
of a federal regulatory system with a central bank as a lender of last
resort to meet short term liquidity problems. Only recently have any of
these banks, which provided the empirical data base studied in Chapter 4,
enrolled as a member of either the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) or the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) for one of two reasons,
both related to liquidity problems. First, these institutions could not
sell their mortgages to a federally sponsored secondary mortgage market
agency without subscribing to federal deposit insurance. Second, during
periods of substantial disintermediation wherein small depositors collec-
tively withdraw significant funds, these institutions had to honor these
liabilities, despite most of their funds were in long-term mortgage assets,
without the back-up of a central bank. As a result, over the past decade,
most of the large and medium-sized savings banks and the larger cooperative
banks have become members of either the FDIC or the FHLBB.
3It is interesting to note that variation in a fifth characteristic,
the downpayment or loan-to-value ratio, is not among the factors addressed
by alternative mortgage instrument proposals. This is probably attribu-
table to the fact that this factor has been the subject of considerable
variation in the special loan programs to date. The mortgage insurance
programs administered by FHA, VA, and now private mortgage insurance com-
panies, have all focused on variation of this factor, i.e., downpayments of
less than 20 percent of the appraised value of the property. Note: that
it is variation in this characteristic that many studies (Chapter 2) have
concluded is a major determinant of risk. Is this likely to be the case
because it is the only loan term which has varied since standardization of
mortgage terms in the 1930's?
4According to one author:
Several studies have found that the use of VRM in Great Britain
and other countries have not mitigated feast-and-famine conditions
in the mortgage market. The VRM has long been the sole type of
mortgage originated in England. Many of the operational problems
of the VRM have been overcome by the British. For example, no
type of government peg or control is used. British lenders are
entirely free to change rates at whatever time and to whatever
level they choose. Uniform industry practice is apparently
assured by tradition; the VRM is the sole and time-honored type
of mortgage that is made. However, British lenders have suffered
disintermediation and associated problems in tight-money
periods despite the presence of a varying yield on their
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portfolios. (Schaaf, A. H. "Reforming the Residential Mortgage
Market", California Management Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, Spring
1976:76).
5Experience was to the contrary in California: "From mid-1975 through
1977, the volume of VRM's increased rapidly, as large California VRM len-
ders had about 60 to 80 percent of their new loan originations in VRM's
(see Exhibit 5-3). However, during 1978, as mortgage interest rates rose
sharply, the VRM percentage declined to about 40 to 50 percent and VRM
growth has slowed. The reason apparently is that lenders are offering
VRM's on less attractive terms relative to FPM's in anticipation of
declining interest rates. Other things being equal, an FPM with prepayment
penalties is more attractive to the lender in these circumstances since it
locks in high interest rates." (Melton and Heidt, 1979:26)
6Two aspects of low downpayment loans in present mortgage market.
One, as PMI's have absorbed greater share of market, less room for expan-
sion at public sector initiative. Two, monthly payments under these
instruments are greater as financing proportionately more. Thus, while
these instruments address households without accumulated capital for
downpayment, they do not address issue of monthly carrying costs relative
to income.
7The reasons for the shrinking capital base of savings institutions
have been stated by Jaffee and Rosen (1979) as follows:
While the present economic environment and the introduction of the
MMC has shifted the strategic profit opportunities for traditional
mortgage lenders, there are also three fundamental imbalances which
are forcing a number of institutions to seek additional sources of
credit. The first imbalance concerns the extraordinary increase in
demand for new and existing single family homes which is accompanying
the maturation of the post-World War II baby boom generation. This
demographic surge has produced record levels of home purchase and
sharply higher relative housing prices. This combination has in turn
generated record demands for mortgage credit by first time buyers,
households trading up to higher quality units, and households using
some of their increased housing equity for non-housing purposes.
This sharply higher aggregate demand for credit is juxtaposed
against record low personal savings rates and fairly modest inflows of
funds to traditional mortgage lenders. This has produced a "mortgage
credit gap" even in years of seemingly good deposit flows.
In addition to this aggregate "mortgage credit gap", there has
also developed an increasing regional imbalance in the supply and
demand for mortgage credit. While the West, and in particular
California, has traditionally been a capital deficit region, the sharp
acceleration of migration to California and the West starting in 1974
has accerbated the problem. Net migration to California in 1977 and
1978 was nearly 250,000 people a year. This new population growth,
the "baby boom demand", and the uncoupling (divorce) of Western fami-
lies has greatly increased the demand for housing units. This demand
surge combined with housing prices that have doubled in four years
(caused in part by this increment in demand) has accelerated the
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demand for mortgage credit in California relative to the rest of the
country. On the other hand, the young migrants and households in
California have only added modestly to the supply of funds in
California -- thus creating a substantial "regional mortgage credit
gap".
The final imbalance concerns the credit gap facing a number of
individual institutions. A substantial number of traditional mortgage
lenders are finding their lending and borrowing power restricted by
statutory capital requirements and restrictions on regulations
restricting their borrowings. As a result in order to continue pro-
viding mortgage credit, they are forced into an "asset selling
posture."
8As of May 30, 1980, revised FHLBB regulations on MBB's published in
the Federal Register were summarized in the Housing and Development
Reporter as follows: -
The new regulations on borrowing raise the limit on overall borrowing
from 50 percent of an association's total savings accounts to 50 per-
cent of its assets and eliminate the separate 15 percent limit on
outside borrowing. Richard G. Marcis, chief economist for the Bank
Board, said the changes increase the potential volume of outside
borrowing from about $70 billion (15 percent of $478 billion in
savings) to $290 billion (50 percent of $580 billion in assets).
9The FSLIC MBB requirements vis-a-vis the solvency of the issuing
institution included several threshold criteria in terms of both earnings
and losses:
... (3) All appraised losses have been offset by specified loss
reserves to the extent required by (the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance) Corporation." (CFR Title 12, Sec. 563.8-2, subsection (a))
(4) The insured instit tions average income (before income
taxes and extraordinary items and after payment of interest and
dividends on savings accounts) for its last three fiscal years
and is at least two times the annual amount required for interest
and amortization of the related expenses of all mortgage-backed
bonds issued pursuant to this section (excluding any such bonds
to be refunded out of the proceeds of any issue).
10Specifically, on self-insured passthrough securities:
The selling institution must designate a specific reserve from its
net worth equal to half of its subordinated interest up to 5 per-
cent of the pool and 100 percent of its interest exceeding 5
percent. Thus, an institution taking the maximum subordinated
position of 10 percent would have to set aside a reserve of 7.5
percent of the original amount of the mortgage pool.
11Many thrift savings institutions are mutual institutions which means
that the depositors are, at least on paper, shareholders; in contrast, the
commercial banks are owned by stockholders who have made an equity invest-
ment in the institution.
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CHAPTER 6
EPILOGUE
The foregoing chapters have presented analyses of institutional
development and empirical research on residential mortgage risk experience
over the past several decades in the United States. The results of these
analyses suggest that (1) changes in mortgage underwriting policies through
greater emphasis on household financial resources and de-emphasis of
property appraisal, are in order, (2) these changes may not be readily
adopted by the institutions engaged in mortgage lending and, thus, any
significant change may require externally generated "carrots" or "sticks",
and (3) changes in the general economy, particularly in the markets for
mortgage funds, may introduce further impetus for modification in
underwriting policies and practices.
PRESENT MORTGAGE UNDERWRITING POLICIES: CHANGES RECOMMENDED
BY PAST RISK EXPERIENCE
Mortgage lending decisions require an evaluation of the likelihood of
repayment on an agreed upon schedule. Delinquencies and defaults present
at least two types of risk to the lender. Delinquency, either for an
extended period of time or on a repeated basis, may impose significant ser-
vicing costs in contacting and counseling the borrower. Default, which
requires either foreclosure proceedings and resale of the property serving
as collateral security or collection from the mortgage insuror, may result
in a net profit or less to the lender. Apart from the risks associated
with the particulars of an individual loan, the probabilities of
delinquency or default and related profits or losses to the lender are also
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affected by more general economic trends, such as unemployment, the rate of
inflation and its impact on household income and housing prices.
Underwriting criteria thus should reflect perceptions of general market
conditions as well as individual loan risks.
To underwrite individual loans, the most reliable information
available to the lender in assessing likelihood of delinquency or default
is the household financial resources and income stream relative to
the mortgage and other debt burdens which are to be supported. The fin-
dings of the metropolitan Boston analyses supported those of previous stu-
dies in this regard. Those factors most closely related to the probability
of default included regular earnings per capita and the amount of down-
payment relative to the property purchased. In addition, installment debt
relative to household earnings and loans made for purposes of refinancing
were positively associated with the probability of delinquency.
This research indicates that lenders would be well advised to abandon
emphasis on property appraisal, particularly value defined as purchase
price discounted by neighborhood factors, as a determinant of risk.
Overemphasis on this information is misleading and in the past has resulted
in loans made to higher risk borrowers in what are regarded as lower risk
locations and loans denied to lower risk borrowers in perceived higher risk
neighbor-hoods. This conclusion is also supported by previous risk
studies. While those prior studies generally have not focussed on the use
of property appraisals and neighborhood characteristics in loan
origination, several did report results which indicated undue emphasis on
location and underemphasis on household financial resources. For example,
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one FHA study published in 1963 concluded that "the general upward bias of
property and location ratings may have had a tendency to encourage accep-
tance of cases which were marginal with respect to the borrower", while the
study results indicated that "borrower characteristics were considerably
more important than property and location characteristics in contributing
to mortgage mortality" (FHA, 1963: 55). Similar studies on conventional
mortgages indicated that the incidence of mortgage delinquency and default
was higher on properties in suburban than urban locations (e.g., Kendall,
1964; ADL, 1975). In spite of these conclusions, the study of lending
criteria in metropolitan Boston indicates that property appraisal has
remained paramount. The metropolitan Boston analyses indicated that the
higher bank appraised value, the lower the bank perceived risk. Bank
appraised value overshadowed household financial factors such as regular
earnings per capita as a determinant of a conventional or federally insured
loan. Moreover, in instances where the purchase price discounted for
neighborhood factors resulted in an appraised value less than the purchase
price, the greater the likelihood of a federally insured loan. Yet, the
study of Boston data corroborated that neither of these factors were
determinants of subsequent delinquency or default. In the final analysis,
household financial factors at the time of origination, not property or
location, were the best risk indicators.
Possible Implications of Revised Underwriting Policies
If lenders were to adopt underwriting criteria which reflected these
analytical results, neighborhood trends, and, in turn, appraised value
would no longer be generally used as a critical factor in risk evaluation
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of mortgage applications. Only in two cases might consideration of price
trends (as opposed to prediction of property values) be warranted.
One case is where the lender has a direct interest in the rate of
appreciation. Under instruments such as the shared equity mortgage
described in Chapter 5, the lender's rate of return is determined not only
by the interest rate on the mortgage but also by the increase in purchase
price at resale, as the lender's shares any capital gain with the borrower.
It is interesting to note that in metropolitan areas such as Boston, price
trend data over the past decade indicate that lenders would have realized a
higher rate of return in urban neighborhoods undergoing gentrification than
in suburban communities.
The other case is in metropolitan areas where there are neighborhoods
where prices have actually decreased. If the lender considers the property
as collateral security in evaluating risk at origination, then it may be
important in the event of default that the resale price is greater than the
outstanding mortgage. In these cases, a lender could not make a collatera-
lized loan. However, since the loan request in these areas is likely to be
relatively small, lenders might consider uncollateralized personal loans
based on their evaluation of the borrowers.
Based on delinquency and default experience, it appears that not only
should underwriting emphasis on property value decrease but evaluation of
the household's financial resources with respect to the mortgage and other
debt to be supported should increase commensurately. In this event, it
should become easier for households in urban neighborhoods, particularly
those with substantial resources, to obtain mortgage funds; conversely,
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households in suburban areas with more marginal financial resources would
have more difficulty. Finally, some possible side effects of greater
emphasis on financial resources may be that urban and suburban households
with modest financial resources, previously considered adequate risks, are
now viewed as too risky.
Additional Research Useful to Lenders Interested in Promoting Revisions
in Underwriting Policies
Apart from further research on mortgage delinquency and default
experience, further research in three other areas might assist in con-
vincing mortgage lending institutions to relinquish the traditional empha-
sis on location and property appraisal. One area is price trend studies on
urban neighborhoods. Research which has juxtaposed lenders' predictions of
property values with actual price trends has generally indicated that
lenders' estimates are considerably below actual prices in urban neigh-
borhoods (e.g., Hammer, Siler, George, and Associates, 1979; Parkman Center,
1977). While price trend information is not indicative of delinquency or
default risks, lenders do need assurances that prices will not actually
decline such that the outstanding mortgage amount is more than the resale
price of the property serving as collateral security.
A second useful area of study is an assessment of (1) the actual costs
of originating and servicing loans, (2) the profits or losses associated
with foreclosure and resale, and (3) the extent to which smaller mortgages,
which offer less risk exposure but are more costly in terms of return,
might be made on a more streamlined basis. In this type of inquiry, the
primary traditional lenders, the thrift institutions, have done little.
Most of this research has been done by the mortgage bankers which may or
- 265 -
may not be representative of the industry. In the second, little systema-
tic research has been done. Efforts to analyze these data in the metropo-
litan Boston study were thwarted by the fact that this information was not
maintained by the thrift institutions. In the third, one senior mortgage
officer in a Boston area savings institution suggested that property
appraisals, which are a labor intensive and costly aspect of loan
origination, ought to be eliminated altogether for mortgages of less than
$20,000 or $30,000. He would recommend that, given the minimal portfolio
risk exposure to a lender on these loans, they should simply be originated
as personal loans with the major emphasis on financial resources and
capacity to support debt service.
A third area of study useful to mortgage lending institutions
interested in modification of their present underwriting standards would be
evaluation of their rejected loan files against their actual delinquency
and default experience. While limited data has been maintained on rejected
loans in the past, lenders should find monitoring this information on an
ongoing basis useful in assessing what good business risks they may be
excluding.
TECHNIQUES TO INTRODUCE CHANGE IN MORTGAGE UNDERWRITING POLICIES
Apart from research designed to evaluate underwriting practices, more
active organizational effort may be required to introduce changes in insti-
tutional perceptions of individual loan risks and, in turn, underwriting
policies and practices. Selection of techniques depends on one's theoreti-
cal assumptions about the market for home mortgages.
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Neoclassical Perspective
If one subscribes to the neoclassical assumptions discussed in Chapter
2, one assumes that underwriting policies will change by demonstrating to
lending institutions that there are profitable loans to be made. If more
complete information made available through research on individual loan
risks does not precipitate general industry changes in underwriting
policies, then perhaps demonstration programs would be more convincing to
other lenders that they were overlooking profitable business opportunities.
History has not borne out these marketplace assumptions. For example,
for many years, mortgage bankers and mortgage companies have offered loans
in urban neighborhoods where savings institutions were not actively
lending. In cases such as Malmart in Boston, federally insured loans made
by the mortgage company were often purchased by the savings institutions.
The fact that Malmart's loans appeared to be profitable, particularly given
the effectively higher rates charged to cover the company expenses as an
intermediary and still sell loans at market rates of interest, did not
appear to precipitate direct investment on the part of the savings
institutions. It also should be noted that, in neoclassical terms, higher
rates of interest are warranted on the basis of higher risk. If the effec-
tively higher rates of interest of a mortgage company, result in higher
costs to urban borrowers who were no riskier, then the costs to the urban
borrower are unjustified from a strictly market perspective. The justi-
fication for these higher costs to the borrower is the higher costs of the
mortgage company as a lender. However, this justification still raises the
question -- why should borrowers in a metropolitan area have differential
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costs of mortgage funds based on the location of the property they are
purchasing?
Liberal and Structuralist Perspectives
The assumptions of liberal analysts that some types of public inter-
vention in the marketplace may be required to ensure more equitable distri-
bution of funds appear to have some basis in fact in the mortgage lending.
Intervention techniques include legislative and regulatory initiatives such
as the Community Reinvestment Act which requires federally chartered or
insured depository institutions to serve the credit needs as well as depo-
sit services required, particularly in low and moderate income areas of the
area they are chartered to serve. The fact that many depository
institutions, after the CRA was enacted, became interested in the
underwriting practices of progressive institutions such as the South Shore
National Bank in Chicago described in Chapter 3 would seem to support the
argument that public intervention may be required to catalyze interest and
institutional action on research results or demonstrations of alternative
lending practices.
A structural analyst would maintain that significant changes in
underwriting practices are contingent on changes in institutional
structure. One should not belittle the extent to which changes in any
social structure challenge traditional belief systems and vested economic
interests. For example, the raison d' etre of the residential appraiser is
property appraisal. To the extent that the importance of this function is
diminished or, perhaps for smaller mortgages, eliminated altogether pre-
sents a direct threat to the individual appraisers and to institutions such
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as the professional residential appraisal societies. Such change is not
likely to be met without resistance.
Structuralists also maintain that institutional change may also render
some previous forms of intervention relatively ineffective. For example,
changes in the institutional investors in home mortgages discussed in
Chapter 5 may have significant implications for the effectiveness of the
Community Reinvestment Act which may be applied across the board to deposi-
tory institutions but which does not affect the insurance companies, pen-
sion funds, or many of the other institutional or individual investors
purchasing mortgage related securities. Thus, reforms may often extend to
a limited sphere of institutions unless they are redesigned for new
appl ications.
Reform Amidst Upheaval: Changes Introduced With New Institutional
Investors and Low Mortgage Instruments
New mortgage instruments and new institutional investors may offer
avenues for change in traditional mortgage underwriting practices. For
example, key institutions such as Standard and Poor as the lead rating
agency for mortgage backed bonds or passthrough securities do not have
several decades of practice, long standing training manuals and personnel
committed to decades of appraisal and underwriting traditions. Thus, one
might be able to introduce changes in Standard and Poor's rating manual
first published in 1978 more easily than the FHA Underwriting Manual first
published in 1938.
On the other hand, as national and less publicly accessible institu-
tions enter and take hold in the mortgage market, changes in underwriting
practices may become more difficult to effectuate. For example, the extent
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to which local savings institutions have perceived their deposit base as
dependent on a public image as good citizens in their community has made
them sensitive to public criticism of mortgage lending practices. Non-
depository national institutions are likely to be more immune to local
neighborhood organizing for modifications in underwriting policies which
adversely affect local investment.
MORTGAGE UNDERWRITING POLICIES: CHANGES RECOMMENDED FOR THE FUTURE BY
PRESENT TRENDS AND PAST EXPERIENCE
Past mortgage delinquency and default experience indicates that place
does not predict risk, household income does. Moreover, under present eco-
nomic trends, household earnings potential in the future may be different
from what it has been before.
Present developments in the utilization of variable rate and renego-
tiable mortgages suggest that these new instruments may introduce new risk
considerations. Will the seasoning effects observed on fixed-rate long-
term mortgages, wherein the frequency of delinquency and default decrease
over the life of the loan, hold true for these alternative instruments?
Will household incomes increase sufficiently to sustain any changes in debt
service under these variable mortgages?
Given that the importance of income becomes all the more paramount
under instruments predicated on household earnings potential, some major
home mortgage lending institutions have begun to develop underwriting
systems which would incorporate calculations on the household's earning
potential. A major national bank has indicated interest in introducing
underwriting criteria which take into account the sectors of the economy
in which the borrowers are employed. These developments would undoubtedly
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have significant effects on which households had access to home mortgage
credit. Of two households with identical earnings at the time of appli-
cation, one employed in the primary labor market with wages indexed to in-
creases in the cost of living and the other in the secondary labor market
without such financial safeguards, the first would be more likely to obtain
a mortgage under this new set of underwriting criteria. Thus, what has
commonly been referred to in economics literature as a dual labor market,
would be extended to the home mortgage market. Homeownership as a means to
secure shelter and procure a real estate asset which is more likely to
appreciate at the rate of inflation than financial assets would thus be
more accessible to those employed by major employers in the stronger sec-
tors of the economy.
Future development of mortgage instruments, and the underwriting cri-
teria applied by institutions issuing them, reflect past
experience. Underwriting policies should not be developed and applied for
years without empirical research and feedback on whether information at
origination is taken into consideration and weighted properly in the deci-
sion to accept, reject, or impose differential terms on an application.
Lenders should be alert not only to who has been accepted who may be a bad
risk, but also who has been rejected who is likely to have been a good
risk. Finally, it will be important to critically evaluate institutional
structures, the extent to which their portfolio considerations affect
availability and types of mortgages available and whether, in the markets
for capital resources, alternative structures should be created to increase
access to funds.
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APPENDIX B
MORTGAGE DATA USED IN METROPOLITAN BOSTON ANALYSES
OVERVIEW
This Appendix describes the sources and types of information on
mortgage loans in metropolitan Boston. While it may be most easily read by
those with some background in housing finance and statistical research
methods, the general reader may find it useful as an orientation to the
terminology and concepts used in mortgage lending.
DATA BASE1
Data Collection
Given the large number of savings institutions and extensive volume of
mortgage loans made in metropolitan Boston, it was necessary to design a
means by which information on a small but representative group of loans
could be obtained. In doing so, there were four key objectives.
First, the scope of analysis was defined as one-to-four family
existing homes. 2 This definition covered loans obtained by owner-occupants
or absentee landlords to purchase or refinance a mortgage on a one-to-four
family existing dwelling.3 Loans originally obtained by one borrower and
assumed by another were also included.
A second consideration was to obtain a sufficient number of both con-
ventional and federally insured loans so as to have the capability of con-
ducting separate analyses of each loan type.4 Many earlier studies had
concluded that lower downpayment loans, where the borrower's equity was
less than 20 percent of the bank appraised value of the property, were con-
siderably riskier than those with downpayments of 20 percent or more.
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Federal mortgage insurance and guarantee programs under the Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) and Veterans Administration (VA) were established to
insure these lower downpayment loans, and hence, mortgage risk determinants
might be different for these federally insured loans compared to conven-
tional loans. Also, recent studies on the administration of federally
insured mortgage insurance programs indicated that the fact that these
loans are 100 percent federally insured or guaranteed may influence the
behavior of private lenders, as they bear little investment risk (Bachman,
1978; Lefcoe, 1977). Under these circumstances, the origination criteria
and servicing patterns for these loans might differ from that of conven-
tional loans. Thus, the data collection was designed to obtain roughly
equal numbers of conventional and federally insured loans.
A third objective was to obtain, within each of these two loan types,
a comparable number of loans in different status categories at the time
data were collected. Given that the vast majority of loans outstanding are
"current," i.e., paid up to date, special attention would be necessary to
obtain sufficient data on loans which were not current. After a review of
statutory and regulatory requirements and general bank mortgage lending
practices, three non-current loan status categories were identified. The
most serious of these were defaults, that is, those mortgages on which the
lender has determined that there is little or no chance that the loan will
be paid back.5 The next most serious are loans on which no payments have
been made for three months (90 days) or more. At this point, bank person-
nel must appraise the property serving as collateral security. They must
also evaluate whether the delinquency is attributable to temporary
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circumstances and, thus, may be brought back up to date; or whether default
proceedings should be initiated, if they are not in process already.
Finally, data were obtained on minor delinquencies, i.e., those loans over-
due less than 90 days. Of these three "bad" loan status categories, minor
delinquencies would occur most commonly, serious delinquencies next, and
defaults would be the rarest occurrences and, hence, the nost difficult
category in which to obtain an adequate number of loans.
A final objective was to obtain a data base which included a suf-
ficient number of loans in urban and suburban areas so as to be able to
evaluate any differential risk considerations. For example, some urban
neighborhood organizations locally and nationally had maintained that home-
buyers in their communities tended to receive federally insured loans
regardless of their ability to pay or other financial considerations. From
the perspective of these organizations, federally insured loans were issued
based on the lender's perceptions of neighborhood risk rather than finan-
cial characteristics of the borrower(s) and the condition of the subject
property. While sampling procedures could not be developed on the basis of
property location per se, one could design the data collection so as to
obtain information from a sufficient number of urban and suburban banks
such that loan data would be secured on a representative number of urban
and suburban properties.
Data Collection Procedures
Based on these four objectives, data collection procedures were
designed to obtain representative information from the Boston area state-
chartered savings institutions responsible for most of the loan activity on
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one-to-four family homes. These procedures may be summarized as follows:
1) Estimates were made of the number of serious delin-
quencies which, as relatively rare occurrences,
would be the more difficult loan status categories
on which to obtain data. These estimates were
based on computerized overdue reports. (Comparable
information for defaults, as even rarer events, was
not available.) Based on these estimates, it was
determined that data should be collected from
approximately one-third of the 97 eligible lending
institutions to insure an adequate data base. 6
2) Eligible savings institutions were rank-ordered by
deposit size (total dollars on deposit) and every
third bank on the list was drawn for the sample.
In addition, a supplementary random sample of
eight urban-based banks was added to insure that
there would be an adequate number of loans on urban
properties. Thus, the final sample consisted of
41, or nearly half, of the 97 eligible institutions
in the metropolitan area.
3) Data was collected, in most cases, on every loan
delinquent for 90 days or more at the date of
collection. Current loans were selected by match-
ing each serious delinquency with a paid-up loan
of the same type and approximately the same
origination date, so as to control for any varia-
tions in loan conditions or underwriting practices
over time. Minor delinquencies were sampled on
the basis of a predetermined interval so as to
obtain roughly the same number of these as current
loans and serious delinquencies. Information was
compiled on all defaults at each of these institu-
tions over the past ten years so as to insure that
there would be a comparable number of loans in
this status category.
Data collection was undertaken over a period of almost 10 months
during 1978. The data base is "cross-sectional," i.e., the loan status
categories are determined at one point in time, the date of the overdue
reports used to identify delinquencies.
While cross-sectional data was the only means for currents and
delinquencies of initially identifying loans in different status
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categories, information on the status history of each of these loans was
also obtained through review of servicing contacts regarding prior minor or
major delinquencies and, in some cases, default contacts. The importance
of this "contact log" information is the longitudinal perspective that it
provides for any given loan. For example, have "current" loans ever been
delinquent? Do delinquencies or defaults tend to be first time payment
problems or are they more likely to be chronically overdue? Thus, by com-
bining longitudinal and cross-sectional information, loan status could be
evaluated over time as well as at a given point in time.
Additional Data Compiled on Special Program FHA Loans
In addition to the primary data base, a sample of FHA loans made under
a special urban lending program administered by the Boston Banks Urban
Renewal Group (BBURG) were also collected. The BBURG-FHA loans were made
from approximately 1969 to 1971 by a group of large Boston-based savings
banks in one neighborhood in Boston, Mattapan. There were a considerable
number of delinquencies and defaults on loans made under this program.
Subsequently, many Boston area banks were reluctant to participate in urban
reinvestment programs on the grounds that, even though the BBURG loans were
100 percent federally insured, the risk experience and the attendant bad
publicity was such that they did not want to repeat the BBURG experience.
While more recent reinvestment efforts such as Neighborhood Housing
Services (NHS), various city and state-sponsored housing rehabilitation
programs, and lending activities related to the Community Reinvestment Act
may have provided an antidote to the BBURG experience, the legacy of this
program may still cloud reinvestment efforts in moderate income and
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minority neighborhoods.
The response from public officials and neighborhood organizations has
been that they do not want to repeat the BBURG experience either. Frequent
foreclosures and insufficient household resources to maintain properties
can both physically destroy a neighborhood and undermine residents' con-
fidence in the community. However, they argue that much of the delinquency
and default risk under this program may be attributable to the administra-
tion of the program rather than the lending risks in urban neighborhoods
per se. Comparisons have been made between the characteristics of these
special FHA loans and federally insured loans in general.
Data on Neighborhood Characteristics
Data on population and housing characteristics were obtained primarily
from 1970 Census data by zip code for most of the communities in the
region. For two cities, Boston and Lynn, these data were compiled by cen-
sus tract. Census data were supplemented with additional information
obtained from the state Building Commission, registry of deeds information
on home sales, and public mortgage disclosure data from the state Banking
Department. The neighborhood factors for which data were selected included
average household income, 1970;
proportion of existing 2 to 4 family homes built
before 1939; and,
proportion of minority residents, 1970.
The basis for selection of these variables was to obtain the best
measures of neighborhood housing markets possible. Other data such as
trends in property values and general physical condition of the housing
stock would be extremely useful but are not available on any consistent
basis for a sufficient number of communities in the region.
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DATA COLLECTION RESULTS AND PREPARATION FOR ANALYSIS
Data Collection Results
Data collection forms were designed to obtain virtually all pertinent
information for which written records are likely to be maintained by the
mortgage lender. This information can be generally categorized as
Identification Information
These data include loan type, loan status, loan
origination date and so on. Most of these data
items were essential in order to properly classify
the loan. Hence, loans for which these data items
were not available were generally dropped.
Borrower(s) Information
This information includes financial characteristics
such as income (regular earnings, additional earn-
ings, and actual or expected rental income), liquid
assets, installment debt and credit history. It
also includes attributes of the borrower(s) such as
race, age, sex, marital status, or first time
homeowner. Finally, attributes of the wage earner(s)
which may have some financial bearing on their abil-
ity to repay the loan include occupational prestige,
number of years employed at current or previous job,
number of wage earners in the household and their
relative contribution to household earnings.
. Property Characteristics
These include the age of the property, the number
of units (single, two, three or four family), the
purchase price, and property taxes (both at the time
of the mortgage origination and subsequently at the
time of data collection).
. Mortgage Loan Characteristics
These data items included the loan amount applied
for, the bank appraised value of the property serv-
ing as collateral security, the original loan amount
received, and the loan amount outstanding. Other
terms of the loan granted included stated and effec-
tive interest rate, points charged, mortgage insur-
ance program and maturity, premium, where applicable,
and finally the monthly mortgage debt (principal and
interest) required to repay the loan. Additional
information included purpose of the loan (purchase or
refinancing), whether any junior financing by another
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lender was involved to assist the borrower in making
the required downpayment, and the hazard insurance
premium.
Servicing Characteristics
In addition to the above information available from
mortgage application files, considerable data was
compiled from records of any contacts the bank had
with the borrower regarding minor delinquencies or
prolonged delinquencies that had prompted default
warning notices. This information was compiled
separately for (1) contacts made since the most
recent mortgage payment and, thus, applied to the
present delinquent or default status of the loan,
and (2) contacts made on prior delinquencies.
Data Editing
After loan information had been computerized, a series of editing
routines were performed to check on the accuracy and completeness of the
variables in the data base. Major editing tasks included the following:
Missing data
Each variable was reviewed to determine how often
the required information was missing or unknown,
usually because it had not been recorded in bank
files. Certain variables were subsequently elim-
inated for analytical purposes because they were
missing for the majority of loans in the sample.
Out-of-range responses
Variables for which the recorded information was
out-of-range (i.e., unacceptably high or low values)
were flagged, and either corrected or treated as
missing.
Logical inconsistencies
For each loan, the values of two or more variables
were compared to insure that they were consistent
with one another. For example, by law, the amount
of the loan approved by the bank cannot be greater
than the final appraised value (as is, or with
improvements specified as a condition of loan
approval). Such inconsistencies were treated as
missing data for that particular loan.
Once the variables comprising the data base had been fully edited, the
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quality of the data for individual loans was reviewed. Loans were dropped
from the sample if any of the following items were missing:
. loan age (the number of months between the time the
first mortgage payment was made and the date in
1978 when the loan data was collected);
. combined household size (the number of borrowers
and their dependents);
. regular earnings of all borrowers; and,
. monthly mortgage principal, interest and property
tax payments.
Cases which involved absentee landlords, of which there were few, were
also eliminated. Out of a primary sample of nearly 3,800 approved loans
(excluding BBURGs), approximately one-third contained sufficiently complete
and accurate information to be retained for analysis. The distribution of
these loans by loan type and status at the time of sampling is given in
Exhibit B-l. The configuration of variables and combinations of variables
which most commonly eliminated cases collected in the original data sample
are summarized in Exhibit B-2.
An examination of where the data losses occurred in this editing pro-
cess indicated that (1) of the two basic loan types, federally insured loan
cases tended to have more of the data necessary for analysis than did con-
ventional loans, and (2) among the four status categories, defaults tended
to have less of the data necessary. Neither of these patterns were
surprising. Given the extent to which federal insurance and guarantee
programs have historically had detailed application information require-
ments which the originating lender was obligated to obtain from the
borrower, credit bureau, and so on, these loans are more likely to have
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EXHIBIT B-1
NUMBER OF LOANS BY TYPE AND STATUS
Conventional Federally-Insured
Current
Minor Del iquencies
Major Del iquencies
Defaults
TOTAL
Total
120
148
97
101
466
193
251
170
108
722
313
399
267
209
1188
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EXHIBIT B-2
CASES DELETED DUE TO MISSING DATA
Conventional
497aNo Key Variables Missing
Federally-Unsured
756
a
One Key Variable Missing
Earned Income -
Mortgage Debt 2 -
Property Tax 166 100
Debt Ratio 21 13
Loan Age 93 39
Principal, Interest, Taxes - -
Two or More Key Variables Missing
Earned Income Plus Others 221 93
Loanage Plus Others 42 14
[excluding Earned]
2-4 Other Variables 5 4
All Variables Missing 32 29
aSubsequently, some additional cases were dropped on the basis of
either out-of-range responses or logical inconsistencies.
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more extensive information than that collected on conventional loans. Only
recently Massachusetts banks interested in selling mortgages to outside
investors or obtaining private mortgage insurance have had to complete more
extensive applications on conventional mortgages than has been necessary
when they hold these loans through termination or maturity. As for
defaults, given that these loan files are inactive and retained only as
archives, the relative incompleteness of these files as compared with those
of active loans, current or delinquent, is not unusual.
Computed Variables
Based on the initial data obtained, a series of variables were com-
puted either (1) to combine data items might be more useful in the aggre-
gate than separately, e.g., total household income rather than a string of
variables for each source of income and corresponding amount, or (2) to
develop ratios as important relative measures, e.g., mortgage-related debt
to income or bank appraised value to purchase price. These computed
variables included:
Household Characteristics
Among these were combined household size (number of
borrowers plus number of dependents), combined
earned or unearned income, and ratios based on this
information such as regular earnings per capita.
Also included were total installment debt and
the household monthly payment burdens outside the
mortgage. Mortgage-related debt (principal, inter-
est, and property taxes) was also calculated as a
ratio of several different measures of household
income.
Loan Characteristics Related to the Property
These variables include the original loan amount,
the amount applied for, the appraised value of the
property, and the purchase price of the property.
The relationship of these dollar amounts on any
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given loan indicate the extent to which the bank's
assessment of value and willingness to lend matches
the homebuyer's perceptions of reasonable purchase
price and loan amount necessary. Ratios such as
appraised value to purchase price, loan to value
ratio, amount applied for relative to the amount
received, were all computed and examined as possi-
ble determinants of loan type and/or status.
Loan Characteristics Over Time
Most of these variables address "seasoning effects"
through calculations such as age of loan (at the
time of data collection or loan termination, in the
case of defaults), mortgage amount outstanding rela-
tive to the amount received, number of monthly pay-
ments made relative to the total number of payments
to be made from origination to maturity, and so on.
Period of time in which the loan was originated or
defaulted was also calculated as a means of cali-
brating the extent to which historical particulars
of the national or regional economy, governmental
policy vis-a-vis federally insured loans, or bank
modification of appraisal or underwriting prac-
tices might affect bank decision-making on loan
type or the probabilities of delinquency or
default.
Servicing Patterns
Two series of computed variables were developed to
quantify bank servicing history on delinquent and
defaulted loans. One of these series addressed
frequency and type of contact and some of this
information was used to develop a set of dependent
variables on prior delinquency. The other series
pertained to defaults, duration of delinquency
prior to foreclosure notice, date of foreclosure
notice to default, profits versus losses on fore-
closures, and so on. This latter series was devel-
oped to provide indicators of how long loans are
generally delinquent prior to the bank initiating
default proceedings and, once default proceedings
are initiated, the extent to which the lender
recoups the outstanding loan balance or faces a
deficit. It is important to note that sampling
procedures at a point in time are more likely to
capture a delinquency of longer duration than a
more minor one and, thus, delinquency data are
somewhat biased as a result.
After these computed variables were designed, a critical assessment
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was made of the data available. In a few instances, those without suf-
ficient data for each of the factors necessary to derive the computed
variable had to be dropped.
Once these variables were calculated, further assessment was made of
their analytical potential. For example, there was considerable overlap
among some variables such as age of loan defined as number of payments made
to date, time period of origination, and the ratio of the outstanding loan
to original loan amount. Under these circumstances, one variable was
selected on the basis of information available for the greatest number of
cases and for the strongest potential to predict loan type or status
outcomes.
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NOTES TO APPENDIX B
This section is based on a document entitled "Sampling Methodology"
obtained from the Massachusetts Banking Department in conjunction with the
loan data requested under the Freedom of Information Act in December of
1978.
2Loans on larger apartment buildings, new construction loans, home
improvement loans and mobile homes were not sampled. Such loans would have
required different types of information and, as rarer events, it is unlike-
ly a thorough statistical analysis could be done. If a building included
space used for commercial purposes, but also included one to four dwelling
units, the loans were sampled provided that at least 50% of the units could
be considered residential. Condominiums were also included, but did not
number significantly in this sample.
3Loans to absentee owners were ultimately dropped as there were not
many of these loans and basic economic information such as rental income
was not available from the data.
4Conventional loans which have private mortgage insurance were
included in the sample. FHA loans issued under the 203(b) or 223(e)
program were included, while those issued under the 235 or 237 programs
were not. The latter involved income subsidies and would need to be eval-
uated under different criteria.
5In such situations, the lender has either (1) foreclosed with the
intent of selling the property serving as collateral security to recoup as
much of the outstanding loan as possible, or (2) charged-off the loan, by
writing the face value down to little more than one dollar with a note for
the full value still outstanding to the borrower (done in situations where
the value of the property has deteriorated to a point considerably below
the outstanding loan amount such that foreclosure is impractical). For
federally insured loans, the lender may have "assigned" the loan to the
appropriate federal agency to collect on the insurance or guarantee.
6As of June 30, 1978, these savings institutions held 191,303 one-to-
four family conventional loans at $4,911,340,000 outstanding. Federally
insured loans numbered only 33,402 with a total of $1,245,128,000 out-
outstanding.
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APPENDIX C
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES OF BIVARIATE RELATIONSHIPS
OVERVIEW
The relationships between the various borrower, loan, property and
neighborhood characteristics for which data were available were examined to
assess the extent to which any of these characteristics might be related to
the two series of loan outcomes which are the subject of this study. One
of these outcomes is whether a loan applicant was awarded a conventional
mortgage or considered a higher risk applicant and granted a federally
insured mortgage. The second series of outcomes represent loan status,
that is, within each loan type, whether the loan is current, a minor or
major delinquency, or a default.
This series of statistical analyses is viewed as preliminary because
individual mortgage, property and borrower characteristics are considered
one at a time. More detailed analyses, in which the effects of a number of
different characteristics are simultaneously taken into account, are pre-
sented in the following sections. It should be noted that a number of the
preliminary findings discussed here are modified to varying degrees when
other factors are taken into consideration.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS
The differences between these loan types were reviewed through two
types of summary tables. One set is a table of the mean values for the
specific variables along with tests for statistically significant differen-
ces between the means of conventional and federally insured loans. The
other set of tables crosstabulated loan type by categorical breakdowns of
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EXHIBIT C-1
MEANS AND PERCENTAGES FOR SELECTED VARIABLES
BY LOAN TYPE BY ORIGINATION PERIOD
Loans Originated
From 1951 to 1968
CONVEN- FEDERALLY SIGNIF-
TIONAL INSURED ICANC
LEVEL
Loans Originated
From 1969 to 1978
CONVEN- FEDERALLY SIGNIF-
TIONAL INSURED ICANCg
LEVEL
I. HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Regular earnings
per capita monthly
Total household size
Installment debt to
regular earnings (x1OO)
Mortgage debt to regular
earnings (x1OO)
163
6.2
3.7
142
6.1
4.8
20.1 20.6
ns
ns
ns
ns
II. PROPERTY CHARACTERISTICS:
Purchase Price
Appraised value
Appraised value to
purchase price (x100)
Percent of properties
located in suburban
areas
Property ageb
Percent single family
homes
22,868 17,488 .001
22,570 17,368 .001
103.9
83.0
30.1
87.1
99.9
66.3
30.9
69.2
ns
.01
ns
.01
275
5.6
3.7
22.2
255
5.6
5.2
ns
ns
.01
21.9 ns
28,571 25,325 .001
28,765 23,078
104.0
69.9
37.6
72.2
99.9
29.0
38.4
60.5
.001
.01
.001
ns
.001
aSignificant at .05 level or more.bData missing for substantial number of loan cases.
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VARIABLES
EXHIBIT C-1
(Cont.)
MEANS AND PERCENTAGES FOR SELECTED VARIABLES
BY LOAN TYPE BY ORIGINATION PERIOD
Loans Originated
From 1951 to 1968
VARIABLES
CONVEN- FEDERALLY SIGNIF-
TIONAL INSURED ICANCE
LEVELa
Loans Originated
From 1969 to 1978
CONVEN- FEDERALLY SIGNIF-
TIONAL INSURED ICANCE
LEVELa
III. LOAN CHARACTERISTICS:
Original loan amount
received
Loan amount to
appraised value (x1OO)
Maturity period
(in years)
Number of months
originated prior to 1979
Loan age
(months in force)
16,416 16,142
73
23
160
131
ns
93 .001
26 .001
173 .001
153 .001
21,794 21,519
76
23
61
44
93 .001
28 .001
66
53 .001
IV. LENDER CHARACTERISTICS:
Bank deposit size
(in millions of dollars) 244 433 .001 230 512 .001
Percent of banks located
in suburban areas 44.7 23.8 .001 45.8 12.8 .001
Percent of loans granted
by savings banks 59.6 88.3 73.7 89.5 .001
aSignificant at .05 level or more.
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ns
EXHIBIT C-1
(Cont.)
MEANS AND PERCENTAGES FOR SELECTED VARIABLES
BY LOAN TYPE BY ORIGINATION PERIOD
Loans Originated
From 1951 to 1968
VARIABLES
CONVEN- FEDERALLY
TIONAL INSURED
SIGNIF-
ICANCg
LEVEL
4
Loans Originated
From 1969 to 1978
CONVEN- FEDERALLY
TIONAL INSURED
SIGNIF-
ICANC6
LEVEL
V. BORROWER ATTRIBUTES:
Age (in years) 39
Percent male
Percent married
Percent widowed or
divorced
91.5
86.2
6.2
Percent self-employed 8.4
Percent with two or more
wage earners
Percent first time
homeowners
9.6
48.4
34
97.4
91.7
.001
.05
.05
1.5
3.4
28.3
83.5
ns
.001
.001
a
VI. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS:
Mean household income,
1970 13,029 11,094
Percent minority
population, 1970
Percent of structures
built prior to 1939
15.83.2
21
Percent change in pop-
ulation 1970 to 1975 3.6
Bank-financed home
sales, 1975-1978 80
001
001
31 .001
1.2
69
ns
.001
36
91.2
84.1
6.9
14.2
28.3
49.4
34 .01
87.4 ns
85.5
ns
4.9
2.7
46.2
88.8
11,850 10,361
3.3
27
.79
78
12.5
.001
.001
.001
.001
.001
37 .001
-1.3 ns
62 .001
aSignificant at .05 level or more.
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one of the borrower, mortgage, property, or neighborhood factors and then
tested whether there were significant differences in the distribution of
these factors between the two loan types.
Household Financial Characteristics
A number of factors were examined to assess the financial resources of
a household relative to household size and debt burden to be sustained by
these resources. Regular earnings per capita, that is, total monthly wages
divided by the number of persons in the household, were not significantly
different for loans originated in the first time period (1951-1968) but
were significantly different in the second (1969-1978). Total household
size was not significantly different in either time period, thus indicating
that any differences in regular earnings per capita were primarily attribu-
table to the dollars earned rather than the number of persons supported.
Number of wage earners is significantly higher for federally insured
loans during both periods. Between 1969 and 1978, 28 percent of the con-
ventional loans and 46 percent of the federally insured were obtained by
households with two or more wage earners. Prior to 1969, 9 percent of the
conventional and 28 percent of the federally insured loans were issued to
households with multiple wage earners.
Installment debt to regular earnings was slightly higher for federally
insured at 4.8 percent than for conventional borrowers at 3.7 percent in
the earlier period. In the later time period, this debt to income ratio
did not increase on average for conventional loans and increased by less
than one-half of one percent for federally insured.
Finally, the ratio of mortgage-related payments (principal, interest,
- 309 -
and property taxes) to regular earnings was not significantly different for
these loan types in either period. Nor did these ratios change con-
siderably over time. On the loans originated between 1951 and 1969, these
ratios were .201 and .206 for conventvenal and federally insured
respectively; between 1969 and 1978, .222 and .219.
Property Characteristics
One of the most important distinctions between conventional and
federally insured loans was found in the number of units, property value,
and urban or suburban location of the property for which mortgage financing
was obtained. Regarding number of units, both types of loans were granted
on single and two-to-four family homes. The proportion of single family
homes financed by either loan type was higher prior to 1969 as indicated in
Exhibit C-2. After 1969, the proportion of two-to-four family dwellings
increases for both loan types.
The dollar values associated with the property were also significantly
different for these loan types. The higher the purchase price, the bank
appraised value, or the amount of the loan, the greater the likelihood that
a conventional loan was granted. The mean value of the purchase price for
properties financed prior to 1969 was $22,868 for conventionals and $17,488
for federally insured; from 1969 to 1978, $28,571 for conventionals and
$23,325 for federally insured. After 1969, the corresponding mean bank
appraised value was somewhat higher for conventionals. As a result, the
ratio of these bank appraised values to purchase prices indicated that
appraisals on properties where federally insured loans were granted tend to
be slightly below the purchase price.
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EXHIBIT C-2
NUMBER OF UNITS IN PROPERTY FINANCED
BY TYPE OF LOAN RECEIVED
CONVENTIONAL
Prior to 1969 1969 to 1978
86.9% 75.2%
9.5%
3.6%
100.0%
18.7%
6.1%
100.0%
FEDERALLY INSURED
Prior to 1969 1969 to 1978
71.5% 59.7%
14.9%
13.7%
100.0%
21.2%
19.0%
100.0%
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Number of
Units
1
2
3 or 4
Of these measures of property value, bank appraised value exhibits the
strongest relationship with the type of loan received. Within the limited
range of bank appraised values of $10,000 to $40,000 where both types of
loans were granted, the likelihood oi receiving a conventional loan still
increases rapidly as the appraised value of the property increases.
Property location was defined by the population density of an area,
urban with more than 10,000 persons per square mile and suburban with a
density of 10,000 or fewer. Overall, conventional loans were predominantly
in suburban areas, while federally insured loans were relatively evenly
split between urban and suburban areas. However, when examined by key time
periods in FHA history, the distribution is skewed such that prior to 1969,
66.3 percent of the federally insured loans were suburban. However, after
the Housing Act of 1968 wherein Congress mandated the Federal Housing
Administration to actively solicit urban loans, particularly loans to
minority homebuyers and loans in racially integrated neighborhoods
generally, the locus of federally insured loan activity shifts from subur-
ban to urban properties. Possibly as a result of stringent FHA regulations
subsequently introduced to curb servicing abuses by the loan originators
under this urban mandate, the volume of FHA loan activity from 1974 on
appears to have decreased somewhat. Nonetheless, of the loans originated,
an even higher proportion were urban than in earlier periods. These
results are summarized in Exhibit C-3.
Age of property for which information was recorded by the lenders for
only half of all the loan cases, indicated virtually no difference between
conventional and federally insured loans. For these limited number of
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EXHIBIT C-3
PROPERTY LOCATION OF FEDERALLY INSURED
LOANS BY PERIOD OF ORIGINATION
PERIOD OF ORIGINATION
PROPERTY LOCATION
URBAN SUBURBAN NUMBER OF PROPERTIES
Prior to 1968
1968 to 1973
1974 to 1978
31.2%
66.5%
76.0%
68.8%
33.5%
24.0%
250
284
179
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cases, the mean age for both types was 30 years prior to 1969 and 38 years
after 1969.
Loan Characteristics
Loan characteristics are a product of what the applicant household
originally requested measured against what the lender considered a viable
loin. Unless the loan was received on terms identical to those requested,
terms to some extent reflect the lender's risk considerations. For
example, in the previous section on property characteristics, appraised
value for conventionals tended to be higher than the purchase price; for
federally insured, slightly lower. Thus, loan type granted reflects the
lender's assessment of risks associated with the property serving as col-
lateral security. In turn, this appraisal affects the loan amount which
can be granted relative to the appraised value. Time of origination may
also affect the terms of the loan granted as a result of general economic
conditions or changes in underwriting policies of individual lending insti-
tutions or instrumentalities, such as the Federal Housing Administration,
which may affect lenders across the board.
One important characteristic is the loan amount originally received by
the borrower. In both time periods, the differences between the mean con-
ventional and federally insured loan amounts were not significant within
the appraised value range ($10,000 to $40,000) for which both types of
loans were granted.
Loan to appraised value ratios differed significantly in both of these
periods. Conventional loan to value ratios averaged 73 percent in the
loans made prior to 1968 and 76 percent afterwards. The mean value for
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federally insured loans was 93 percent in both periods. These differences
are not surprising given that the federally insured loan programs were
developed to assist homebuyers who did not have the financial resources
required to make a 20 percent downpayment for a conventional loan. The
loan amount generally needed by federally insured mortgage holders was 13
percent above the maximum 80 percent loan to value ratio allowed for a con-
ventional loan during the period studied. 1  In this respect, where the bank
appraised value closely approximated the purchase price, the federally
insured borrowers were self-selected. By law, they were ineligible for a
non-insured mortgage.2 However, if bank appraised value is considerably
below the purchase price, the borrower may have a substantial equity
investment and a loan to value ratio which does not reflect this equity in
full as a downpayment.
Loan maturities, the number of years over which a loan is repaid, were
generally shorter for conventional loans. Conventionals averaged 23 years
for both periods; federally insured, 26 and 28 years respectively.
Overall, there was relatively little variation within each loan type.
Apart from a few conventionals made for less than 20 years, most of the
loan maturities were within a 20 to 30 year range.
Two variables were calculated to place each loan in time. One was
developed so as to gauge origination dates of these loans relative to one
another. This factor, defined as the number of months originated prior to
January of 1979, placed the loan origination chronologically over the past
three decades. The earliest loan origination date in the sample was 1951;
the most recent, 1978. In both time periods, the origination dates for
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federally insured loans were significantly earlier than those for conven-
tional loans.
The second time-related factor calculated was the age of the loan,
that is, the number of months over which mortgage payments had been made
prior to sampling. For current and delinquent loans, this variable was
viiftually synonymous with origination date; however, for defaults, this
time factor was often considerably different. For example, a loan could
have been originated in 1964 and gone into default in 1974. Under the ori-
gination before 1979 variable, this loan would be fifteen years old. How-
ever, under the loan age measure, this loan was in effect for only ten
years (from 1964 to 1974). Again, the age of federally insured loans was
significantly older than conventionals in both time periods. The results
of both these time factors would seem to indicate federally insured loans
are generally held for a longer period of time while conventional loans are
terminated (either paid up or foreclosed) earlier in this term to maturity.
Lender Characteristics
General characteristics of the savings institutions which granted
these mortgages were examined so as to assess and differences in types of
loans originated. In terms of deposit size of the institution, comparing
both time periods, smaller banks were increasingly more likely to have
issued conventional loans while the very largest banks maintained a high
proportion of federally insured loans in the data sampled. The proportion
of each loan type in the mortgage data sampled held by small, medium and
large institutions is summarized in Exhibit C-4. These results were com-
pared with the total portfolio holdings of all Boston area thrift
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EXHIBIT C-4
LOAN TYPE BY DEPOSIT SIZE GROUP
BY ORIGINATION TIME PERIOD
Loans made 1951-1968 Loans made 1969-1978
DEPOSIT SIZE Conventional
Federally
Insured Conventional
$11 to 90 million 54% 46% 76% 24%
$91 to 500 million 26% 74% 50% 50%
Over 500 million 13% 87% 13% 87%
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Federally
Insured
institutions so as to ascertain whether they were peculiar to the sample
data or indicative of general lending patterns. 3 As of June, 1978, of the
total number of real estate loans held by state-chartered thriit institu-
tions in metropolitan Boston, only 11 percent were federally insured. How-
ever, for the ten largest thrift institutions with deposits of $250 million
or:more, 39 percent of their outstanding real estate loans in the metro-
politan area were federally insured. 4  Of the other real estate loans held
by this ten bank group, only 22 percent were conventional loans on one-to-
four family homes. Thus, while the proportion of federally insured loans
has been augmented through sampling procedures, it appears that larger
institutions generally have had proportionately larger holdings of
federally insured loans.5
Urban and suburban bank locations, defined as the city or town in
which the main office of the institution was located, were also compared.
Urban banks, comprised of those with main offices in municipalities with
population densities of 10,000 or more, held over three-fourths of the
federally insured loans in both time periods (Exhibit C-l).
Finally, a third comparison of lender characteristics was made between
savings and cooperative banks as the two types of financial institutions
from which loan data was collected. Given that cooperatives are generally
smaller, it is not surprising that these results correspond to those on
deposit size indicating that most of the federally insured activity was
among the larger savings banks.
Further analyses will be required to assess the extent to which these
loan type differences between institutions are attributable to bank
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characteristics, deposit size or main office location, or to the financial
resources of the households which obtain mortgages from these institutions.
Borrower Attributes
Profiles of the non-financial characteristics of the borrowers under
each loan type were prepared for comparative purposes. Borrower was
defined as the primary wage earner in the applicant household, that is, the
person making the greatest percentage contribution to total household
earnings. Conventional borrowers tended to be both somewhat older and
employed several more years than federally insured borrowers. With regard
to the sex and marital status of the primary wage earner, no important dif-
ferences by loan type were in evidence. The vast majority of primary wage
earners were male and married and, hence, there was little variation within
either loan type. In terms of occupational prestige, in both periods, con-
ventional loans were generally awarded to applicants of higher status
occupations; federally insured, to less prestigious occupations. One
potentially useful factor in distinguishing conventional from federally
insured homebuyers was whether they were first time homeowners or had been
homeowners previously. Given that homeownership has generally served to
provide households with substantial accumulation of capital which, on sale,
can be put toward the downpayment on another home, it is not surprising
that in both time periods federally insured borrowers appear to be more
likely to be first time homebuyers than conventional borrowers. However,
given that roughly one-third of the loans in each time period had no infor-
mation regarding this attribute, firm conclusions cannot be drawn.
Household financial data were not available for other information such as
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rental income and liquid assets with which one could more directly assess
the financial resources available for the downpayment.
Neighborhood Characteristics
Using primarily census data, a comparative picture of neighborhood
characteristics was also prepared. Property location has traditionally
been a consideration in residential mortgage appraisal and underwriting.
For example, in the most recent textbook of the American Institute of Real
Estate Appraisers, the section stressing the importance of neighborhood
evaluation in property appraisal includes the following characteristics on
a checklist:6
Economic: Economic profile of residents.
Social: Population characteristics.7
Physical or Environmental: Conformity of structure;
Age and condition of residences
and other improvements.
Data were obtained for factors which approximated this checklist. The
issue for this first set of preliminary analyses is to assess whether any
of these characteristics differ significantly accordingly to the type of
loan granted. Average household income was somewhat higher for conven-
tionals than federally insured loans in both periods. The proportion of
minorities in the census tract or zip code where the property was located
was considerably higher for federally insured loans. Finally, federally
insured loans were more likely to be found in neighborhoods with older two-
to-four family housing. It should be noted that since the neighborhood
data obtained is as of 1970 or later, it is most applicable in terms of
gauging possible effects on the bank's loan type decision in the later
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period of loan originations.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATUS GROUPS WITHIN EACH LOAN TYPE
Comparisons of the mean values of a variable in each loan status cate-
gory serves several purposes. First, these calculations enable one to
assess whether there are significant differences in the values for loans in
each risk status category. For example, is the fact that defaults are
generally younger loans, with the lowest average loan age, and currents,
older loans with the highest average loan age, significant? That is, are
there important differences between the mean values of the age of the loans
in the current, minor delinquent, serious delinquent, and default
categories. The results of a comparative analysis of mean values, sum-
marized in Exhibits C-5 and C-6, indicate that many of these mean differen-
ces are significant. Highlights of these analyses are summarized below:
Defaults are distinctly the youngest (in terms of the number of months
in effect) for conventional and federally insured loans. However, conven-
tional loan defaults with a mean value of less than three years are con-
siderably younger than federally insured defaults which average almost five
years. The mean values of current, minor and major delinquencies are
generally more comparable. It is interesting to note that minor delin-
quencies, particularly for federally insured loans, are considerably older
than major delinquencies. This indicates that more seasoned loans may
become 30 to 90 days overdue, but are less likely than newer loans to
become seriously delinquent.
Loan-to-value ratio or, conversely, the ratio of the borrower's down-
payment or equity to property value is a commonly used measure of the
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EXHIBIT C-5
MEANS AND PERCENTAGES FOR SELECTED VARIABLES
BY LOAN STATUS AT TIME OF SAMPLING BY LOAN TYPE
VAR IABLES
I. LOAN CHARACTERISTICS:
Original loan amount
received
Loan amount to appraised
value (x1OO)
Maturity period
(in years)
Loan age b
(months in force)
CONVENTIONAL LOAN STATUS
MINOR MAJOR
CURRENT DELINQUENCY DELINQUENCY DEFAULT
24,106
70.4
23.0
69.6
23,876
72.0
23.6
74.0
25,790
76.5
23.1
63.1
24,807
78.8
23.7
33.2
II. HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL
Mortgage debt to
regular earnings (x1OO)
Installment debt to
regular earnings (x1OO)
Regular earnings per
capita (monthly
Total household size
CHARACTERISTICS:
22.2
2.27
315
5.2
21.4
3.52
287
5.9
21.9
5.11
306
5.6
22.9
4.68
260
6.1
ns
.01
ns
.01
aSignificant at .05 level or more.
bResults skewed by the fact that currents and major delinquencies were
matched for this variable in the sampling procedures.
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SIGNIF-
ICANC
LEVEL
ns
.001
ns
.001
VARI BLES
VARIABLES
EXHIBIT C-5
(Cont.)
MEANS AND PERCENTAGES FOR SELECTED VARIABLES
BY LOAN STATUS AT TIME OF SAMPLING BY LOAN TYPE
CONVENTIONAL LOAN STATUS
MINOR MAJOR
CURRENT DELINQUENCY DELINQUENCY DEFAULT
III. PROPERTY CHARACTERISTICS:
Purchase price
Appraised value
Appraised value/
purchase price (x1OO)
Percent of properties
located in suburban areas
Property agec
Percent single family
homes
IV. BORROWER ATTRIBUTES:
Age (in years)
Percent male
Percent married
Percent widowed or
divorced
Percent sel f-employed
Percent two or more
wage earners
Percent first-time
homeowners
35,109
34,852
102.5
77.5
34.3
74.8
36.9
90.0
10.3
2.6
10.3
33.3
51.1
32,533
34,386
105.9
77.6
40.2
76.9
37.9
91.2
6.2
6.2
17.3
25.0
39.4
31,887
33,336
106.2
76.0
31.3
82.3
37.3
95.9
7.2
7.2
18.1
21.6
41.9
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SIGNIF-
ICANCE
LEVELa
31,867
31,673
99.6
76.2
31.0
76.3
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
35.7
88.1
9.0
9.0
19.1
24.8
45.0
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
cData missing for a substantial number of loan cases.
EXHIBIT C-5
(Cont.)
MEANS AND PERCENTAGES FOR SELECTED VARIABLES
BY LOAN STATUS AT TIME OF SAMPLING BY LOAN TYPE
CONVENTIONAL LOAN STATUS SIGNIF-
MINOR MAJOR ICANC
CURRENT DELINQUENCY DELINQUENCY DEFAULT LEVELVARIABLES
V. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS:
Mean household income,
1971
Percent minority
population, 1970
Percent of structures
built prior to 1939
Bank financed home sales,
1975 to 1978
12,884
2.4
24.9
81.1
12,819
2.2
22.2
79.6
12,519
2.7
22.3
79.2
12,318
4.1
24.3
75.4
ns
ns
ns
.001
VI. LENDER CHARACTERISTICS:
Deposit size
(in millions) 234.7 258.0 247.9 193.8 ns
Percent of banks located
in suburban areas 51.7 41.2 50.5 57.4 ns
Percent of loans granted
by savings banks 67.5 78.4 70.1 73.3 ns
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EXHIBIT C-6
MEANS AND PERCENTAGES FOR SELECTED VARIABLES
BY LOAN STATUS AT TIME OF SAMPLING BY LOAN TYPE
FEDERALLY INSURED
MINOR
VARIABLES CURRENT DELINQUENCY
LOAN STATUS
MAJOR
DELINQUENCY
I. LOAN CHARACTERISTICS:
Loan age (months in force) 88.8
Loan amount to appraised
value (x1OO)
Original loan amount
received
93.3
20,650
Maturity period
(in years) 27.4 26.8
II. HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS:
Mortgage debt to
regular earnings (x1OO) 20.7 20.6
Installment debt to
regular earnings (x1OO)
Regular earnings
per capita (monthly)
Total household size
4.46
228
5.7
4.93
185
5.9
27.6
22.1
4.76
234
5.6
26.1 .001
21.7
5.78
193
5.9
ns
ns
.001
ns
III. PROPERTY CHARACTERISTICS:
Percent single
family homes 65.4
Purchase price
Appraised value
Appraised value/
purchase price (x1OO)
Percent of properties
located in suburan areas
Property agea
22,415
22,279
98.8
42.1
33.7
74.6
20,231
19,950
100.5
59.3
31.9
60.6
21,861
21,581
99.9
32.9
37.5
41.1 .001
18,337 .001
18,273 .001
99.9
25.9
41.0
ns
.001
ns
aSignificant at .05 level
DEFAULT
SIGNIF-
ICANC
LEVEL
120.9
92.9
18,582
76.2
93.1
20,126
59.3
94.6
17,185
.001
ns
.001
or more.
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EXHIBIT C-6(Cont.)
MEANS AND PERCENTAGES FOR SELECTED VARIABLES
BY LOAN STATUS AT TIME OF SAMPLING BY LOAN TYPE
FEDERALLY INSURED'
MINOR
VARIABLES CURRENT DELINOUENCY
IV. BORROWER ATTRIBUTES:
Age (in years)
Percent male
Percent married
Percent widowed or
divorced
Percent self-employed
Percent two or more
wage earners
Percent first-time
homeowners
35.2
91.2
89.1
2.1
1.1
47.2
86.8
32.7
92.4
90.8
4.8
3.5
33.1
85.3,
LOAN STATUS
MAJ OR
DELINQUENCY
33.6
87.6
84.5
4.2
3.1
37.6
82.1
SIGNIF-
ICANC
DEFAULT LEVEL
34.2
90.7
83.3
5.6
4.0
39.8
92.8
.01
ns
ns
ns
ns
.05
ns
V. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS:
Mean household income,
1970 10,790
Percent minority
population, 1970 8.6
Percent of structures
built prior to 1939 34.2
Bank-financed home
sales, 1975-1978 66.9
11,273
10.2
29.4
72.2
10,392
14.9
37.8
60.6
9,303
32.1
43.5
48.5
.001
.001
.001
.001
VI. LENDER CHARACTERISTICS:
Deposit size
(in millions) 544.5 449.2 526.7 412.4 .001
Percent of banks located
in suburban areas 9.8 25.9 14.1 14.8 ns
Percent of loans granted
by savings banks 90.7 88.8 89.4 89.8 ns
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lender's risk exposure. The results of this analysis indicate that,
indeed, among conventional loans, the higher the initial equity investment
of the borrower, the lower the risk to the lender. The mean loan-to-value
ratio for conventional defaults is 79 percent; current loans and minor
delinquencies 77 percent or less. Results for federally insured loans are
not significant, as these mortgages generally have very high loan-to-value
ratios.
Among the household financial characteristics, the mortgage debt to
income ratios appeared to vary little between status groups. Lenders
appear to generally adhere to the standard of mortgage-related debt income
ratios of .25 or less. While these results are not statistically
significant, the fact that this underwriting standard appears to be applied
fairly rigorously is noteworthy.
Regular earnings per capita, the dollars earned relative to the size
of the household supported by these earnings, was used to assess income
effects on mortgage status. Generally, current loans and serious
delinquencies have the highest monthly earnings per capita ($315 and $306
for conventionals and $228 and $234 for federally insured loans); minor
delinquencies and defaults, the lowest ($287 and $260 for conventionals and
$185 and $193 for federally insured loans). This result may be partially
attributable to the fact that currents were matched to serious delin-
quencies on the basis of loan type and period of origination. Again, given
the major changes in the relative value of household income in the past
three decades, it will be important that final analyses control for the
date of origination or age of loan so as to take these historical factors
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into account. Finally, it is important to note that while regular earnings
per capita appears to differ significantly by status category, the absolute
measures of household income and combined household size, i.e., number of
wage earners plus total number of dependents, are not significant. Thus,
categorical underwriting criteria based on absolute measures of income or
household size would appear to be unwarranted. Wage earnings relative to
household income, however, will be tested to assess the strength of this
variable in predicting loan status.
Installment debt to regular earnings ratio is an indicator of monthly
debt payments over and above the mortgage. In all cases, current loans
have the lowest ratios, particularly for conventional loans which average 2
percent. Ratios of 4 percent or more are found among conventional major
delinquencies and defaults and in all federally insured loan status
categories. While these percentages appear small, monthly debt payment
requirements can have a substantial effect on the household's ability to
meet all of its financial obligations.
Of the property characteristics, bank appraised value of the property
serving as collateral security of the mortgage loan is generally higher,
relative to the purchase price, for conventional loans than federally
insured loans. For conventional loans, the mean bank appraisal value in
all but the default category was higher than the homebuyer's stated
purchase price, that is, greater than 1.00. For federally insured loans,
the mean appraisal was generally slightly below the purchase price. In
terms of actual appraised values, conventionals were higher with means
ranging irom $31,673 (defaults) to $34,386 (minor delinquencies, which were
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slightly higher on average than current loans). These mean differences
among federally insured loans ranged from $18,273 (defaults) to $22,279
(currents). It will be important in subsequent analyses to examine the
effects of these dollar differences after controlling for dates of origi-
nation, particularly given the importance of the changing value of the dol-
lar during the past several decades in which these loans were originated.
Despite past emphasis by some appraisal and underwriting manuals on
the age of the property, this information was not collected on many of the
loans (44 percent of the federally insured cases with otherwise sufficient
data for multivariate analysis; 43 percent of the conventional cases) and,
for those cases where the data was available, there was no significant dif-
ferences in property age by loan status for either conventional or
federally insured loans.
Number of units has often been used as an industry measure of loan
risk, based on the assumption that single-family houses are the least
risky; two family, next; and three- or four-family the highest risk. The
results of this analysis indicated mixed patterns. Any differences in the
percentage of single-family homes in each status category were insignifi-
cant for conventional loans. Among federally insured loans, minor
delinquencies had the highest proportion of single-family homes; current
and major delinquencies, the next; and defaults, the lowest.
Contrary to conventional wisdom in some segments of the mortgage
lending industry, multiple wage earner households showed less propensity to
delinquency or default for conventional and federally insured loans. Age
of primary wage earner was insignificant for conventional loan status and
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marginally significant for federally insured loans. For conventional
loans, occupational prestige appeared to be related to loan status, with
borrowers from higher prestige occupations having less propensity to delin-
quency and default, but this relationship did not hold for federally
insured loans. For each of these variables, it will be important to
corntrol for household financial information such as earnings per capita in
order to assess whether these borrowers' attributes have any incremental
explanatory value or simply serve as proxies.
Several characteristics, proportion of minority residents, older two-
to-four-family units, and average 1970 household income in the census tract
or zip code where the property is located, do not appear to influence the
status of conventional loans, but do seem to bear some relationship to the
status of federally insured loans. Further analysis should indicate
whether, after controlling for various financial characteristics of the
households, these factors remain significantly different by status.
Of the lender characteristics, differences in the deposit sizes of
banks holding loans in each status group are insignificant for conventional
loans. However, smaller banks tend to have a greater proportion of
defaults on federally insured loans. As discussed in subsequent analyses,
this may be attributable to the fact that smaller banks tend to assign
federally insured loans to financially riskier borrowers while larger banks
have tended to apply federally insured loans more broadly.
While none of these results is conclusive, each breakdown is a useful
indicator of the distribution of the variable within each loan status cate-
gory and the extent to which the variable is related to status categories.
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SPECIAL ANALYSES OF KEY VARIABLES
Loan Status by Age of Loan
As discussed in the previous section, more "seasoned" loans have less
tendency towards serious delinquency or default than newer loans. Within
this general pattern, there appear to be distinct changes over time as well
as some differences between conventional and federally insured loans which
warrant further discussion.
Previous studies, based on FHA loans, have concluded that there is a
"honeymoon" period during the first two years in which relatively few loans
default (e.g., Armstrong, 1977). However, these default data indicate that
over the past decade in metropolitan Boston defaults tend to occur in the
first two years on conventional loans. Among federally insured loans, the
likelihood of default peaks in the fourth and fifth years. After the fifth
year, the likelihood of default gradually declines for both types of loans.
None of the loans 16 years or older were defaults.
The distribution of age of loans sampled in each status group is sum-
marized by loan type in Exhibit C-7. It is important to note that given
that the sampling methodology paired current loans with those seriously
delinquent on the date of data collection, the loan age distribution of
current loans cannot be considered representative of all loans on which
payments were current. The age of those loans which were minor delinquen-
cies at the time data were collected indicates that loans older than five
years are more likely to experience minor delinquency problems. Thus, it
appears that older loans fall in arrears but are less likely to become
serious delinquencies or defaults.
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EXHIBIT C-7
LOAN AGE BY LOAN STATUS GROUPS
(CONVENTIONAL AND FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS)
0-2 2-5 >5-10 >10-15 >15 0-2 2-5 >5-10 >10-15 >15
0-2 2-5 >5-10 >10-15 >15
Age of Loan (in years)
Conventional
Federally Insured
0-2 2-5 >5-10 >10-15 >15
Age of Loan (in years)
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DEFAULTS
The history of serious delinquencies by loan age is worthy of note.
These loans either had been overdue by more than 90 days but avoided
default through repayment in the past or were major delinquencies at the
time of data collection. To some extent, one might expect that the longer
a loan has been outstanding, the higher the probability that it will have
some history of delinquency. However, the data available do not indicate
these increasing frequencies over time. The proportion of conventional
loans with some history of serious delinquency increases slightly from 34
percent of the loans outstanding for two years.or less to 57 percent of
those outstanding for eight to ten years. In subsequent time periods,
however, these proportions decline. Federally insured loans dip from 64
percent of the loans outstanding for two years or less to 46 percent of the
loans in the subsequent time period, and manifest proportionate increases
for most of the following years. These unexpected patterns may be par-
tially attributable to the inadequacies associated with the historical
information on prior delinquencies discussed in the following subsection on
loan servicing patterns. Another possible explanation is that this
expected pattern of increasing probabilities may be applicable only for
minor delinquencies. That is, while most loans may be more than thirty
days overdue during the life of the loan, serious delinquencies of more
than ninety days may not be commonly experienced. Unfortunately, data were
generally not available on servicing contacts made on minor delinquencies.
Even for serious delinquencies or defaults, both of which were clearly
minor delinquencies at some point, this information was not recorded.
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Loan Servicing Patterns
Once a loan has been granted, the type and frequency of contact that
bank personnel may have with the borrower, particularly in the course of
any minor delinquencies, may have a significant effect on the ultimate sta-
tus of the loan. As discussed in earlier sections, banks may differ con-
siderably as to how different types of loans (e.g., conventional versus
federally insured, owner-occupied versus absentee-owned) are serviced.
Moreover, individual banks may differ in terms of how often delinquent bor-
rowers are contacted, the nature of that contact, how quickly the bank for-
wards the delinquent loans to staff or outside attorneys for foreclosure
proceedings, and so on.
In the data compiled by the Banking Department, an effort was
apparently made to quantify and categorize the nature and frequency of con-
tact with the individual borrowers, particularly for contacts regarding
prior delinquencies. Given the extent to which written records may not
reflect the full servicing history of the loan, this information was ini-
tially evaluated for the status of the loan at the time of data collection
(as opposed to a prior delinquent status of the loan). This preliminary
evaluation indicated that most, but not all, defaults had some servicing
records--reminder notices, foreclosure warnings, etc. Over one-third of
the major delinquencies had no record of any contact and again as many had
record of a contact regarding their ninety day arrears but none prior to
this time. Many minor delinquencies had no record of any servicing
contact.
Thus, delinquency records may be relatively incomplete. Nonetheless,
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for those loans where servicing records are available, those contact
histories give some historical perspective on the delinquency experience of
each loan. To what extent have those loans which were "current" at the
time of data collection always been current, or are there indications that
these loans have previously been delinquent? To what extent have minor and
major delinquencies or defaults been delinquent, paid up, and then lapsed
into delinquency again? Exhibit C-8 summarizes the patterns of the "worst"
contact--overdue by less than 90 days, more than 90 days, or threatened
with foreclosure--made by the lender prior to the last date on which a loan
was current. Briefly, the data in this table may be summarized as follows:
. One-half of all the loans sampled had no prior delinquency
contact.
. Less than 10 percent of the loans sampled as current in
either conventional or federally insured categories had
a recorded history of contact by the lender for reasons
of delinquency.
Among minor delinquencies, 58 percent of the conventionals
and 73 percent of the federally insured had been delinquent
before and many of these had been seriously delinquent or
received default warnings before. Major delinquencies
indicate similar patterns.
Defaults indicate a somewhat lower prior propensity to
delinquency than the delinquencies.
Only 50 percent of the conventionals and 62 percent of the
federally insured loans had a recorded history of delinquency
or default contact by the lender.
In sum, in this cross-sectional data sample, it appears that currents have
by and large been current since their origination, but minor and major
delinquencies and defaults tend to have a mixed history or having pre-
viously been in various delinquency status categories.
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EXHIBIT C-8
SUMMARY OF "WORST" CONTACT MADE PRIOR TO DATE THROUGH WHICH PAID
CONVENTIONAL LOANS
"Worst" Contact
No Prior contacts
Pre-90 day contact
Post-90 day contact
Default notice
TOTAL
Sample Size
SCurrent
98.3%
0.8%
0.8%
Mi nor
Delinquency
42.2%
9.5%
32.0%
--- 16.3%
100.0% 100.0%
(120) (147)
Major
Delinquency
38.1%
2.1%
30.9%
28.9%
100. 0%
(97)
Default
49.5%
3.0%
26.7%
20.8%
100.0%
(101)
Current
91.7%
1.6%
FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS
'Mi nor
Delinquency
26.7%
8.8%
4.7% 45.4%
2.1%
100. 0%
(193)
19.1%
100.0%
(251)
Major
Delinquency
24.7%
4.7%
Default
39.3%
6.5%
38.8% 20.6%
31.8% 33.6%
100.0% 100.0%
(170) (107)
CA)
(-AJ
FHA LOANS MADE UNDER THE BOSTON BANKS URBAN RENEWAL GROUP (BBURG) PROGRAM
A comparison of certain characteristics of FHA loans made under the
BBURG program in the late 1960's and early 1970's in Boston with other
federally insured loans approved by the same banks is presented in Exhibit
C-9. While borrower attributes are quite similar for these two groups of
loan recipients, there are a number of important differences with respect
to property and risk-related factors.
Measures of property value--purchase price, appraised value, and the
amount of the loan--were, on the average, $4,000-$5,000 lower for BBURG
loans than for other federally insured mortgages, although these figures
may be somewhat inflated due to earlier origination dates. BBURG reci-
pients had less monthly income per household member and a higher percentage
of that income devoted to housing costs than ordinary FHA/VA loans approved
by these banks. Loan amounts averaged over 97 percent of the bank's ap-
praised property value on BBURG loans, indicating extraordinary low
downpayments.
Given the objectives of the BBURG program--to provide mortgages for
less affluent borrowers, particularly minorities who wanted to purchase
homes in several neighborhoods in Boston-these differences are not
surprising. However, because of the special nature of the BBURG program,
loans made under this program have been deleted from the study's data base
prior to conducting major analyses.
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EXHIBIT C-9
MEANS AND PERCENTAGES FOR SELECTED VARIABLES FOR FHA
LOANS MADE UNDER THE BBURG PROGRAM COMPARED WITH
OTHER FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS MADE BY THE SAME BANKS
FHA-BBURG LOANS
OTHER FEDERALLY
INSURED (FHA, VA)
SIGNIFICANCE
LEVELb
I. HOUSEHOLD FINAN
Regular earnings per
capita (monthly)
Total household size
Installment debt to
regular earnings
Mortgage debt to
regular earnings
CIAL CHARACTERISTICS:
192
5.8
5.2
24.2
II. PROPERTY CHARACTERISTICS:
Purchase price 17,705
Appraised value
Appraised value to
purchase price
Percent of properties
located in suburban areas
Property age
Percent single family homes
III. LOAN CHARACTERISTICS:
Original loan amount
received
Loan amount to appraised
value
Maturity (in years)
Months originated prior
to 1979
Loan age (months in force)
17,633
99.96
48.0
16.1
17,105
97.1
28.9
100.3
59.0
- 238 -
VARIABLES
257
5.5
5.2
22.1
.001
ns
ns
.05
22,782
22,557
100.00
.001
.001
ns
.00119.8
38.6
55.1
.01
.001
21,166 .001
.001
.001
.001
93.9
27.7
62.6
51.9
aNote that all BBURG loans were made by large Boston-based banks in one
Boston neighborhood.bSignificant at .05 level or more.
.05
EXHIBIT C-9
(Cont.)
MEANS AND PERCENTAGES FOR SELECTED VARIABLES FOR FHA
LOANS MADE UNDER THE BBURG PROGRAM COMPARED WITH
OTHER FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS MADE BY THE SAME BANKS
VARIABLES
IV. LENDER CHARACTERISTICS:
Deposit size (millions)
Bank location
Percent savings banks
FHA-BBURG LOANS
599
loo. 0a
98.9a
OTHER FEDERALLY
INSURED (FHA, VA)
581
100.0
92.4
SIGNIFICANCE
LEVELa
ns
ns
.01
V. BORROWER ATTRIBUTES:
V. BORROWER A TTRIBUTES:
Age (in years)
Percent male
Percent married
Percent widowed/divorced
Percent self-employed
Percent with two or more
wage earners
37.0
82.4
78.4
10.2
34.2
85.4
84.2
.01
ns
ns
ns
ns
ns
6.0
2.62.4
43.5 47.7
Percent first time
homeowners 90.1 89.3 ns
VI. NEIGHBORHOOD CHARACTERISTICS:
Mean household income,
1970 8,041 10,074 .001
Percent minority population,
1970 44.8 14.9 .001
Percent of structures 2 to 4
family units built prior to
1939 54.4 39.4 .001
aNote that all BBURG loans were made
Boston neighborhood.
by large Boston-based banks in one
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NOTES TO APPENDIX C
1Ongoing statutory and regulatory changes may permit higher loan to
value ratios for conventional financing without any insurance requirements.
2By and large, these statutory requirements were enacted in the
1930's. Equity, or the percentage downpayment made by the homebuyer, is an
indicator of the lender's risk exposure. If the homeowner's initial
investment is one-fifth of the bank appraised value of the property, the
property must depreciate by that amount before the bank's investment is
inadequately secured. In other words, as long as the resale value of the
property is greater than the outstanding loan balance, the bank should be
able to recoup its investment through foreclosure and resale of the
property.
3See Appendix B for a discussion of the stratified sampling procedures
used which deliberately increased the data collection of federally insured
loans over that which would have been collected through a random sample of
loans.
4These data were obtained from the Mortgage and Deposit Disclosure
Directory issued by the Massachusetts Banking Department.
5It should be noted that this may also be indicative of the lending
policies of some smaller institutions which grant only conventional loans
and require downpayments as high as 30 to 40 percent. This precludes
financing for those households who need lower downpayment loans. Policies
such as these also preclude conventional financing at 20 percent down.
6American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers. Appraising the
Single-Family Residence. Chicago: A.R.E.A., 1978:90.
7This most recent edition of the textbook includes the following
caveat: "...The appraiser should avoid reliance on the racial, religious,
or ethnic characteristics of the residents. Racial and other ethnic fac-
tors are not reliable predictors of value trends and use of such factors by
the appraiser in neighborhood analysis can be misleading." AIREA, 1978:85.
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APPENDIX D
STATISTICAL TABLES ON
METROPOLITAN BOSTON DATA
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EXHIBIT D-1
CORRELATIONS, MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
LOAN TYPE ANALYSIS
LOANS ORIGINATED 1951-1968
Correlation Matrix
(N = 322)
()(2) (3) (4) (5)
Variable
I Basic Equation
Typea
Months originated prior to 1979
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x100)
Appraised value/purchase price (x100)
Appraised value (in dollars)
-. 128
.106
-. 135
.135
.464
-. 235
-. 109
-. 049
-. 247
.155
-. 011
.304
-. 009
-. 024 .210
Mean .208 169.7 145.3 4.5 100.5 18,662
Standard Deviation .407 37.9 80.3 6.4- 8.6 5,122
II Additional Significant Variablesb
Deposit size of bank
Number of units (single
vs. 2-4 family)
Marital status (widowed
or divorced)
-. 214
-. 166
-. 077
.015
-. 145
-. 024
.091
.137
.022 -. 167
.118 -. 078
-.027 -.007 -.115
-. 053
.001
-. 183
-. 079
.046
acoded 1 = conventional, 0 = federally-insured.
bMatrices calculated with all additional variables and, hence, this information is based on only 233 cases.
Reduction in cases also attributable to the fact that runs included only through 1967 and, hence, loans
originated in 1968 omitted from these calculations.
(1)
(2)(3)
(4)
(5)(6)
ro3
(7)(8)
(9) .100
(6) - (7) - (8) - (9)
EXHIBIT 0-2
CORRELATIONS, MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
LOANS ORIGINATED 1951-1968
Correlation Matrix
(N = 589)
Variable
I Basic Equation
Typea
Months originated prior to 1979
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x1OO)
Appraised value/purchase price (x1OO)
Appraised value (in dollars)
-. 070
.086
-. 151
.118
.396
-. 280
-. 026
-. 106
-. 254
-. 039
-. 045
.207
.035
-. 040 .071
Mean .348 63.7 265 4.6 101.3 25,235
Standard Deviation .477 30.5 153 6.2 16.5 7,182
II Additional Significant Variablesb
(7) Deposit size of bank
(8) Self Employed
-. 471
.236
.258
.003
.093
.032
.052 -. 079
.038 -. 023
acoded 1 = conventional, 0 = federally-insured.
bMatrices calculated with all additional variables. Calculations included loans
originated in 1968 and, hence, total number of cased reduced only to 579.
(1)(2)
(3)(4)
(5)(6)
L.3
-. 196
.157 -. 174
(1) - (2) - (3) - (4) (5) (6)
EXHIBIT D-3
CORRELATIONS, MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
LOAN STATUS ANALYSIS
CONVENTIONAL LOANS
Status Outcome Correlation Matrix
(N = 446)
Probability of:a
Being
Ever receiving seriously
Risk factor Default default notice delinquent
I Basic Equation
90 days or
more delinquent
at sampling
30 days or
more delinquent
at sampling
(1)(2)
(3)(4)
5)
Age of loan (in months)
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x1OO)
Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x1OO)
Refinanced loan
Loan amount/appraised value (x100)
-. 292
-. 068
.078
.052
-. 050
.191
-. 167
-. 121
.076
.035
-. 081
.221
-. 073
-. 115
.099
.013
.095
.264
-. 219
-. 054
.147
.051
.056
.236
-. 088
-. 085
.152
.002
.144
.159
Mean .224 .339 .576 .433 .735
Standard Deviation .418 .474 .495 .496 .442
II Additional Significant Variablesb
(7) Occupational Prestige .029
a'lBad" loans for each outcome were coded 1 and "good" loans were coded 0.
bMatrices calculated with all additional variables and, hence, this information is based on only 321 cases.
I
EXHIBIT D-4
CORRELATIONS, MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
LOAN STATUS ANALYSIS
CONVENTIONAL LOANS
Risk Factor Correlation Matrix(N = 446)
Risk factor
I Basic Equation
Age of loan (in months)
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x1OO)
Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x1OO)
Refinanced loana
Loan amount/appraised value (x1OO)
-.314
-. 136
-. 118
-. 007
-. 155
-. 014
-. 219
-. 063
-. 014
.111
.111
.078
.007
.054
(6) (7)
-. 277
Mean 60.9 288 3.8 22.1 .20 74.1
Standard Deviation 51.6 211 6.4 8.2 .40 13.6
II Additional Significant Variablesb
(7) Occupational Prestige
W,
.133 .145 .020 -. 070 .016 -. 032
aCoded 1 if a loan was refinanced and 0 if it was not.
bMatrices calculated with all additional variables and, hence, this information is based on only 321 cases.
(1)(2)
(3)
(4)
5 6
() (2) (3) (4) (5)
EXHIBIT D-5
CORRELATIONS, MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
LOAN STATUS ANALYSIS
FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS
Status Outcome Correlation Matrix
(N = 667)
Probability of:a
Ever 90 days or 30 days or
Ever receiving seriously more delinquent more delinquent
Risk factor Default default notice delinquent at sampling at sampling
I Basic Equation
(1) Age of loan (in months) -.215 -.067 -.068 -.257 -.045
(2) Regular earnings per capita -.060 -.068 -.031 .036 -.092
(3) Installment debt/regular earnings (x100) .065 .043 .105 .063 .068
(4) Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x1OO) .041 .065 .039 .093 .035
(5) Refinanced loan .010 -.032 -.019 .020 -.000(6) Loan amount/appraised value (x1OO) .079 .054 .059 .043 .006
Mean .153 .295 .616 .378 .729
Standard Deviation .360 .457 .487 .485 .445
II Additional Significant Variablesb
(7) Single Family Home -.212 -.165 - -. 197 -
(8) Deposit Size -.121 -.134 - - -
(9) Percent Minority Population .273 .236 .172 - .141
(10) Age (of Borrower) - - - - -. 138
a"Bad" loans for each outcome were coded 1 and "good" loans were coded 0.
bMatrices calculated with all additional variables and, hence, this information is based on only 589 cases.
EXHIBIT D-6
CORRELATIONS, MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
LOAN STATUS ANALYSIS
FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS
Risk Factor Correlation Matrix
(N = 667)
Risk factor
I Basic Equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
(1) Age of loan (in months)
(2) Regular earnings per capita -.458
(3) Installment debt/regular earnings (x1OO) -.092 .022
(4) Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x100) -.075 -.222 .075
(5) Refinanced loana .019 .022 -.006 -.031
(6) Loan amount/appraised value (x100) -. 068 -. 006 .034 .095 -. 243
Mean 93.4 210 5.0 21.0 .016 93.3
Standard Deviation 65.7 129 6.3 7.6 .128 6.9
II Additional Significant Variables
(7) Single Family Home .130 -.079 -.058 -.388 .021 -.047
(8) Deposit Size -. 195 .142 .005 .040 -. 066 .330 -. 039
(9) Percent Minority Population -. 022 -. 004 .016 .152 .060 .079 -. 392 .071
(10) Age (of borrower) .031 -. 046 .035 .021 .242 -. 103 -. 016 .021 .118
aCoded 1 if a loan was refinanced and 0 if it was not.
W.
EXHIBIT D-7a
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
LOANS ORIGINATED FROM 1951-1968
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING CONVENTIONAL LOAN
BASIC EQUATION
Explanatory variable
Months originated prior to 1979
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x1OO).
Appraised value/purchase price (x1OO)
Appraised value
Constant
00
ni q~ i nr-TT
b
.0003,6
-. 00009
-. 00796
.00179
.00004
-. 52850
standard
error
~00056~-
.00027
.00321
.00240
.00000
F
.41
.12
6.15
.55
69.06
2 R 2 = .233
R (adj.) = .221
F = 19.199
N = 322
b
-. W06
-. 001
-. 079
.010
.000
-5.521
standard
error
.005
.002
.032
.019
.000
2.218
Goodness of fit x =
df =
p =
I I
F
T25-
.08
6.07
.28
40.59
6.20
255.15
316
.995
OLS LOGIT
EXHIBIT D-7b
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
LOANS ORIGINATED FROM 1951 - 1968
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING CONVENTIONAL LOAN
Basic Equation with Additional OLS
Significant Variables standard
b error F
Explanatory variable
Months originated prior to 1979 -.00042 .00063 .453
Regular earnings per capita .00043 .00029 2.245
Installment debt/regular earnings (x100) -.00551 .00338 2.654
Appraised value/purchase price (x100) -.00265 .00266 0.993
Appraised value .00003 .00000 54.491
Number of units (single or 2-4 family) -.09670 .03043 10.099
Marital status (widowed or divorced) .36358 .11427 10.123
Deposit size of bank -.00027 .00008 12.403
Constant .10073
R2 = .317
R2 (adj) = .293
F = 12.992
N = 233
EXHIBIT D-8a
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
LOANS ORIGINATED FROM 1969 - 1978
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING CONVENTIONAL LOAN
Basic Equation OLS LOGIT
standard standard
b error F b error F
Explanatory variable
Months originated prior to 1979 .00064 .00063 1.04 .003 .003 .77
Regular earnings per capita .00005 .00012 .17 .000 .001 .24
Installment debt/regular earnings (x100) -.01057 .00289 13.37 -.068 .018 13.67
Appraised value/purchase price (x100) .00290 .00109 7.01 .017 .007 5.22
Appraised value .00003 .00000 99.35 .000 .000 74.62
Number of units (single or 2-4 family) -.60506 .03043 10.099
Constant -. 09670 -. 5.783 .943 37.59
L1
R2 = .186 Goodness of fit x2 = 641.90
R2(adj) = .179 df = 582
F = 26.571 p = .043
N = 589 N = 589
EXHIBIT D-8b
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
LOANS ORIGINATED FROM 1969 - 1978
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY OF RECEIVING CONVENTIONAL LOAN
Basic Equation with Additional OLS
Significant Variables standard
b error F
Explanatory variable
Months originated prior to 1979 -.00114 .00049 5.401
Regular earnings per capita .00010 .00010 1.023
Installment debt/regular earnings (x1OO) -.00832 .00250 11.092
Appraised value/purchase price (x1OO) .00150 .00095 2.487
Appraised value .00001 .00000 94.959
Number of units (single or 2-4 family) -.09670 .03043 10.099
W Self-Employed .21426 .06065 12.480
Deposit size of bank -.00070 .00006 152.259
Constant .22106
R2 = .437
R2(adj) = .430
F = 63.205
N = 579
EXHIBIT D-9
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
CONVENTIONAL LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT
OLS
1~ * I
Risk Factor
Age of Loan (in months)
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x1OO)
Mortgage debt regular earnings (x1OO)
Refinanced Loan
Loan amount/appraised value (x1OO)
Constant
(/3
N
standard
b error
.00040
.00010
.00295
.00238.
.04912
.00145
-. 00266
-. 00035
.00182
-. 00180
-. 03265
.00395
.23474
R2
R2 (adj)
F
N
F
45.38
13.31
.38
.58
.44
7.38
.135
.123
11.371
446
LOGIT
standard
b error
-. 026
-. 003
.014
-. 013
-. 101
.032
-1.453
.004
.001
.018
.017
.173
.012
1.096
F
36.28
12.62
.59
.64
.34
6.92
1.76
Goodness of fit x2 = 396.16
df = 439
p = 930
N = 446
(r 2 change of .02 or more) for this status outcome.
_____________________________ 4 I
aNo additional variables were significant
EXHIBIT D-10a
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
CONVENTIONAL LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY THAT DEFAULT NOTICE WAS EVER ISSUED
L S
tL tOI
Risk Factor
Age of Loan (in months)
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x1OO)
Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x100)
Refinanced Loan
Loan amount/appraised value (x100)
Constant
standard
b error
.00046
.00011
.00341
.00275
.05680
.00168
-. 00185
-. 00044
.00321
-. 00262
-. 06113
.00600
.19020
R2
R2(adj)
F
N
F
16.38
15.22
.88
.91
1.16
12.74
.101
.089
8.225
446
__ _ _ _ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ V
LOGIT
stan ard
b error
-.010
-. 003
.018
-. 015
-. 146
.035
-1.850
Goodness of fit
.003
.001
.016
.014
.147
.010
.907
x2 = 519.34
df = 439
p =.005
N = 446
w,
F
15.10
13.91
1.19
1.08
.98
12.04
4.16
EXHIBIT D-10b
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
CONVENTIONAL LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY THAT DEFAULT NOTICE WAS EVER ISSUED
OLS
standard
Risk Factora b error F
Age of Loan -.00118 .00058 4.120
Regular earnings per capita -.00037 .00015 6.344
Installment debt/regular earnings (x100) -.00431 .00393 1.199
Mortgage debt regular earnings (x1OO) -.00399 .00367 1.184
u Refinanced Loan -.06294 .07103 0.785
Loan amount/appraised value (x1OO) -.00515 .00199 6.723
Occupational prestige -.00753 .00252 8.912
Constant .20701
aThese runs included additional variables added in earlier steps (single
family; Multiple Wage Earner; Self-Employed). None of these were
significant, but their inclusion has some effect on the values presented in
this table. Summary statistics for this equation were as follows:
R2 = .101; R2 (adi) = .072; F = 3.481; N = 321.
EXHIBIT D-11
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
CONVENTIONAL LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY THAT LOAN
(N = 446)
WAS EVER SERIOUSLY DELIQUENT
OLS
Risk Factor
Age of Loan (in months)
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x1OO)
Mortgage debt regular earnings (x100)
Refinanced Loan
Loan amount/appraised
(constant)
value (x100)
standard
b error
.00047
.00012
.00353
.00285
.05876
.00174
-. 00063
-. 00031
.00406
-. 00283
.20123
.01077
.08627
F
1.79
7.06
1.32
.99
11.73
38.28
R2 = .118
R2 (adj.) = .106
b
-. 003
-. 001
.019
-. 013
-. 494
.051
-2.321
LOGIT
standard
error
.002
.001
.017
.013
.147
.009
.788
Goodness of fit
a No additional variables were significant (r2 change of .02 or more) for this status outcome.
(A)
U,
F
1.75
6.52
1.24
1.02
11.26
31.28
8.67
= 551.94
= 439
=.000
x2
df
p
EXHIBIT D-12
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
CONVENTIONAL LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY THAT LOAN 90 DAYS OR MORE DELIQUENT AT SAMPLING
t -
Risk Factor
Age of Loan (in months)
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x100)
Mortgage debt regular earnings (x100)
Refinanced Loan
Loan amount/appraised value (x100)
(constant)
OLS
stanaara
b error
-. 00201
-. 00027
.00700
-. 00128
.12384
.00819
.00298
R2(adj.)
F
N
.00047
.00012
.00353
.00284
.05875
.00174
F
18.13
5.35
3.94
.20
4.44
22.17
R2 =.123
=.111
= 10.231
= 446
LOGIT
stanaara
b error
-. 010
-. 001
.032
-. 007
.307
.042
-2.244
.002
.001
.016
.014
.138
.009
.834
Goodness of fit x2
df
a No additional variables were significant (r2 change of .02 or more) for this status outcome.
WA(3n
F
16.46
5.17
3.86
.26
4.96
19.70
7.23
549.69
439
000
446
EXHIBIT D-13
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
CONVENTIONAL LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY THAT LOAN 30 DAYS OR MORE DELIQUENT AT SAMPLING
Risk Factor
Age of Loan (in months)
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x100)
Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x1OO)
Refinanced Loan
Loan amount/appraised value (x100)
(constant)
WA
L,
-4
b
-. 00071
-. 00022
.00761
-. 00297
.19635
.00615
.38618
R2 =
R2 (adj)
F:
N:
OLS
standard
error
.00043
.00011
.00320
.00258
.05331
.00158
F
2.74
4.58
5.65
1.32
13.57
15.16
.089
.076
7.126
446
LOGIT
standard
b error
-. 003
-. 001
.056
-. 015
.637
.032
-. 164
.002
.001
.023
.014
.183
.009
.774
F
2.25
3.80
5.66
1.17
12.10
13.39
.04
Goodness of fit x2 = 473.20
df = 439
p =.125
N = 446
a No additional variables were significant (r2 change of .02
OLS
i i
or more) for this status outcome.
EXHIBIT D-14a
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT
Risk Factor
Age of Loan (in months)
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x100)
Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x100)
Refinanced Loan
Loan amount/appraised value (x100)
(constant)
00I/3
tn,
OLS
standard
b error
-. 00168
-. 00058
.00241
-. 00174
.10355
.00355
.12305
R2
R2 (adj)
F
N
.00024
.00012
.00215
.00187
.10850
.00201
F
50.59
22.83
1.26
.86
.91
3.13
=.085
=.077
= 10.254
= 667
LOGIT
standard
b error
-. 017
-. 006
.020
-. 019
.518
.039
-2.127
.003
.001
.017
.016
.425
.021
2.068
Goodness of fit x2= 504.63
df =.660
p = 1.000
N = 667
F
43.47
19.72
1.42
1.42
1.48
3.42
1.06
EXHIBIT D-14b
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT
OLS
standard
Risk Factora b error F
Age of loan (in months) -.00220 .00027 68.963
Regular earnings per capita -.00092 .00015 38.497
Installment debt/regular earnings (x100) -.00032 .00219 0.022
Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x1OO) -.00788 .00229 11.811
Refinanced loan .10249 .11065 0.858
u-i Loan amount/appraised value (x100) -.00707 .00211 11.255
Single-family Home .09305 .02384 15.235
Deposit size -.00027 .00006 22.276
Percent minority population .00334 .00071 22.279
constant -.29944
a This run included all additional variables. Thus, the statistics presented
are not comprehensive as they summarize results only for those factors which were
significant. The summary statistics for this equation were as follows:
R2 = .243; R2 (adj.) = .215; F = 8.790; N = 569.
EXHIBIT D-15a
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY THAT DEFAULT NOTICE WAS EVER ISSUED
Risk Factora
Age of Loan (in months)
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x100)
Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x100)
Refinanced Loan
Loan amount/appraised value (x100)
(constant)
CA)
O9)
b
-. 00077
.00040
.00230
.00149
-. 06196
-. 00254
.17266
R2 =z
R2 (adj) =
F=
N=
OLS
standard
error
.00031
.00016
.00281
.00245
.14320
.00264
F
6.21
6.27
.67
.37
.19
.93
.021
.021
2.326
667
b_
-. 004
-. 002
.011
.006
-. 188
.015
-1.873
LOGIT
standard
error F
.002
.001
.013
.012
.401
.014
1.416
6.16
6.11
.69
.31
.22
1.08
1.75
Goodness of fit x2 = 795.20
df = 660
p =.001
N = 667
EXHIBIT D-15b
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY THAT DEFAULT NOTICE WAS EVER ISSUED
OLS
standard
Risk Factora b error F
Age of loan (in months) -.00119 .00036 11.171
Regular earnings per capita -.00054 .00020 7.487
Installment debt/regular earnings (x100) -.00075 .00294 0.065
Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x1OO) -.00315 .00312 1.016
Refinanced loan -.07425 .14899 0.248
Loan amount/appraised value (x100) .00647 .00283 5.219
Single-family Home -.08350 .05122 2.657
Deposit size -. 00035 .00008 19.651
Percent minority population .00431 .00095 20.553
constant .01248
a This run included all additional variables. Thus, the statistics presented
are not comprehensive as they summarize results only for those factors which
were significant. The summary statistics for this equation were:
R2 = .139; R2 (adj.) = .107; F = 4.412; N = 569.
EXHIBIT D-16a
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY THAT LOAN WAS SERIOUSLY DELINQUENT
Risk Factor
Age of Loan (in months)
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x100)
Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x1OO)
Refinanced Loan
Loan amount/appraised value (x100)
(constant)
(\3
OLS
standard
b error F
-. 00066
-. 00027
.00747
-.00030
-.0 1236
.00335
.37948
.00033
.00017
.00300
.00261
.15162
.00281
4.02
2.58
6.20
.01
.011.42
R2 = .022
R2 (adj) = .013
F = 2.422
N = 667
LOGIT
standard
b error F
-.003 .001 3.98ninni 9 r%
.034
.002
-.028
.014
-.533
.014
-011
.321
.012
1.157
Goodness of fit x2
df
p
N
6.12
.02
.01
1.32
.21
= 873.64
= 660
=.000
= 667
EXHIBIT D-16b
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY THAT LOAN WAS SERIOUSLY DELINQUENT
OLS
Risk Factor
Age of Loan (in months)
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x100)
Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x100)
Refinanced Loan
Loan amount/appraised value (x100)
Percent minority population
(constant)
standard
b error
.00038
.00021
.00316
.00336
.16038
.00305
-. 00100
-. 00048
.00452
-. 00425
.01562
.00704
F
6.841
5.137
2.038
1.062
0.009
5.335
.00377 .00102 13.590
.08960
0)o
a This run included all additional variables. Thus, the statistics presented
are not comprehensive as they summarize results only for those factors which
were significant. The summary statistics for this equation were as follows:
R2 = .110; R2 (adj.) = .078; F = 3.397; N = 569.
EXHIBIT D-17a
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY THAT LOAN WAS 90 DAYS OR MORE DELINQUENT AT SAMPLING
OLSt .d
Risk Factor
Age of Loan (in months)
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x1OO)
Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x100)
Refinanced Loan
Loan amount/appraised value (x1OO)
(constant)
(A)
a.'
standard
b error
.00032
.00016
.00290
.00253
.14660
.00272
-. 00214
-. 00033
.00259
.00308
.13716
.00183
.39545
R2
R2 (adj)
F
N
F
45.08
3.96
.80
1.48
.88
.46
= .080
= .071
= 667
LOGIT
standar
b error
-. 010
-. 002
.012
.013
.327
.009
-. 116
Goodness of
.002
.001
.013
.011
.325
.013
1.210
fit x2
df
p
N
F
40.63
4.06
.53
1.35
1.01
.48
.01
= 827.65
= 660
=.000
= 667
EXHIBIT D-17b
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY THAT LOAN WAS 90 DAYS OR MORE
DELINQUENT AT SAMPLING
OLS
standard
Risk Factora b error F
Age of Loan (in months) -.00234 .00037 39.556
Regular earnings per capita -.00054 .00021 6.758
Installment debt/regular earnings (x100) -.00162 .00307 0.279
Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x1OO) -.00223 .00321 0.482
Ln Refinanced Loan .23176 .15500 2.236
Loan amount/appraised value (x100) .00595 .00295 4.057
Single-family home
(constant)
.07057 .03340 4.465
-. 07714
a This run included all additional variables. Thus, the statistics presented
are not comprehensi e as they summarize results only for those factors which
were significant( r change of .02 or more). The summary statistics for this
equation were as follows: R2 = .171; R2 (adj.) = .140; F = 5.673; N = 569.
EXHIBIT D-18a
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY THAT LOAN WAS 30 DAYS OR MORE DELINQUENT AT SAMPLING
Risk Factor
Age of Loan (in months)
Regular earnings per capita
Installment debt/regular earnings (x1OO)
Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x100)
Refinanced Loan
Loan amount/appraised value (x1OO)
(constant)
OLS
standard
b error
00009
-. 00029
.00494
.00066
.00977
.00022
.72341
R2
R2 (adj)
F
N
.00030
.00016
.00275
.00240
.13920
.00258
.014
.005
1.516
667
F
.08
3.54
3.22
.08
.01
.01
______________________________ a
LOGIT
standard
b error
.001
-. 001
.027
.004
.022
.001
.969
.002
.001
.015
.012
.356
.013
1.228
F
.11
3.39
3.20
.10
.00
.01
.62
Goodness of fit x2 = 770.81
df = 660
p =.000
N = 667
cn
OLSi
EXHIBIT D-18b
REGRESSION AND LOGIT ANALYSIS STATISTICS
FEDERALLY INSURED LOANS
DEPENDENT VARIABLE = PROBABILITY THAT LOAN WAS 30 DAYS OR MORE
DELINQUENT AT SAMPLING
OLS
standard
Risk Factora b error F
Age of Loan (in months) -.00042 .00035 1.404
Regular earnings per capita -.00034 .00020 2.968
Installment debt/regular earnings (x100) .00282 .00290 0.943
to Mortgage debt/regular earnings (x100) -. 00047 .00304 0.024
Refinanced Loan .09272 .14673 0.399
Loan amount/appraised value (x100) .00254 .00279 0.826
Percent minority population .00342 .00094 13.318
Age (of borrower) -.00902 .00243 13.732
(constant) .66972
a This run included all additional variables. Thus, the statistics presented
are not comprehensive as they summarize results only for those factors which
were significant. The summary results for the equation were as follows:
R2 = .118; R2 (adj.) = .086; F = 3.671; N = 569.
